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[]
[null,null,null,"Document #","Status"]
[null,null,null,"LCA-15-G","FINAL"]
[null,null,null,"Author(s)"]
[null,null,null,"Joseph Kenny"]
[]
[null,null,null,"Subsystem/Office"]
[null,null,null,"System Engineering, Performance and Safety Assurance"]
[null,"Document Title"]
[null,"LSST Camera Hazard List"]
[]
[null,"Purpose"]
[null,null,"This document collects the bottoms-up hzard elements of all LSST Camera subsystems, and compiles them into a single log; see LCA-14, the Preliminary Hazard Analysis for source information on the hazard assessmenet process and tables on sheet 3"]
[null,"Definitions"]
[]
[]
[]
[null,"References"]
[null,"LCA-31","System Safety Program Plan"]
[null,"LCA-14","LSST Camera Preliminary Hazard Analysis"]
[]
[null,"Change Log"]
[]
[]
[]
[null,null,"Revision A"]
[null,"2011-10-13","Released. See LCN-001."]
[null,"2011-04-07",">Bumped to Draft 11; added hazards associated with the assembly, integration, and test process (102-112) and assigned them to a new group: \"I&T;\""]
[null,"2011-02-09",">Added Intro sheet to capture tracked changes, including between drafts; up'd to Draft 10; added feedback from all subsystem with changes shown in red;  new hazards are identified with red Hazard ID numbers; none of the changes affected the CPS protection protocol list; added statistics at bottom of list to show summary numbers for various categories"]
[null,null,"Revision B"]
[null,"2011-10-17","Released. See LCN-005."]
[null,"2011-10-14",">Finalized for CD-1 Review;  reorganized Change Log; status changed to \"Review\""]
[null,"2011-10-04",">Bumped to Draft 12; overall update of the hazard list with a reassessment of risk values, revised table to include revison date for each row"]
[]
[null,null,"Revision C"]
[null,"2013-04-22",">MN started new revision to capture updates to hazards during preliminary design phase; fixed conditional formatting to correct color-coding of risk categories"]
[null,"2013-04-23",">Fixed data validation drop-down box references; updated Sci Raft hazards based on input from Vincent Riot"]
[null,"2013-08-28",">Updated shutter hazards"]
[null,"2014-04-16","Released. See LCN-1085."]
[null,null,"Revision D"]
[null,"2014-08-29","Renumbered all hazards with system identifier. General update from subsystems to reflect current design in prepraration for CD-2.\n\nEdited individual hazards to add references to related hazard report documents where appropriate. Added a reference to the Camera mechanical standard LCA-280 where appropriate. Add quantitative definitions to Hazard Probability Level tables in Sheet 3, Hazard Assessment Tables.\n\n"]
[null,"2014-09-09","Release per LCN-1121."]
[null,null,"Revision E"]
[null,"2015-07-08","Updated and added hazards. I&T and service hazards moved O&SHA Hazard Tab. (See Changelog tab starting on line 329)\n\n"]
[null,null,"Revision F"]
[null,"2015-07-14","Updated and added hazards. I&T and service hazards moved back to Hazard List tab. Column added to Hazard List to tag O&SHA hazards. Added tab for obsoleted items and moved obsoleted items to that tab. See Changelog tab starting on line 506.\n\n"]
[null,null,"Revision G"]
[null,"2017-08-18","Updated and added hazards. Column added to Hazard List to record date-of-last-modification. Added and edited many hazards and mitigations to Camera Body/Shutter, Cryostat, and I&T Subsystems. Retired four items. Rev-G changelog items start on line 1100.\n\n"]
[null,null,"Revision H"]
[null,null,"Current working registry (last update 6/12/2018)\n"]

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[]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"'1.  Intro, Def''s, Change Log'!B10","v":"LSST Camera Hazard List"},null,null,null,null,null,null,"LCA-15-H "," -- WORKING DRAFT"]
[null,null,"2.  Camera Hazard List"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"Print Date: ",{"$f":"NOW()","v":"2018-06-12T13:59:09.760"}]
[null,{"$f":"MAX(B8:B213)+1","v":1},"next available number"]
[null,null,null,"Hazard Identification",null,"Un-Mitigated Hazard and Risk Level",null,null,null,null,null,"Mitigation Method / Updated Hazard and Risk Level",null,null,null,null,null,"Verification"]
[null,"#","Subsystem","Type","Title","Hazard Description","Severity","Probability","Risk Value","Risk Category","Mitigation Strategy","Mitigation Description","Severity1","Probability1","Risk Value1","Risk Category1","Verif Method","Verification Plan","Protection System?","O&S hazard?","Commissioning?","Camera or TS?","LCA-140 #","Date modified","Mitigation Descr. Scrubbed?","Verific. Descr. Scrubbed?","Verif. Accepted?","Completed on LCA-140?","Verif Doc."]
[null,"CB&M-001","Shutter","Mech","Leading edge blades collide","IF leading-edge blades collide during activation THEN collision could damage the blades, L3 lens, or filter",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety device","1. Use switches to only enable blade motion when the opposing blade stack is in its parked position\n2. Use Hall-Effect switches for gating blade timing, ensuring that blades stay within their prescribed trajectory",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1- Run protection certification tests to verify that limit switches only enable motion when blades are parked \n2- Run protection certification tests to verify that that gating logic works correctly","CPS",null,null,"C",null,"2017-05-30"]
[null,"CB&M-002","Shutter","Mech","Blades collide","IF a timing belt breaks, THEN blades within a stack could collide and damage the blades",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","1. Design blades such that blade brackets always contact first and not the blades;\n2. Add a catch block on the blade root to ensure that leading and trailing blades do not fall away from each other if a belt brakes; this prevents damage to the chicane feature",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1- Inspect blade final position and confirm that brackets  contact before blades\n2- Inspect blade final position and confirm that stop-blocks contact before blades",null,null,null,"C",null,"2017-05-30"]
[null,"CB&M-003","Shutter","Mech","Blade scrapes against L3","IF a blade flutters or vibrates during actuation, THEN it could strike and damage the L3 lens or filter",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","Design, fabricate, and test Measure natural frequency of blades using a correlated FEA model to show that worst-case dynamic deflection is within allowed dynamic envelope stiff and light blades to reduce dynamic vibration and flutter;\n",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test"," Review blade tests\n ",null,null,null,"C",null,"2017-05-30"]
[null,"CB&M-004","Shutter","Mech","Pinching","IF shutter is actuated during access or servicing, THEN blade or carriage could injure personnel by pinching  while it is closing",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","1- Employ lock-out and E-stop at shutter during servicing; \n2- Add maintenance mode with low-speed, jogging, and max blade speed limits",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","1. Verify that LOTO procedures are in place and performed during non-maintenance mode servicing\n2. Confirm that maintenance mode is used for shutter servicing access when LOTO cannot be employed",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2017-05-30"]
[null,"CB&M-005","Cam Bdy","Struc","Housing over-pressure","IF the camera housing, shroud, and L1-L2  enclosure structure is overpressurized, THEN  pressure could damage the structure",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","1. Use a pressure-relief device to ensure that camera volume pressure never exceeds its limits\n2. Use a pressure switch to turn off purge flow if pressure increases",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1. Test relief valve to verify that it operates correctly\n2. Test pressure switch to verify that it operates correctly",null,null,null,"C",null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"CB&M-006","Cam Bdy","Struc","Housing structural failure","If a single housing or back flange element fails, THEN the failure could result in large-scale housing damage or collapse (The camera housing and back flange provide the primary structural support for the camera",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Eliminate hazard","1. Use redundant bolted connections to ensure that no single failure can endanger the camera structure;\n2. Design back flange and housing with conservative factors of safety, even under seismic loads, per LCA-280, \"Camera Mech Std's\"",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","1. Review FEA analysis used set bolt limit loads; analyze pre-load per LCA-280;\n2. Verify bolt torques during assembly;\n3. Perform proof load test to demonstrate that structure can carry max loads ",null,null,null,"C",null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"CB&M-007","Cam Bdy","Env","Camera volume contamination","IF any one of the housing seals fails, THEN a leak could  could introduce contaminants into the camera volume and damage hardware inside",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","1- Lightly pressurize camera volume to ensure that leaks only outward \n2-  Monitor internal pressure and flow rate of purge gas to identify leaks",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1- Test purge system to demonstrate ability to hold min over-pressure;\n2- Test pressure gauge and flow meter to verify that they have sensitivity to detect a leak of a min leak rate",null,null,null,"C",null,"2017-11-01"]
[null,"CB&M-009","Shutter","Mech","Leading blade overruns end of travel","IF leading-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation,THEN it could damage blades and possibly the L3 lens or filter",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety device","1. Use Hall-Effect switches for gating blade timing, ensuring that blades stay within their prescribed trajectory;\n2. Add garage plates to contain blades at their end of travel",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1- Run protection certification tests to verify over-travel switch function\n2-Confirm garage plate functionality","CPS",null,null,"C",null,"2017-11-01"]
[null,"CB&M-010","Shutter","Mech","Trailing blade overruns end of travel","IF trailing-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation, THEN it could damage blade and the L3 lens",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","1. Position trailing blade in Z so it clears L3 completely\n2. Add blade stop in parked position to limit motion in the event of belt breakage",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1. Measure blade Z-location to confirm it clears L3 lens;\n2. Confirm that blade stop bounds blade motion in its parked position",null,null,null,"C",null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"CB&M-011","Cam Bdy","Env","Dynalene leak in purge unit"," IF a Dynalene line leaks, THEN dynalene  could contaminate many camera components (Dynalene coolant is used for cooling purge gas air in the purge unit, located in the utility trunk)",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety feature","1. Use high-integrity fittings for Dynalene lines\n2. Make the purge unit cabinet water-tight;\n3. Employ a leak detector in UT auxilary electronics",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1. Leak test purge unit Dynalene lines;\n2. Verify that purge unit is water-tight;\n3. Test functionality of leak detector","CPS",null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-04",1,1]
[null,"CB&M-012","Cam Bdy","Env","Purge unit reheater overcurrent","IF a purge gas re-heater in the purge unit shorts to ground or over-heats, THEN it could start an electrical fire in the utility trunk",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety device","1. Add over-current protection on the heater circuit;\n2. Add smoke detectors in Utility Trunk \n3-Interlock smoke detection to shut down power supplies via CPS ",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","1-Review overcurrent protection (FDR)\n2-Accept smoke detection manufacturer unit certification\n3-Review CPS logic","CPS",null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-22",1,1]
[null,"CB&M-013","Cam Bdy","Env","Purge system failure or filter failure","IF the purge system fails, THEN it could damage CB hardware by blowing contaminated air into it",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Procedure, training","1. Place supply-line pressure switch upstream of filter (to shut down upon overpressure)\n2. Monitor and trend airline flow",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1-Verify pressure switch operation\n2-Verify trending monitor","CPS",null,null,"C",null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"CB&M-014","Cam Bdy","Mech","Injury/damage from falling/\ndropped  equipment","During material handling with lifting equipment, equipment may fall or otherwise impinge on worker, resulting in injury",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Procedure, training","Strictly adhere to procedures during material handling operations (lift plans, critical lift plans, SOPs, LCAs, eTraveler)",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Audit proper use of procedures, hoist operator certifications",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"CB&M-015","Shutter","Mech","Shutter damages L2 or L3 lens during removal","IF the shutter unit is mishandled during servicing removal  operations, THEN the shutter unit could  scratch a lens or damage an L2 strut",2,"B",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":5},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"High"},"Procedure, training","1. Use extraction rail to hold the shutter and control its motion during removal and insertion\n2. Define prescribed motions and use process controls to ensure that they are used\n",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","1. Test the extraction and insertion degrees of freedom with dummy lenses;\n2. Assure field use of process control procedures",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"CB&M-016","Cam Bdy","Mech","Damage from mismating of hardware","Equipment is damaged during mating (bolting, epoxying, etc.) of hardware ",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Procedure, training","Strictly adhere to procedures during material mating operations (dry fitting, lift plans, critical lift plans, SOPs, LCAs, eTraveler)",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Audit proper use of procedures, hoist operator certifications",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2017-05-30"]
[null,"CCS-001","CCS","Control","Erroneous commands","Erroneous commands could result in unsafe behavior by various camera components",1,"A",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":1},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"High"},"Safety device","Implement Camera Protection System independent of CCS to prevent erroneous commands from causing hazardous responses by subsystem hardware",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Generate erroneous commands under controlled conditions to verify that responses are controlled","CPS",null,null,"C",null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"CmCam-001","Com Cam","Struc","Shipping damage","IF Com Cam is mishandled during transport, THEN Camera hardware could be damaged",null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,null,null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,null,null,"Y","Y",null,null,"2018-05-10",1,1,null,null,"Telecope has responsibility over Camera/ComCam during transport"]
[null,"CmCam-002","Com Cam","Mech","Falling compressor cabinet during installation","IF compressor cabinets are mishandled during installation under  TMA THEN workers nearby  could be crushed",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Procedure, training","1-Develop a lift plan to assure safe cabinet installation\n2-Use only trained material-handling equipment operators",null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},"Audit","1-Review lift plan \n2-Verify operator training and certification",null,"Y","Y",null,null,"2018-05-10",1,1]
[null,"CmCam-003","Com Cam","Matl's","Quad box Dynalene leak"," IF a Dynalene line (in quad box) leaks, THEN dynalene  could contaminate  camera components ",null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,"1. Use high-integrity fittings for Dynalene lines\n2. Employ a leak detector in UT auxilary electronics",null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,"1. Leak test purge unit Dynalene lines;\n2. Test functionality of leak detector","CPS","Y","Y",null,null,"2018-05-10",1,1]
[null,"CmCam-004","Com Cam",null,"Pinch from shutter","IF shutter actuates during installation or maintenance THEN worker could be injured by moving blades",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},null,"1- Employ lock-out and E-stop at shutter during servicing; \n2- Add maintenance mode with low-speed, jogging, and max blade speed limits",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},null,"1. Verify that LOTO procedures are in place and performed during non-maintenance mode servicing\n2. Confirm that maintenance mode is used for shutter servicing access when LOTO cannot be employed",null,"Y","Y",null,null,"2018-05-10",1,1]
[null,"CmCam-005","Com Cam",null,"Pinch from slider","IF slider actuates during installation or maintenance THEN worker could be injured by moving filter-changer parts",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","Employ engineered safety features  to protect personnel, lock-out/tag-out provisions, emergency shut-off",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},null,"Inspect safety systems during verification testing; include in periodic inspection and PM plans",null,"Y","Y",null,null,"2018-05-10",1,1]
[null,"CmCam-006","Com Cam",null,"Catastrophic loss of active vibration control units","IF more than one Cryotel AVC is running on ComCam THEN vibration could damage the AVCs ",null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,null,null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,null,null,"Y","Y",null,null,"2018-05-10",1,1]
[null,"CmCam-007","Com Cam",null,"Active vibration control units coolant leakage","IF Cryotel AVC cooling-system leaks THEN coolant could damage nearby electronics",null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,"Use high-integrity fittings for coolant lines",null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null," Leak test purge unit coolant lines;",null,null,"Y",null,null,"2018-05-10",1,1]
[null,"CmCam-008","Com Cam",null,"ComCam contamination from vent after turbopump-/power- failure","If a Turbopump fails or loses power, THEN  backventing of room air to ComCam could contaminate cryostat",null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,"1-ensure all elements, specifcally valves and actuators, fail to a safe conditon, presumably \"closed\" in all cases.\n2-ensure critical valves are interlocked to pressure gauging such that inadvertant operation cannot vent the cryostat",null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,"1- Verify isolation valve function and failure state\n2-Complete testing on vacuum control systeem / logic to ensure no improper operation of critical valves or actuators.","CPS","Y","Y",null,49,"2018-05-10",1,1]
[null,"CmCam-009","Com Cam",null,"Uncontrolled venting of ComCam cryostat","IF there is a catastrophic loss of cryostat vacuum due to loss of cryo vacuum system function, THEN contaminants and water vapor  could be introduced into the cryostat and damage the detector",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},null,"1-Use double O-ring seals with an intermediate vacuum groove or conflat flange at all bolted joints.  \n2-Monitor and pump interstitial groove vacuum levels (CCS)\n3-Use gate valve  normally closed with  spring closure upon deenergization \n4- Monitor pressures on both sides of gate valve and use  logic to only open gate valve in known safe configurations (CPS, CCS)",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},null,"1-Leak chack each O-ring in all double\nseals\n2-Verify groove vacuums are monitored and pumped\n3-Confirm gate valve auto-closure under loss of power and air\n4-Certify gate valve operation in all combinations of pressure differential","CPS",null,"Y",null,"108 A-E","2018-05-10",1,1]
[null,"CmCam-010","Com Cam",null,"Raft Tower outside min/max operating temp range","Thermal excursion exceeeds allowable limits resulting in damage to electronics or sensors ",null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,"Employ automated shutdown/safe-state system timed after automated notifications for temperature excursion (More at Hazard Report LCA-10795)",null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,"Test notification and shutdown automations","CPS","Y","Y",null,107,"2018-05-10",1,1]
[null,"CmCam-011","Com Cam",null,"Injury from moving TMA","IF TMA moves with workers nearby, THEN TMA may strike/crush workers ",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},null,"Employ control of hazardous energy lockout of telescope motion axes",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},null,"Confirm worker use of  lock-out of telescope drives during access",null,"Y","Y",null,null,"2018-05-10",1,1,null,null,"Telescope hazard"]
[null,"CmCam-012","Com Cam",null,"Asphyxiation after refrigerant release in a tight space","If refrigerant is released in a tight space (Maypole area) THEN worker injury/death may occur by oxygen deficiency ",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},null,"Equip tight spaces containing refrigerant lines with fixed oxygen deficiency monitor",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},null,"Test ODM periodically, verify alarm setpoint",null,"Y","Y",null,null,"2018-05-10",1,1,null,null,"Telescope hazard; may be an OSHA confined space"]
[null,null,"Com Cam",null,null,"(All I&T hazards go to commissioning/ComCam)",null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,null,null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,null,null,"Y","Y",null,null,"2018-05-10"]
[null,null,"Com Cam",null,null,"(All Refrigerator hazards seen in Cryo- go to commissioning [Minus the load for CamCam])",null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,null,null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,null,null,"Y","Y",null,null,"2018-05-10"]
[null,"Crft-001","Crnr Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower/RCM drops below min operating temp","IF a raft tower or RCM module drops below min operating temp THEN low temps could damage electronics",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Modules mounted to Cryo/Cold Plate heat sinks, which establish min possible temp; test modules to cold-survival temp. (More in Hazard Report LCA-10795)",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Test","Run verification tests on temp gradients of as-installed modules; run under-temp survival tests on all modules",null,null,null,"C",null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Crft-002","Crnr Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower/RCM exceeds max operating temp","IF a raft tower or RCM module rises above max operating temp THEN heat could damage electronics",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Modules mounted to Cryo/Cold Plate heat sinks with multiply-redundant connections; Plates actively controlled test modules to hot-survival temp. (More in Hazard Report LCA-10795)",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Test","Run verification tests on contact resistance and temp gradients up as-installed modules; run over-temp survival tests on all modules",null,null,null,"C",null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Crft-003","Crnr Raft","Struc","Dropping a raft","IF one of the three springs or attaching  pins fails THEN raft could drop onto L3 or swing it over into neighboring sensors, damaging sensors or optics",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Design uses compression springs and shear pins in double-shear with high margins",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Proof test all shear pins; procure pins and spring with material certifications",null,null,null,"C",null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Crft-004","Crnr Raft","Struc","Drop raft at load transfer","IF the cam-lock that holds the pre-load spring in place to the FEE cage or grid releases inadvertently THEN  raft could drop onto L3 or swing it over into neighboring sensors, damaging sensors or optics",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Procedure, training","Develop robust design and assembly procedures that can tolerate misalignment and be inspectable",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Test the procedure on prototype raft towers, then inspect engagement of cam on all raft towers as they are integrated",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Crft-005","Crnr Raft","Struc","Drop sensor off raft","IF a ceramic threaded stud fractures, THEN a sensor could drop onto L3, damaging the sensor or L3",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Eliminate hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and designed with high margins of safety",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Process control","Run strength qualification tests on the stud design, and on the full sensor mech assembly",null,null,null,"C",null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Crft-006","Crnr Raft","Elec","Over-current damage to sensor or FE board","IF a sensor is subjected to overcurrent or an uncontrolled short to ground THEN these conditions could damage a sensor",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Over-current protection in power supplies protect sensor from short",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Run qualifiation test on system","CPS",null,null,"C",null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Crft-007","Crnr Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","IF raft tower electronics are subjected to electrostatic discharge THEN ESD could damage raft electronics",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller and GREB/WREB outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller  or  GREB/WREB at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure control - per LCA-10794.",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Verify safety feature operates",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Crft-008","Crnr Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from materials","Materials or parts with volatile compounds outgas off vapor that plates onto sensors, possibly damaging them permanently",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Test all parts, materials, and processes used for raft tower assembly; acceptance test all completed assemblies against outgassing standards. Hazard Report LCA-10741",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Audit","Verify by QA records that all parts being used have passed tests; check AT test records to ensure that assembly meets outgassing req's",null,null,null,"C",null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Crft-009","Crnr Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by by-products of component failure","An electronic component fails catastrophically, contaminating the sensors",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Eliminate hazard","Use only electronic parts tested to failure and compared against outgassing standards;\nLimit max power available to actual needs",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Verify by QA records that all parts being used have passed destructive tests",null,null,null,"C",null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Crft-010","Crnr Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by cross-contamination","Contaminants are introduced to a raft tower and subsequently contaminate sensors",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Establish cleanliness criteria and qualify all processes and facilities",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Monitor work to assure adherance to cleanliness requirements",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Crft-011","Crnr Raft","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable and REB",4,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":18},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Procedure, training","Assembly procedures ensure proper connector mating and handling",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system.",null,"Y",null,"TS",null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"Crft-012","Crnr Raft","Elec","On board circuit failure","On board circuit internal failure could cause damage to a sensor ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","Reliability issue. Addressed by  design,  calculation and lifetime testing of on board circuits - addressed in electronics reliability plan.",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,null,"C",null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"Crft-013","Crnr Raft","Elec","GREB/WREB power on sequence","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed;\nActivating the Back Substrate (step 5) before the Bias voltages (step 2) are set to minimal values may cause damage to the sensors.\nDrains are \"off\" and BS is \"On\" could cause a destructive current to appear;\nOutput Drain and Output Diode :  always + with respect to FSS. Forward biasing of junction will cause damage of sensor;",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747\nBS enable switch on the REB board allows application of BS after stable conditions satisfied - firmware and/or hardware control.\nAdd GND diode to output drain and output diode to prevent these potentials from going very negative (>0.3V)",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","See Hazard Report 10747",null,null,null,"C",null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Crft-014","Crnr Raft","Mech","Sensor loses thermal contact to raft","Failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat, in particular the guide sensors when read at 9Hz.",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and will have lock washer, or equivalent to prevent loosening.",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Run thermal cycling tests on the full sensor mech assembly",null,null,null,"C",null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Crft-016","Crnr Raft","Elec","Input voltage out of range","An input voltage to the electronics board is over-voltage and  damages the FPGA, components on the board, or sensor(s)",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Over-voltage proctection on power supplies",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify that over-voltage protection is operational","CPS",null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-05"]
[null,"Cryo-001","Cryostat","Press/Vac","Uncontrolled venting of cryostat","IF there is a catastrophic loss of cryostat vacuum due to loss of cryo vacuum system function, THEN contaminants and water vapor  could be introduced into the cryostat and damage the detectors and L3/S2",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","1-Use double O-ring seals with an intermediate vacuum groove or conflat flange at all bolted joints.(COMPLETE)  \n2-Monitor and pump interstitial groove vacuum levels (CCS)\n3-Use gate valve  normally closed with  spring closure upon deenergization (COMPLETE)\n4- Monitor pressures on both sides of gate valve and use  logic to only open gate valve in known safe configurations (CPS, CCS)\n",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1-Leak check each O-ring in all double\nseals\n2-Verify groove vacuums are monitored and pumped\n3-Confirm gate valve auto-closure under loss of power and air\n4-Certify gate valve operation in all combinations of pressure differential\n\n","CPS\n",null,null,"C","108A-E","2018-05-14",1,1,null,null,"1- Awaiting word from Callen/Qiu\n2- LCA-16458\n3- Awaiting word from Qiu\n4- LCA-16458\n"]
[null,"Cryo-002","Cryostat","Struc","Cryo Plate structural failure","IF the cryo plate contracts too much as it is cooled THEN associated stresses could damage the cryo plate",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Eliminate hazard","Use flexures to allow for differential motion between the cold cryo plate and warm cryostat wall (COMPLETE)\n",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Test","Test flexure rigidity / flexibilty per spec (COMPLETE)\n",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-12",1,1,null,null,"Awaiting word from Callen/Ku"]
[null,"Cryo-003","Cryostat","Struc","Cold Plate structural failure","IF the cold plate contracts too much as it is cooled THEN associated stresses could damage the cold plate",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Eliminate hazard","Design coldplate (now non-rigid structure) as a compliant to thermal excursions of support system (COMPLETE)\n",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Review","FDR",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-12",1,1,null,null,"Awaiting word from Callen/Ku"]
[null,"Cryo-004","Cryostat","Struc","Brittle failure of cryostat parts","IF cooldown overstresses brittle cryostat components, THEN cooldown stresses could damage components  ",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Eliminate hazard","1-Use only materials that do not get brittle at our survival temperatures;  (COMPLETE)\n2-complete design and analysis using spec safety factors for critical material / components (COMPLETE)\n3-test undocumented materials to ensure strength and toughness properties understood / known at operational temperatures (COMPLETE)",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Review","1-Analyze material behavior as part of material selection process (FDR COMPLETE)\n2-FDR (COMPLETE)\n3-review test results to ensure adequate margin with respect to analysis of required material properties (FDR COMPLETE)\n",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"1, 2, & 3 - https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/158046541/LCA-11589.pdf?version=2&modificationDate=1497641170000&api=v2 "]
[null,"Cryo-005","Cryostat","Struc","Brittle failure of ceramic Grid","IF the grid is exposed to mechanical or thermal stresses, THEN stresses could damage grid (Grid is manufactured from SiC ceramic, making it less fracture-tough than metals and making it susceptible to catastrophic brittle failure)",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","1-design the Grid with large safety factors and test any high-stress regions (COMPLETE)\n2- complete cold temperature strength and toughness testing on samples (COMPLETE)\n3-design grid to eliminate joints and elements with potential stress concentrations (COMPLETE)",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","1, 2, & 3: FDR",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"1, 2, & 3 - https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/158046541/LCA-11589.pdf?version=2&modificationDate=1497641170000&api=v2 "]
[null,"Cryo-006","Cryostat","Struc","Buckling of flexure","IF a Grid, Cryo- or Cold-Plate thin-bladed flexure buckles, THEN buckling could severely damage  cryostat contents",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","1-design flexures with large safety factors;  (COMPLETE)\n2-load test all flexure designs (COMPLETE)",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","1-FDR (COMPLETE)\n2-Qualification / acceptance test all flexure load tests to max seismic loads (COMPLETE)",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-12",1,1,null,null,"1-https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/158046541/LCA-11589.pdf?version=2&modificationDate=1497641170000&api=v2\n "]
[null,"Cryo-007","Cryostat","Elec","Heater short to ground","IF a Cryo- or Cold-Plate heater shorts to ground THEN overheating could damage the element and nearby hardware",4,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":19},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Safety device","1-electrically isolate heaters from camera ground plane\n2-Use over-current protection and current monitoring to ensure that heater circuits shut off if a short to ground occurs\n3-wire heaters in parallel to ensure shorted heater does not short entire heater system",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Review","1-complete grounding / isolation tests of heater as installed and at operational temperature testing\n2- Verify that protection circuits are functioning\n3-Verify parallel wiring","CPS\n",null,null,"C",48,"2018-04-22",1,1,null,null,"1, 2, & 3 - Awaiting word from Callen"]
[null,"Cryo-008","Cryostat","Control","Cryostat uncontrolled vent","IF loss of backing vacuum on turbo-pump occurs, THEN an uncontrolled vent could damage the  cryostat vacuum system ",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","1-ensure all elements, specifcally valves and actuators, fail to a safe conditon, presumably \"closed\" in all cases.\n2-ensure critical valves are interlocked to pressure gauging such that inadvertant operation cannot vent the cryostat\n",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1- Verify isolation valve function and failure state\n2-Complete extensive testing on vacuum control systeem / logic to ensure no improper operation of critical valves or actuators.\n","CPS","Y",null,"C",49,"2018-05-14",1,1,null,null,"1 - Awaiting word from Qiu\n2 -Awaiting word from Qiu (May be  LCA-16458)"]
[null,"Cryo-009","Cryostat","Control","Cryo cold plate under-temp","IF Cryo- or cold plate temps drop below their minimum operating limits, THEN Cryostat hardware might be damaged",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Temperature sensors on cryo- and cold-plates provide feedback to the protection system and  upon under temperature excursion of the cold-plate, turn off all refrigerators; upon under temperature of the cryo-plate, turn off the cryo-refrigerators.          ",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test monitoring feedback control and under-temperature controller","CPS",null,null,"C",50,"2018-04-12",1,1,null,null,"Awaiting word from Qiu"]
[null,"Cryo-010","Cryostat","Control","Cryo, Cold Plate over-temp","IF the Cryo- or Cold-Plate exceed their max operating limits THEN Cryostat hardware might be damaged",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Temp sensors on Cryo and Cold plates provide feedback; upon over-temp, cut power to heaters and RCM power supplies",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test montiroing feedback control and over-temp switches","CPS",null,null,"C",51,"2018-04-22",1,1,null,null,"Later: Ask Qiu"]
[null,"Cryo-011","Cryostat","Env","GN2 purge asphyxiant hazard","IF nitrogen accumulates around cryostat during backfilling, THEN hazardous oxygen-deficient air could injure nearby workers.",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","1-use highly reliable all metal sealing of all GN2 containers, transfer lines and connections to minimize possibility of leak\n2-Use oxygen-deficiency monitors near the cryostat during accesses to ensure that personnel are not at risk of asphyxiation",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","1-design review to ensure proper material and component selection\n2-Verify proper ODM use ",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-22",1,1,null,null,"1 - Awaiting word from Qiu\n2 - Continuous"]
[null,"Cryo-012","Cryostat","Matl's","Release of refrigerant","IF refrigerant is released into cryostat, THEN sensors and other cryostat hardware could be damaged ",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","1-use single mill run lengths of tubing for refrigeration system in cryostat, no tubing joints in cryostat. (COMPLETE)\n2-design with high safety factors for burst pressure for all tubing in cryostat. (COMPLETE)\n3-implement pressure relieve vavle and burst disc in system,outside cryostat, to limit maximum system pressure to safe levels. (COMPLETE)\n4-Pressure test refrigeration system inside cryostat (COMPLETE)",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","1- FDR \n2-FDR\n3-FDR\n4-Review test documentation",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"1, 2, & 3 - https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/158046541/LCA-11589.pdf?version=2&modificationDate=1497641170000&api=v2 \n4 - Awaiting word from D. Shelley "]
[null,"Cryo-013","Refrig","Therm/Cryo","Icing of refrig return lines","IF refrig return lines are overcooled, THEN they will ice up and drip water on system electronics, possibly causing shorts",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","1 - enclose and protect all electronics hardware inside utility trunk (COMPLETE)\n2 - only route refrigeration lines outside UT (COMPLETE)\n3 - hermetically seal UT (COMPLETE)\n4- design high efficiency heat exchanger to limit low temperature return flow (COMPLETE)\n5-Optimize refrigerant mixture composition to reduce icing on return line (COMPLETE)",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1,2&3 - Inspect as-built\n4&5- Run refrigeration system verification testing ",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-18",1,1,null,null,"1, 2, & 3 - TBD\n4 & 5 - Awaiting word from Qiu"]
[null,"Cryo-014","Refrig","Therm/Cryo","Heat-X Can leak causes icing","IF Heat Exchanger Can develops a vacuum leak, THEN it may ice up and drip water on system elec, possibly causing shorts",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","\n1 - use all-metal seals for Heat-Ex Can vacuum connections (COMPLETE)\n2 - monitor and actively pump on Heat-Ex Can - shut off refrigeration system on vacuum loss at e-3 torr (CCS, CPS)",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1 - leak test Heat-X Can\n2 - test functionality of Heat-Ex vacuum system pump and monitoring/shutoff components ","CPS",null,null,"C",85,"2018-04-18",1,1,null,null,"1  - Awaiting word from Qiu\n2 - LCA-16458"]
[null,"Cryo-016","Refrig","Press/Vac","Heat-X Can over-pressure","IF a refrigerant line from a heat exchanger leaks in the Heat-Ex Can, THEN the chamber could fail due to over-pressure",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","1 - Incorporate burst disc in Heat-Ex Can (COMPLETE)\n2-Design and fabricate heat exchanger to insure heat exchanger has no leaks \n",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1- Pressure test Heat-X Can  and verify burst disc parameters \n2 - Pressure-test heat exchangers per ASHRAE-15\n",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-18",1,1,null,null,"1 & 2 - Awaiting word from Qiu"]
[null,"Cryo-017","Refrig","Fire","Refrigerant fire at a leak in system","IF refrigerant leaks near an ignition source, THEN a fire could injure personnel or damage equipment",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Eliminate hazard","Use only non-flammable refrigerant, so there is no possibility of fire",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},"Low","Review","Verify that non-flammable refrigerant is used",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-18",1,1,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/Qiu%202919C%20flamm%20acceptance%20Feb%202018.pdf?api=v2"]
[null,"Cryo-019","Refrig","Matl's","Refrigerant leak in Utility Trunk","IF refrigerant hoses at the Utility Trunk interface leak, THEN vaporized refrigerant will carry oil mist contaminate the M2 Mirror",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Ensure system is leak free before charging",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Pressure test/sniffing the as-installed system",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-18",1,1,null,null,"1 - TBD"]
[null,"Cryo-020","Cryostat","Struc","Overpressure failure of cryostat ","IF cryostat is overpressured during purge/venting, THEN cryostat or L3 could fail structurally",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety device","1-See Hazard Report 10742, Include burst disk on cryostat vacuum system\n2-Design cryostat and L3 to withstand pressures greater than burst disc pressure\n",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","1- FDR: Verify that burst disk parameters  are consistent with design specifications\n2-Review at Final Design Review\n",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-18",1,1,null,null,"1  - https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/158046541/LCA-11589.pdf?version=2&modificationDate=1497641170000&api=v2\n2 - https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/MESN14-000018-AB%20Complete.pdf?api=v2 "]
[null,"Cryo-021","Cryostat","Matl's","Asphyxiation due to release of refrigerant","IF refrigeration system leaks into utility room, THEN it may displace air, causing asphyxiation of personnel entering the room",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Warning device","1-employ oxygen deficiency monitor in utility room\n2-Size room to accommodate refrigeration system release with ambient air O2 >19.5%.(COMPLETE)",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1-Test ODM periodically, verify alarm setpoint\n2-Confirm room volume before installation\n",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-18",1,1,null,null,"1 - TDB (Continuous)\n2 - https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/Summit%20Utility%20Room%20ODH-sizing20180420.pdf?api=v2"]
[null,"Cryo-022","Cryostat","Struc","Cryostat vacuum-pressure failure","IF cryostat is inadequately structurally designed THEN total differential pressure could make it fail structurally",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control Hazard","Complete sturctural analysis using maximum differential pressure possible with inclusion of safety factor (COMPLETE)",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","Complete full design review (LLNL L3 Engineering Note and SLAC acceptance)",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-22",1,1,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/Approval%20Memo%20-%20L3%20Lens%20Assembly.pdf?api=v2"]
[null,"Cryo-023","Cryostat","Press/Vac","Cryostat Manual Vent","IF a worker manipulated a manual valve in an incorrect time / manner THEN cryostat could vent to ambient air ",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","1-Add clear labeling and signage to all manually controlled vent and purge system components, insure training documents highlight hazard.\n2-ensure all operating personnel trained on operations of vacuum system\n3-automate common functions for system operation (See Cryo-001 and Cryo-008)\n",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","1-Review labeling\n2-Review of operations training manuals and training records\n3-Review acceptance of Cryo-001 and Cryo-008",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-22",1,1,null,null,"1 - TBD\n2 - Continuous\n3 - See Cryo-001 and Cryo-008\n"]
[null,"Cryo-024","Cryostat","Mech","Simultaneous turbo-pump operation and camera motion","IF the telescope moves while a turbo-pump is running, THEN gyroscopic force could damage the pump  ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Turbo-pumps must be backed by scroll pumps, which are in pump carts off the camera; thus, turbo pumps can not be turned on without personnel access which requires lock-out of telescope motion axes",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Confirm worker use of  lock-out of telescope drives during access",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-22",1,1,null,null,"Continuous"]
[null,"Cryo-029","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","IF simultaneous plugs in vapor supply line and liquid supply line at or near compressor occurs, THEN  >600 psig pressure between compressor and blockage could cause compressor failure",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Pressure transducer cuts compressor power via software and PLC and prevent over pressure at compressor (COMPLETE)",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Review","Review transducer/PLC logic","CPS",null,null,"C",101,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"LCA-16458"]
[null,"Cryo-037","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","IF valves in vapor supply line and liquid supply line are simultaneously  improperly-closed at or near compressor THEN the resulting pressure (>600psig) between compressor and closed valve could damage the compressor",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Install pressure transducer to actuate mechanical switch to cut compressor power and prevent over pressure (Same as Cryo-029) (COMPLETE)",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test pressure transducer and switch system","CPS","Y",null,"C",103,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"LCA-16458"]
[null,"Cryo-040","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","IF valve is improperly closed in return line at or near Camera, THEN >600psig pressure on the systems's pressure side could damagethe compressor",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Employ proper refrigeration system servicing procedure",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Assure service procedure is in place and properly used",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"Need procedure from Qiu"]
[null,"Cryo-041","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","IF Camera with full refrigerant charge is disconnected with valves closed while cold, THEN, upon warmup, severe Camera overpressure could result in catastrophic refrigerant release inside cryostat ",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety device","Place pressure relief valve near Camera",4,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":19},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Review","Accept manufacturer's certs on PRV",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"Need from Qiu"]
[null,"Cryo-042","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","IIF leak check gas is improperly applied, THEN  leak-check gas could cause refrigeration system overpressures damaging system",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Place pressure relief valve or burst disc near at leak-check gas source",4,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":19},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Inspection","Verify placement of PRV or disc",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"Need from Qiu"]
[null,"Cryo-043","Refrig","Matl's","Refrigerant toxicity","IF refrigerant 2919C refrigerant is released in a confined space THEN worker exposure could lead to illness ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","1-Use ASHRAE Class A refrigerants\n2-Store refrigerant in vented or large-volume areas",4,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":18},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Review","1- Review refrigerant toxicity class analyses \n2-Review/approve storage procedures",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"1 -https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/MMR%20Refrigerant%202919C%20Mix.xlsx?api=v2 \n2 - TBD at Summit"]
[null,"Cryo-045","Refrig","Env","Cold system condensation","IF condensation forms on cold system, THEN condensation could drip onto optics.",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","Install a thermal static expansion valve on cold system return line (COMPLETE)",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test efficacy of expansion valve in preventing condensation",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"Awaiting word from Qiu"]
[null,"Cryo-047","Cryostat","Mech","Making up Utility Trunk vacuum and refrig lines","IF a vacuum knife-edge flange or refrig VCR fitting is damaged during mate-up of the UT, THEN refrigerant may leak and damage hardware",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Design UT to provide adequate space to allow the final mate-up of refrig lines (COMPLETE)\n ",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Leak test refrig and vacuum lines before putting them into service\n",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"Awaiting word from Qiu"]
[null,"Cryo-048","Cryostat","Elec","Control of elec and fans in Utility Trunk","IF fans or powered systems in the UT are not de-energized, THEN personnel may be injured during an access ",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Procedure, training","Employ CoHE during accesses",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Confirm that CoHE procedures are correctly used",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"Continuous"]
[null,"Cryo-049","Cryostat","Press/Vac","Overpressure of Utility Trunk Volume","IF an air or refrigerant lines breaks in the utility trunk, THEN it could overpressurize the UT and damage UT skin",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety device","Install ~0.5 psi pressure relief valve in the UT outer skin (COMPLETE)",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","Review PRV",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"https://www.agmcontainer.com/breather_valves/ta770-r "]
[null,"Cryo-050","Refrig","Env","PRV drip onto M1/3","IF a refrigeration system PRV is actuated, THEN oil-containing effluent from the Refrigetation system could, while telescope is off-horizon, contaminate M1/3 ",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Route PRV effluent out of M1/3 footprint\nOR Install a local oil trap (in discussion with Telescope people April 2018)",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Review leak-check routing off-telescope OR review oil trap",null,null,null,"C",null,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"TBD"]
[null,"Cryo-051","Refrig","Fire","Compressor cabinet fire","IF a fire occurs in the compressor cabinet, THEN fire could damage compressor cabinet hardware  ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","1-Over-voltage proctection on power supplies\n2-Install smoke detector (CPS) to shut down compressors",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1-Review overage protection on power supplies\n2-Accept smoke detector manufacturer's certs on smoke detector","CPS",null,null,"C",89,"2018-04-25",1,1,null,null,"1 - Awaiting word from Bowden\n2 - TBD (Bowden)"]
[null,"ELX-001","Sys Elec","Therm/Cryo","Electonics overheating","IF Electronics overheat, or are not adequately cooled THEN the temperature of  support electronics would rise to levels that could damage the electronics or ignite a fire",3,"B",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":9},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety device","1 - Use temperature sensors in UT to monitor UT temperature and shut off power if it overheats\n2 - Use smoke detector (VESDA) in UT to shut off power power if smoke is detected\n3 - Include  overcurrent protection on HCUs and power supplies\n4 - Use standard fire retardant or resistant construction ",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1- Test PLC logic to turn off power; buy rated temp switches\n2- Review VESDA manufacturer's certification of detector \n3 - Review HCU/power supply ratings\n4 - Review cable materials list\n","CPS",null,null,null,59,"2018-05-23",1,1]
[null,"ELX-002","Sys Elec","Elec","Over Voltage/Current","IF a Raft Tower power supply produces an over-voltage or -current, THEN power can damage the supply itself or Raft Tower/RCM",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety device","Equip all Raft Tower power supplies with over- voltage and over-current circuits",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","Review power supply over-voltage and -current settings in FPGA","CPS",null,null,null,110,"2018-05-23",1,1]
[null,"ELX-003","Sys Elec","Elec","Cable Abrasion or Stress","IF a power or signal cable is abraded or stressed THEN insulation damage could  compromise connections, possibly resulting in a short circuit, overheating, or fire",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","1 -Design cable plant to avoid stress on joints and rub points; \n2 - Tie down and strain relieve cables to avoid unnecessary cable motions\n3 - Sheathe large cables",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Inspection","1, 2, &3- Inspect camera cable system as it is being installed and as other parts of camera are installed.",null,null,null,null,null,"2018-05-23",1,1]
[null,"ELX-005","Sys Elec","Elec","Electrical Safety","IF workers are exposed to unprotected high voltages and/or currents, THEN workers can suffer arc-flash, shock, or startle hazards",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","1 - Design all electronics w/voltages above 50V to be touch safe.\n2 - During installation handle according to all applicable codes and standards, \n3 - Implement CoHE during maintenance and repair ",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","1 - Inspect assemblies \n2 - Monitor work to assure code compliance\n3 - Review maintenance procedures",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2018-05-23",1,1]
[null,"EXCH-003","Filter-X","Mech","Physical collision of exchange system parts","Inadvertant execution of an action while the system is in a state that is not safe for that action",2,"B",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":5},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"High"},"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10743,  Switches monitor the condition of all actuatable systems, with positive signal required to enable an action",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test instrumentation as part of exchange system performance verification","CPS",null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"EXCH-004","Filter-X","Mech","Dropping a filter","Improper sequencing of clamps leaves a filter in an unsecured condition",2,"B",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":5},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"High"},"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10743,  Switches monitor the position of all mechanisms, and will only open when system is in a safe state",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test instrumentation as part of exchange system performance verification","CPS",null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"EXCH-005","Filter-X","Mech","Single-point failure","Mechanical failure of a single-point failure item:  axles, filter latches, truck wheels, keys on drive shafts",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","Design hardware in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard, ",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Analysis, proof testing and inspection as part of PM plans",null,null,null,null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"EXCH-006","Filter-X","Mech","Wear/fatigue failure","Failure due to long-term wear or cyclic loading causing fatigue failure",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Design hardware in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard, perform periodic inspections to identify wear and preventive maintenance ",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Review inspection and PM plans",null,null,null,null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"EXCH-007","Filter-X","Mech","Personnel injury","Pinch points, closing apertures, rolling and sliding parts are exposed to personnel working on the system",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Engineered safety features  to protect personnel, lock-out/tag-out provisions,  sensors,   emergency shut-off",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Inspect safety systems during verification testing; include in periodic inspection and PM plans","CPS","Y",null,null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"EXCH-008","Filter-X","Struc","Linkage buckling","Buckling or structural failure of thin linkage members, causing damage to Shutter or filter",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Design linkage in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard to carry loads consistent with stall force of motor",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Proof test the linkage, then run verification tests as part of Changer testing",null,null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"EXCH-009","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rotation of the Carousel","Inadvertant rotation of the carousel and collision of a filter by back-driving through the drive train; this can occur when an unbalanced load of filters places a torque on the Carousel",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Eliminate hazard","Use a non-back-driveable gear train",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Test","Proof test the Carousel to demonstrate that gear train can not be back-driven, even under seismic loads",null,null,null,null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"EXCH-010","Filter-X","Mech","Driving Carousel blind","Inadvertant collision and damage to a filter by losing or not tracking the position of the carousel while it is rotating",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10743,  Position sensors or periodic switches establish the Carousel's rotary position during normal operation or after a loss of power or control",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that switches and controls prevent motions that would lead to collision","CPS",null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"EXCH-011","Filter-X","Mech","Carousel misalignment","Carousel stops in the wrong place for a filter exchange, and filter is damaged by the Auto Changer ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Position sensors will indicate when the Carousel is correctly located, and enable the Auto Changer to move",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that switches and controls prevent motions that would lead to collision","CPS",null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"EXCH-012","Filter-X","Mech","Carousel clamp failure","Carousel clamp inadvertently releases, dropping a filter and damaging it",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Clamps are spring-load in the clamped position, so they are fail safe from loss of power or actuator force; clamps are designed to carry full seismic and handling loads of the filters",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Proof test the carousel clamps, run verification tests as part of Carousel testing ",null,null,null,null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"EXCH-013","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rolling of filter in Auto Changer","Inadvertant rolling of the filter on the Auto Changer trucks by back-driving through the drive train, leading to collision of the filter with another filter",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Use a non-back-driveable drive train.",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Process control","Proof test the Auto Changer to demonstrate that drive train can not be back-driven",null,null,null,null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"EXCH-014","Filter-X","Mech","Dropping filter off Auto Changer truck","Latch mechanism that holds the filter releases and drops the filter, damaging it and L2, L3, or the Shutter",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10743:  Both power and an enable signal are required to unlatch a filter",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Run proof tests to verify that latch can carry max load without unlatching","CPS",null,null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"EXCH-017","Filter-X","Mech","Rotator starts to move Camera","Telescope rotator rotates Camera while Auto Changer is transporting a filter; possibly damaging trucks or filter mount",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10743,  Tiltmeter or accelerometer on camera housing monitors orientation of Camera and stops changer",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test functionality of tiltmeter during system testing","CPS",null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"EXCH-018","Filter-X","Mech","Drive screw buckling","Long drive ball screw is in compression during parts of the change and could buckle if load is high enough",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Eliminate hazard","Size drive screw with conservative margins even under seismic and motor stall loads",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Qual test bearings with max stall loads at critical carriage position where buckling loads are highest",null,null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"EXCH-019","Filter-X","Mech","Changer rail mount overload","Rails/support differential CTC causes rails to bow towards each other, pinching filter and trucks, possibly damaging trucks or filter mount",4,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":19},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Eliminate hazard","Design rail mount to minimize bi-metallic bending effect; tolerance trucks to allow for deviation in position with respect to filter",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Review","Review design and analysis to ensure thermal distortion is accommodated",null,null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"EXCH-020","Filter-X","Mech","Changer rail misalignment","If Auto Changer rail interface to Carousel is not repeatible at re-installation, then filter could jamb and be damaged during a subsequent exchange",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Incorporate repeatable locating pins to establish correct location of the Changer",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Process control","Test repeatibility of Changer postioning after re-installation",null,null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"EXCH-021","Filter-X","Therm/Cryo","Drive motor overheats ","Stalled motor overheats resulting in damage. This applies to all the motors in the three subsystems (Carousel, AutoChanger, Loader)",4,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":18},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Control hazard","Current monitor shuts off motor if current exceeds a preset max value. Current preset limit will be defined in the motor controllers.",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Test","Test current monitors as part of carousel proof test ","CPS",null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"EXCH-022","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rolling of the filter in the Loader","Inadvertant rolling of the filter on the Loader by back driving through the drive train leading to a collision with another filter of the AutoChanger components",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Use a non-back-driveable drive train, or add a power-off brake to prevent uncommanded rotation even when the power is off",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Proof test the loader to demonstrate that the drive train can not be back-driven",null,null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"EXCH-023","Filter-X","Mech","Loose items damage Filter-X or L2","Exchange system and L2 could be damaged by a loosened (by motion cycling) Exchange-system part (screw, bolt, fastener, etc.) rolling around inside the camera body  ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Threaded fasteners will have lock washers or equivalent",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Inspection","Inspect each fastener as installed  to assure redundant capturing",null,null,null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"IT-001","I&T","Mech","Sensor damaged during (de)integration","IF RSA positioning is not controlled during integration THEN a sensor can collide with adjacent sensor, raft, or tooling during acceptance testing, integration or deintegration. with damage to sensor. ",2,"B",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":5},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"High"},"Procedure, training","1-Lateral tolerance study performed, LCA-10738, used in design to maintain proper clearances.  Installation tooling design and assembly procedures for adequate clearance between sensors during assembly. (COMPLETE)\n2-Use custom intergation tooling for installations\n3-Train installation staff in proper handling techniques and handling procedures and eTravelers. \n4-Vet procedures during pathfinder",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","1-Review tolerance study\n2-Verify utility of tooling at pathfinder\n3-Verify training during work release\n4-Verify procedures at pathfinder",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-06-11",1,1,null,null,"1-https://docushare.lsstcorp.org/docushare/dsweb/Get/LCA-10738/LCA-10738-A.xlsx\n2-TBD\n3-Continuous\n4-TBD"]
[null,"IT-002","I&T","Matl's","Broken optics ","IF worker drops an item on optics, THEN optics could be damaged or broken",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","\n1-Use protective covers on lenses when possible\n2-Use procedures and eTravelers employing tool control measures",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","\n1-Monitor work to assure use of covers\n2-Monitor work to assure plans are implemented",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-19",1,1,null,null,"1-Continuous\n2-Continuous"]
[null,"IT-004","I&T","Matl's","Cut from broken Grid chip","IF the silicon-carbide Grid is damaged from sharp impact to it, THEN the resulting chip or sharp edge could cut personnel",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Use appropriate procedures to reduce liklihood of damage to Grid",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Review plans and monitor to make sure they are being implemented",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"Continuous"]
[null,"IT-005","I&T","Matl's","Cut from broken CFC strut","If a strut structurally fails, then released carbon fibers could cut personnel",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Use appropriate procedures to reduce liklihood of damage to struts",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Review plans and monitor to make sure they are being implemented",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"Continuous"]
[null,"IT-006","I&T","Matl's","Spraying refrigerant","If a refrigerant line ruptures, then refrigerant spray could cause eye injury",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Use appropriate procedures to reduce liklihood of tube/hose failure",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Review plans and monitor to make sure they are being implemented",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"Continuous"]
[null,"IT-007","I&T","Therm/Cryo","Frostbite","If surfaces at cryogenic temperatures are exposed, then personel who touch them could get frostbite",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Use hand protection PPE while working on uncovered piping",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Audit","Monitor  work to assure use of hand protection",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"Continuous"]
[null,"IT-008","I&T","Env","Asphyxiation due to release of N2","If gaseous nitrogen purge gas free-flows into a confined space, then personnel could be exposed to low-oxygen environment",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","1-Limit flow of N2 into rooms (COMPLETE)\n2-Equip rooms with oxygen-deficiency monitors (COMPLETE)",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","1-Review ODH analysis\n2-Certify ODM",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"1- https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/LSST%20CR%20HB%20ODH%20Safety%20Review%20Form%2020150306jk_MM_Approved_Class_0.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1524759284877&api=v2 \nhttps://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/LSST%20CR%20ACR%20ODH%20Safety%20Review%20Form%2020150306jk_MM_Approved_Class_0.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1524759358256&api=v2  \n2 -https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/B620%20ODM%20CommissioningJuly2017.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1502296716000&api=v2\n"]
[null,"IT-009","I&T","Elec","Shock from exposed leads","If high-current or high-voltage leads are easily exposed, then personnel may get shocked",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety feature","1-Cover all exposed leads; \n2-Incorporate lock-out/tag-out procedures for maintenance",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Inspection","1-Inspect all covers for >50V for touch safety as part of SLAC EEIP program\n2-Audit lock-out/tag-out procedures and implementation",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"1- https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/display/LSSTCAM/Electrical+Equipment+Inspection+Program+-+List+of+affected+Camera+equipment \n2-Continuous"]
[null,"IT-010","I&T","Elec","Shock from unsafe electronics","If custom-designed test-stand electronics are not safely designed, then personnel may get shocked. ",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Design and build equipment to NEC\n",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Inspection","Vet design via SLAC electrical equipment inspection program",null,"Y",null,"TS",null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/display/LSSTCAM/Electrical+Equipment+Inspection+Program+-+List+of+affected+Camera+equipment \n"]
[null,"IT-011","I&T","Mech","Crushing from entrapment","If a moving part of a fixture entraps a limb during a re-orientation or rigging operation, then personnel could be injured",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Procedure, training","1-Rope off areas with moving parts\n2-For rigging operations, use an approved lift plan",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","1-Monitor to assure barrier placement and worker avoidance of roped-off areas\n2-Monitor to  ensure plans are being implemented",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-06-11",1,1,null,null,"1-Continuous\n2-Continuous"]
[null,"IT-012","I&T","Struc","Injury from falling equipment","If equipment falls or moves during an earthquake, then personnel could be injured",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Procedure, training","1-Anchor fixed equipment per SLAC Anchorage of Experimental Equipment Program (\"BIO Policy P-15-001\"); \n2-tether moving equipment to limit motion",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","1-Review seismic analysis\n2-Inspect anchoring and tethers; check to ensure they are being used",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/219259168/Seismic_Anchorage_BOT_Chassis.doc?version=1&modificationDate=1525885691539&api=v2 \n\nhttps://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/219259168/Calculations%20for%20Seismic%20Anchorage%20for%20Raft%20Arm%20Stand%20%281%29.xlsx?version=1&modificationDate=1525888781073&api=v2\n2 - Continuous"]
[null,"IT-013","I&T","Matl's","Surface damage to lens","IF AR coating or glass surface is scratched, THEN  scratch could affect optical performance",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","1-Cover optics when possible\n2-Use guides to emplace optics\n3-Use procedures to to prevent undue contact with optics",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","1-Monitor work to assure use of covers\n2-Monitor work to assure use of guides\n3-Review work procedures and eTravelers",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"1-Continuous\n2-Continuous\n3-Continuous"]
[null,"IT-014","I&T","Mech","Injury from falling equipment","IF equipment falls during material handling with lifting equipment, equipment may fall on worker, resulting in injury",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","1-Limit use of hoists and forklifts to certified personnel.        \n2-Create and work to required lift plans\n3-Vet custom lift gear",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","1-Audit training records\n2-Audit lift plans and monitor to ensure plans are being implemented\n3-Check designs and proof tests during lift plan approvals",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"1 - https://www-internal.slac.stanford.edu/esh-db/training/slaconly/bin/show_training.asp?slac_key=212881&ta_id=12901&deptid=&short=&status=\n2- Continuous\n3 - https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/233319541/LCA-14294-14295%20Raft%20Integration%20Hoist%20Assy.PDF?version=1&modificationDate=1523643423000&api=v2"]
[null,"IT-015","I&T","Mech","Injury from working in awkward postures","While performing Camera work on difficult-to-access components, workers may be acutely (sprain/strain) or chronically (via repetitive motion) injured",3,"B",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":9},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Procedure, training","1-Assess tasks for awkward postures/repetitive motions         \n2-Train workers in safe industrial ergonomics if necessary",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","1. Review plans for possible ergonomic insults and alter tasks accordingly  \n2-Have affected workers complete of SLAC \"Industrial Ergonomics Awareness Training\"",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"1-Continuous\n2-Continuous"]
[null,"IT-018","I&T","Env","Laser light injury","Laser light eye injury during metrology activities",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Eliminate hazard","1-Lasers used will not exceed Class 2 (per ANSI Z136)   \n2-Prohibited use of magnifying instruments during laser metrology operations.\n3-Cap lasers when not in use ",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Inspection","1-Inspect laser metrology gear to assure use of < Class-3 lasers\n2-Monitor work to assure non-use of magnifying instruments\n2-Monitor work to assure cap use",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-27",1,1,null,null,"1-Continuous\n2-Continuous\n3-Continuous"]
[null,"IT-020","I&T","Press/Vac","Test Stand 7 Refrigerant line/system break or breach  ","Injury from uncontrolled release of pressurized refrigerant",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Incorporate burst disc in system",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Inspection","Verify burst disc parameters",null,"Y",null,"TS",null,"2018-04-11",1,1]
[null,"IT-021","I&T","Fire","PT-30 refrigerant fire","IF CryoTiger PT-30 refrigerant is released and ignited, THEN fire can cause damage and injury",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Abide by recommendations in Cryotiger \"PCC with PT Refrigerants\" manual (Brooks Automation doc. no. 825133-00, Revision A) \n",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Monitor work to assure adherance to manufacturer's requirements",null,"Y",null,"TS",null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"Continuous"]
[null,"IT-023","I&T","Press/Vac","Test stand vessel overpressure ","Injury or equipment damage from accidental unvented overpressure and catastrophic failure of vessel. ",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","Equip vessel with a burst disc. (COMPLETE)   \n",4,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":19},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Test","Have SME verify burst disc parameters",null,"Y",null,"TS",null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/RE%20TS7%20vacuum%20vessel%20hazard.txt?api=v2 "]
[null,"IT-024","I&T","Press/Vac","Test stand vessel window breach ","IF test stand window under vacuum is breached, THEN injury or equipment damage may result",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","1-Design and build to vacuum-safety standards (COMPLETE)\n2-Provide supplemental window protection when possible ",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Inspection","1-Have SME vet design\n2-Monitor work to assure use of window protection",null,"Y",null,"TS",null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"1 - https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/RE%20TS7%20vacuum%20vessel%20hazard.txt?api=v2  \n2 - Continuous"]
[null,"IT-026","I&T","Env","Radiation from Fe-55 sources ","Radiation exposure to personnel from four 5μCi Fe-55 sources",4,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":18},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Procedure, training","Control sources per  SLAC Radiation Physics source control program",4,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":19},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Review","Review source control compliance",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/219259168/Radioactive%20Sealed%20Source%20Authorization%20for%208%20Fe-55%2009-13-17.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1525890536536&api=v2 \nhttps://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/219259168/BOT%20Anchoring%20Calculations%20for%20SLAC%20BIO.xlsx?version=1&modificationDate=1525885733000&api=v2"]
[null,"IT-027","I&T","Env","Test-stand contamination from vent after turbopump-/power- failure","If a Turbopump fails or loses power, THEN  backventing of room air to single bay cryostat could contaminate cryostat",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","Automate  gate valve closure during catastrophic venting",4,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":19},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Review","Review automation logic automation","CPS","Y",null,"TS",106,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/display/LSSTCAM/BNL+SR+TS7+Alarm+Conditions%2C+Monitoring+and+Responses#BNLSRTS7AlarmConditions,MonitoringandResponses-Cloak_TempAlarmsTemperatureConditions "]
[null,"IT-028","I&T","Therm/Cryo","Miscooling of TS cryostat after misinstallation of cryocooler lines ","IF Cryocooler lines are switched, THEN TS cryostat hardware could be miscooled (over- or under-cooling) ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","Label lines to prevent mismating (COMPLETE)",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Inspection","Inspect lines before use",null,"Y",null,"TS",null,"2018-04-19",1,1,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/Cryocooler%20line%20labels.JPG?api=v2 "]
[null,"IT-029","I&T","Mech","Mismating of rafts during integration","Dissimilarity between Science and Corner Rafts hold-down mechanisms could prompt improper installation resulting in damage to a raft",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Include in eTraveler explanatory language to  prevent treatment of  a Science Raft like a Corner Raft and vice versa",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","Verify eTraveler entries",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-19",1,1,null,null,"Awaiting eTraveler"]
[null,"IT-030","I&T","Mech","Unintended Integration Stand/Metrology Sensor Arm motion into reference flat or L3 ","IF unintensional metrology sensor arm displacement occurs, THEN reference flat could be damaged   ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Install chocks to prevent damaging with vertical displacements of arm/sensor (COMPLETE)",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test chock efficacy before flat and L3 are in place",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-19",1,1,null,null,"No documentation as ao 15 May 18 per Osier"]
[null,"IT-031","I&T","Struc","Fall from integration stand and BOT work platform ","Injury from fall from elevated work surface on integration stand and BOT work platform",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Install standard railing at platforms edges where working surface is >48\" from floor (COMPLETE)",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Inspection","Inspect rails for OSHA compliance before first use",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-19",1,1,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/219259168/BOT%20rail.JPG?version=1&modificationDate=1525895003352&api=v2"]
[null,"IT-032","I&T","Press/Vac","Dark Box overpressure ","Blocked Dark Box vent while air is flowing can push the Box doors outward, causing catastrophic door loss",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Port vent outlet to prevent dead-ending (COMPLETE)",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Inspection","Inspect vent outlet before first use",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-19",1,1,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/IMG_2138%5B1%5D.JPG?api=v2 and https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/IMG_2139%5B1%5D.JPG?api=v2"]
[null,"IT-033","I&T","Env","Dark Box under BOT stand ODH","IF dark box is purged with nitrogen, THEN worker injury/death by asphyxiation could occur",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Eliminate hazard","Substitute air for N2 (COMPLETE)",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Inspection","View and confirm use of air on Box",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-27",1,1,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/IMG_2146%5B1%5D.JPG?api=v2 et seq."]
[null,"IT-034","I&T","Env","Power loss to I&T facilities","IF filtered ventilation is lost due to a power outage THEN contaminants and water could condense on and damage  hardware",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Assign equipment monitoring staff for all activities. Upon loss of power, a brown-out or loss of connection, follow response procedures to bring systems and equipment into a safe state. ",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","Review power loss protocols",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2016-06-06",1,1,null,null,"Awaiting word from J. Tice"]
[null,"IT-035","I&T","Env","Network connection loss ","IF test stand control or monitoring is lost, THEN unknown states could damage hardware",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Employ automated shutdown/safe-state system timed after automated notifications",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","Review automated shutdown/safe-state systems logic","CPS","Y",null,"TS",109,"2018-05-24",1,1,null,null,"LCA-15131-D and https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/display/LSSTCAM/TS7+Failure+Mode+Analysis "]
[null,"IT-036","I&T","Mech","Damage from ball handler","Loss of control or misuse of handling implement for balls (between  sensor assemblies and grid) damages hardware ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Design ball handler to prevent impingment on adjacent hardware.",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test handler on mockup or prototype",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2017-08-01",1,1,null,null,"Documentation forthcoming from Lange or Cryostat"]
[null,"IT-037","I&T","Mech","BOT/Integration Stand awkward postures","Personnel injury or hardware damage from awkward postures required to work on BOT (top side) and Integration Stand",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","Perform topside BOT/Integration Stand work from an OSHA-compliant elevated platform",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Assure compliance and use of device in field",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2018-04-27",1,1,null,null,"Continuous"]
[null,"IT-038","I&T","Mech","Fan impingement","Injury from high-speed cooling fans ",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Install finger guards over fan faces during I&T activities",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","View fan guards in situ",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2018-04-27",1,1,null,null,"TBD"]
[null,"IT-039","I&T","Env","Eye injury CCOB thin beam laser light","IF CCOB thin beam laser light is in use during personnel access, THEN eye injury could result ",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Eliminate hazard","Use non-coherent light source or Class 2 or weaker laser in CCOB thin beam. \nFollow SLAC Laser Safety protocols (if laser is used)",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Inspection","Assure use of class 2 or weaker laser or non-coherent light",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2018-04-27",1,1,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/130884078/Myriam%20CCOB%20Light%20Source%20Note.pdf?api=v2"]
[null,"IT-040","I&T","Mech","Injury from moving hardware","Pinching or impingment injury from moving Integration Stand hardware",3,"B",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":9},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Procedure, training","1- Include  SLAC CoHE requirements into (operating procedures/eTraveler)\n2- Place barriers around stand for use during controlled material handling ",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","1- Review lift plans /eTravelers for inclusion of safety requirements \n2- Monitor work on stand to assure use of CoHE and barriers",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-06-11",1,1,null,null,"1 - Continuous\n2 - Continuous"]
[null,"IT-041","I&T","Struc","Injury/damage from complicated, heavy lifts around BOT and Camera Integration Stand","Physical human access problems during  mounting/de-mounting camera, de-integrating \nshutter, auto changer, filter loader, L1-L2 assembly, and mounting housing to back flange cause fall, injury, or equipment damage",3,"B",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":9},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Procedure, training","1- Design clearances around BOT and Camera Integration Stand to allow workers clearance to perform assembly/disassembly work \n2-Include reconfiguration procedures (such as rail-removal) in eTravelers/lift-plans",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","1- Review designs of supplemental BOT/CIS gear\n2- Review lift plans /eTravelers for inclusion of safety requirements ",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-04-27",1,1,null,null,"1 - Awaiting word from Scott\n2 - Continuous"]
[null,"IT-042","I&T","Press/Vac","Loss of TS-7 vacuum","IF vacuum in TS-7 is lost, THEN ambient air could flow into cryostat, comtaminating hardware",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Pressure transducers in test stand volume automate gate valve to close upon too-fast pressure rate-of-rise ",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","Review gate valve automation logic","CPS","Y",null,"TS",106,"2018-04-11",1,1,null,null,"Gate valve automation not yet installed as of 9 May 2018. See https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/display/LSSTCAM/BNL+SR+TS7+Alarm+Conditions%2C+Monitoring+and+Responses#BNLSRTS7AlarmConditions,MonitoringandResponses-Cloak_TempAlarmsTemperatureConditions"]
[null,"IT-043","I&T","Elec","Electronics damage from water leak in quad-box cooling system","IF the temporary quad box cooling system leaks, THEN water could drip onto electrical conductors, presenting a shock hazard and/or damaging electronics below ",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety device","Install a drip pan over lower electronics rack ",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Inspection","Inspect pan ",null,"Y",null,"TS",null,"2018-04-27",1,1]
[null,"IT-044","I&T","Mech","Loose items  damage Camera hardware","IF loose tools, parts, or clothing/acessories are dropped into cryostat, utility trunk, or other hardware, THEN items could damage Camera hardware   ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","1 - Use captured fasteners where possible  inside cryostat and UT \n2 - Lanyard all tools used over openings in  cryostat and UT and above optics\n3-Train workers in how to properly hhold and install loose screws",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","1 - Review fastener use inside cryostat  and UT\n2 - Monitor work on Cryostat, UT, and optics for lanyard use. This includes eyeglasses.\n3-Verify worker training at work release",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-06-11",1,1]
[null,"IT-045","I&T","Mech","Vacuum-surface damage from improper handling","IF cryostat vacuum surfaces such as fittings and flanges are mishandled, THEN rough handling could damage surfaces and cause leaks, allowing contamination into crystat ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Specify use of care in handling cryostat vacuum surfaces",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","Review eTravelers for work with vacuum surfaces",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-05-31",1,1]
[null,"IT-046","I&T","Mech","Overestraint of gantry and BOT stage","IF the BOT stage (in servo mode) is moved while the RTM is mated to the integration gantry, THEN the RTM could be damaged",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Power down BOT stage servo mode by unplugging",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Review eTraveler to assure inclusion of servo-mode power down",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-06-11",1,1]
[null,"IT-047","I&T","Env","Contamination of RTM by integration gantry particulates","If particles generated by the integration gantry fall on RTMs during insertions/removals, then particles could contaminate RTM hardware ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","1-Install guards and/or shrouds between IG and RTMs to to block particles \n2-Include guard/shroudi checks in procedures/eTravelers",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Inspection","1-Inspect guards upon installation\n2-Review procedures/eTravelers",null,"Y",null,"C",null,"2018-06-11",1,1]
[null,"IT-048","I&T","Env","Contamination of cryostat while open long-term ",null,null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,null,null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}}]
[null,"Opt-001","Optics","Struc","L1 flexure failure","Failure of an L1 flexure due to excessive radial flex'ing or overload, possibly coming from heating or cooling of the camera beyond its survival temperature limits - if one flexure failed there may be a potential to overload adjacent flexures ",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","Design flexures with safty factor in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to survive a broad survival temperature range, much larger than they should ever see. See Hazard Report LCA-10746.",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Perform qualification testing of the flexure and acceptance testing of all assemblies",null,null,null,null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"Opt-002","Optics","Struc","L1 flexure mount bond failure","Failure of the bond joint holding the flexure to the glass, either due to an adhesive de-bonding or glass fracture at the bond - if one bond joint fails  there may be a potential to overload adjacent bond joints",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Design bond joint with a safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to carry worst-case loading; spec bonding process - design feature to restrain L1 in the event of bond failure",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Proof test the bond joint and run in-process tests of adhesive",null,null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Opt-003","Optics","Struc","L2 flexure failure","Failure of an L2 flexure due to excessive radial flex'ing or overload - possible damage to L1 and filter ",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Design flexures with safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to survive a broad survival temperature range, much larger than they should ever see",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Perform qualification testing of the flexure and acceptance testing of all assemblies",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"Opt-004","Optics","Struc","L2 flexure mount bond failure","Failure of the bond joint holding the flexure to the glass, either due to an adhesive de-bonding or glass fracture at the bond",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Eliminate hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Design bond joint with a safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to carry worst-case loading; spec bonding process",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Proof test the bond joint and run in-process tests of adhesive",null,null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Opt-006","Optics","Struc","L1-L2 Assembly strut failure","Buckling or structural failure of a strut tube, either due to overloading of the CFC tube or de-bonding or shear failure at the adhesively bonded end fittings",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Design strut tube with large factor of safety in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 against buckling for operational and handling loads",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Acceptance test, Qual test and destructive test strut tubes; proof load test all struts",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Opt-007","Optics","Struc","Filter glass fracture","Fracture of the filter glass due to excessive loads imparted on the glass through the support frame ",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Design frame to isolate the filter from external loading due to frame flexure",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Qual test frame and filter assembly with loading and flex'ing tests",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Opt-008","Optics","Struc","Filter glass fracture","Damage to filter glass due to loads imparted on it during a hand-off of the exchange system",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Design Filter frame to prevent overstress - Frame interfaces to carousel and changer truck are very close, so any overload would not affect the filters; switches prevent out-of-sequence actuation that would lead to an overload",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test switches to ensure protection; analyze frame at max overload force",null,null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Opt-009","Optics","Therm/Cryo","Excessive raidative cooling of L3 lens","If the radiative cooling off of L3 were significantly more than predicted, the lens may cool down,  Ultimately, embrittling the glass or causing thermal contraction beyond the range of accommodation of the perimeter gasket.  In either case, this may generate stresses in the glass above allowable limits which could ultimately result in failure",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Eliminate hazard","Analysis of the black-body radiative cooling, which is the maximum radiative heat transfer possible, shows only slightly more cooling than the nominal condition.  Thus, we are already designing for near-worst-case conditions, and even the worst-case temperatures possible do not pose a hazard to the lens",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Review","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.              \n2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures",null,null,null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Opt-010","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive external pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",1,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":4},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"High"},"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10745  \n1.  Design L3 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n2.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 (after I&T observatory located at approx 8000 feet ASL, atmospheric pressure is 75% of SL, this reduces press diff)",1,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":12},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.             \n2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures",null,null,null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Opt-011","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive internal pressure from within the cyrostat, due to overpressurizing the cryostat during backfill and purge operations",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10745,  1. Regulate purge pressure to less than 3kPa (TBD).\n2. Size purge system pump to limit max pressure.\n3. Design L3 lens to survive the mas purge system pressure differential, using a large factor of safety\n4.  Use a pressure-relief valve in the pump/ purge lines to limit the internal pressure on L3 (Pressure relief valve on cryostat housing)",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Qual test L3 Assembly at extremes of temperature and pressure;\nTest pressure-relief valve prior to every vent as part of set-up procedure",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Opt-012","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L1 lens","Overload of L1 due to excessive internal pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10746  \n1. Regulate purge pressure to less than 3kPa (TBD).\n2. Size purge system pump to limit max pressure.\n3. Design L1 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n4.  Use pressure relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 ",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Acceptance test pressure relief valve;\nAnalyze L1 lens for max over-pressure load","CPS","Y",null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Opt-013","Optics","Press/Vac","L3 vacuum gasket failure","Freezing, tearing, or other failure of the vacuum gasket that supports L3 could result in an uncontrolled venting of the cryostat, which could introduce contaminants or water vapor into the cryostat, possibly damaging the detectors",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","1.  Design the vacuum gasket to tolerate the vacuum load + shearing produced by contraction of the flange relative to the lens\n2.  Back-up O-ring around the perimeter of the air-side of the flange.  This is also vacuum-tight, and the volume between the two vacuum seals is evacuated with a second vacuum system.  Thus, this system is fully redundant\n3.  The camera volume is filled with very clean and dry gas, which would fill the cryostat if it were ever to vent",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Test the gaskets and double-seal over all extremes of pressure and temperature to verify their performance, monitor the volume between the primary and secondary seals ",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Opt-014","Optics","Mech","L1 damage during personnel access","The L1 lens is open to the dome and is at risk of damage during personnel access, due to a direct collision or contact with the lens by personnel, tools, or related equipment or gear",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Use a lens cap to cover up the lens during extended accesses; access the camera from the side, so there should be little opportunity to contact the lens",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Verify that procedures are being used during accesses",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"Opt-015","Optics","Mech","L2 or L3 damage during personnel access","To remove the Shutter or Auto Changer from the camera, the region between L2 and L3 is accessed by personnel and handling hardware, when personnel, tools, or handling fixtures could contact L2 or L3.  Such a contact could damage either the coating or even scratch the lens",3,"B",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":9},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10746 and 10745  \n1. Use rails for removing the Shutter and Auto Changer\n2. Install a cover over L2, to prevent contact ",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Use procedures for all large-scale servicing work, to ensure that safety devices are being used",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Opt-016","Optics","Struc","L1 micro-crack leads to failure","A flaw or micro-crack in the glass could cause a failure of the lens, since it is under continuous stress due to pressure loads",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Perform fracture analysis to determine the largest acceptable crack size; use large factors of safety",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Inspect the lens to verify that any cracks are smaller than the critical crack size",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Opt-017","Optics","Struc","L3 micro-crack leads to failure","A flaw or micro-crack in the glass on the inner surface could cause a failure of the lens, since it is under continuous stress due to vacuum/purge pressure loads",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10745  \n1. Perform fracture analysis to determine the largest acceptable crack size; use large factors of safety (limit max differential pressure per Haz # 19) (AR coating will provide limited protection for unintended contact)\n2. Perform period inspections to verify surface condition",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Inspection","Qual and proof test L3 lenses; Inspect to verify that any cracks are smaller than the critical crack size",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2017-11-01"]
[null,"Opt-018","Optics","Matl's","Damage to sixth filter in storage","If the off-camera filter is not stored in a controlled environment, then it could be scratched or its coating irretrievably damaged",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Store off-line filter in the Manual Changer under a purge to physically and environmentally protect it",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Check that Manual Changer use and storage procedures are used",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Opt-019","Optics","Mech","Filter or L3 metal to glass contact","If the optic shifts in its mount (due to not having any deterministic hard-stops in the present design), the optic could impact with the metal frame, creating a stress concentration and crack in the optic.",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Eliminate hazard","By incorporating a polymer hardstop into the opto-mechanical design, the motion of the glass is physically prevented from impacting the metal.  Instead, the glass would impact with the softer polymer material",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Review manufacturing logs to verify that the polymer hardstops have been installed in the assembly.",null,null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Sensor-001","Sensor","Struc","Sensor Handling Damage during acceptance","During acceptance testing, damage could occur on sensor (dropping sensor, breaking edges)",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Hazard Report LCA-10740   Use of handling jig and transport container, training, procedures, (spare sensors)",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Review procedures and plans to verify implementation  PSAP LCA-138",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"Sensor-002","Sensor","Struc","Sensor thermal excursion outside of safe range","Failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Redundant attachment features withlocking features or equilavent to prevent loosening",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Monitor temperature during acceptance testing",null,null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Sensor-003","Sensor","Elec","Over-current damage to sensor from test stand","Loss of a sensor due to uncontrolled short to ground or over-current condition",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Over-current protection in test stand power supplies (spare sensors)",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Run qualification test on test stand readout system",null,null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Sensor-004","Sensor","Elec","ESD during acceptance testing damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages sensors",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10794  (spare sensors)",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","See LCA-10794",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Sensor-005","Sensor","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from materials in test dewar","Materials or parts with volatile compounds outgas contamination that plates onto sensors, possibly damaging them permanently",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Implelment LCA-279, Contamination Control Plan and use Hazard Report LCA-10741 as a guide  (spare sensors)",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","See LCA-279 and LCA-10794",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Sensor-006","Sensor","Elec","Input voltage out of range in test readout system","An input voltage is over-voltage and  damages the CCD",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Over-voltage proctection on test system power supplies",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify that over-voltage protection is operational",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Sensor-007","Sensor","Elec","CCD power on sequence in test readout system","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","See Hazard Report",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Sensor-008","Sensor","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up in test dewar","Contamination due to condensation onto sensors  causing damage",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","See Hazard Report",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Sensor-009","Sensor","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins during acceptance","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable, connector saver, and test stand cabling",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Procedure, training","Assembly procedures ensure proper connector mating and handling",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 3.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system.",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"Sensor-010","Sensor","Elec","Back substrate voltage on EO test stand","Drains are \"off\" and BS is \"On\" could cause a destructive current to appear ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","Enable/Shorting  switch on  REB on allows application of BS after stable conditions satisfied - firmware and/or hardware control  from CABAC",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,null,null,null,"2017-11-01"]
[null,"Sensor-011","Sensor","Elec","Output Drain and Output Diode voltage on EO test stand","Output Drain and Output Diode :  always + with respect to FSS. Forward biasing of junction will cause damage of sensor ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","The Quad preamplifier board interfacing to the sensors in TS3 has TVS TVS protection diodes",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Sensor-012","Sensor","Elec","Gate over-voltage on EO test stand","Excursions of transistor gates in the  CCD readout  structures  outside their allowable range could damage sensor",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10794    \nShorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure controls ",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify safety features and procidures",null,null,null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Sensor-013","Sensor","Elec","Power On & Back Bias activation on EO test stand","Activating the Back Substrate (step 5) before the Bias voltages (step 2) are set to minimal values may cause damage to the sensors",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","The refex controller has a startup script coordinated with the Keithley power supply to ensure proper power sequencing",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,null,null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[null,"Sensor-014","Sensor","Env","Radiation","Personnel hazard from exposure to Iron 55 Radiation Source ",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","Radiation sources shall be handled according to all applicable codes and standards. This may include shielding, rad surveys, barriers, personnel dosimetry, inventory control, and procedures  ",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","Audit dosimetry monitoring and procedures",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"Sensor-015","Sensor","Press/Vac","Test Stand #3 Dewar hazards","Personnel hazard associated with the Test Stand # 3 Dewar inclued: ODH, cryo burns, personel injury due to window failure durng purge  ",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","Implement BNL occupational safety standards including: ODH analysis and monitoring if required, analysis of chamber and PRV for purge system,  training and PPE for work with cryogens",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","Safety reviews to verify implementation of safety plans and requirements",null,null,null,null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[null,"Sensor-016","Sensor","Env","MOSFET radio- sensitivity","Local use of portable radios can RF power at certain frequencies near the focal plane, causing sensor interference or damage ",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Warning device","Post signs prohibiting radio use in vulnerable dome areas (in front of Camera) until  MOSFET effects are quantified",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Inspection","View postings",null,null,null,null,null,"2017-08-01"]
[null,"Srft-001","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower outside min/max operating temp range","Thermal excursion exceeeds allowable limits resulting in damage to electronics or sensors ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Employ automated shutdown/safe-state system timed after automated notifications for temperature excursion (See Hazard Report LCA-10795)",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test notification and shutdown automations","CPS",null,null,null,107,"2014-09-09",1,1]
[null,"Srft-002","Sci Raft","Struc","Dropping a raft","Failure of the springs or attach hardware drops raft onto L3 or swings it over into neighboring sensors  (redesign of hold-down no cam-lock in new design)",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Design raft with appropriate FOS in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":15},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Verify design meets requirements with QA program establilshed in LCA-138 Performance Safety Assurance Plan (PSAP) ",null,null,null,null,null,"2017-05-24",1,1,1,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/222724695/RTM-005%20RTM2%20VTS%20-%20Submitted.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1512941494000&api=v2 "]
[null,"Srft-003","Sci Raft","Struc","Drop raft at load transfer","Mechancial components that have a single failure mode, casuing the raft to fall onto L3 or swing into neighboring rafts / sensors",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","Design raft with appropriate FOS in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard, Design fixtures and tooling with appropriate FOS, establish procedures",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Verify design meets requirements with QA program establilshed in LCA-138 Performance Safety Assurance Plan (PSAP), test procedures with prototype",null,null,null,null,null,"2017-05-24",1,1,1,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/222724695/RTM-005%20RTM2%20VTS%20-%20Submitted.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1512941494000&api=v2"]
[null,"Srft-004","Sci Raft","Struc","Drop sensor off raft","Failure of attachment studs or nuts  causes sensor to fall off raft",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and designed with high margins of safety; design per mechancial standard LCA-280",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Run strength qualification tests on the stud design, and on the full sensor mech assembly",null,null,null,null,null,"2017-05-24",1,1,1,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/222724695/RTM-005%20RTM2%20VTS%20-%20Submitted.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1512941494000&api=v2"]
[null,"Srft-005","Sci Raft","Elec","Over-current damage to REB or sensor or raft","Loss of a sensor or raft due to uncontrolled short to ground or over-current condition",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Over-current protection in power supplies protect REB and  raft from short",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Run qualification test on system","CPS",null,null,null,67,"2017-05-24",1,1]
[null,"Srft-006","Sci Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower",3,"B",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":9},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10794. ESD damage is controlled in the Cleanroom by maintaining EPAs, which are labeled. Grounding Monitors and other EPA equipment, such as ESD table mats and air ionizers, are used, maintained and tested in accordance with LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations). CCD and raft electronics are grounded to the same potention when integrating in accordance with procedures. ",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Monitor assembly and test operations for proper use of ESD controls ",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2017-05-24",1,1,null,null,"Continuous"]
[null,"Srft-007","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from materials","Materials or parts with volatile compounds outgas vapor that plates onto sensors, possibly damaging them permanently",1,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":4},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"High"},"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741. Staff shall be trained in proper cleaning and handling techniques and procedures, including LCA-13493 (Cleaning Standards), LCA-14987 (Process Control), LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations), and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706.",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Monitor assembly and test operations for proper use of contamination controls ",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2017-05-24",1,1]
[null,"Srft-008","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by by-products of component failure","An electronic component fails energeticaly producing smoke, contaminating the sensors",1,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":8},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",null,null,null,null,null,"2017-05-24",1,1]
[null,"Srft-009","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by cross-contamination","Contaminants are introduced to a raft tower and subsequently contaminate sensors",1,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":4},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"High"},"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10741. Staff shall be trained in proper cleaning and handling techniques and procedures, including L:CA-13493 (Cleaning Standards), LCA-14987 (Process Control), LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations), and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706.",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","Monitor assembly and test operations for proper use of contamination controls ",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2017-05-24",1,1]
[null,"Srft-010","Sci Raft","Struc","Sensor damaged by small part","Screw backs out or electronic component breaks off under thermal cycling, dropping onto sensor backside",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Design / choice of lock harwdare, installation torque / procedures.  Contamination barriers that separate REB space from CCD space are rigid enough to protect sensors. Verify electronic component assembly to IPC3 standards. All fasteners to use locking device.",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Control screws by design, installation of barriers, and assemble verifications",null,null,null,null,null,"2017-05-24",1,1,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/222724695/RTM-005%20RTM2%20VTS%20-%20Submitted.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1512941494000&api=v2"]
[null,"Srft-011","Sci Raft","Elec","Input voltage out of range","An input voltage to the REB is over-voltage and  damages the FPGA, components on the board, or CCD",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety device","Over-voltage proctection on power supplies",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify that over-voltage protection is operational",null,null,null,null,null,"2017-05-03"]
[null,"Srft-012","Sci Raft","Elec","CCD power on sequence","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed ",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Produce test reports for code and firmware controls",null,null,null,null,null,"2018-05-10",1,1]
[null,"Srft-013","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up","CCDs receive getter contaminants during warm-up since getter can't keep up with ramp-up rate of Cryo Plate and Grid, causing degradation in sensor performance",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","See Hazard Report",null,null,null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Srft-014","Sci Raft","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable and REB",4,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":18},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Procedure, training","Staff shall be trained in proper handling techniques and handling procedures, including LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations) and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations).",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system.",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Srft-015","Sci Raft","Struc","Mechanical damage to REB's","Boards can be mechanically damaged during handling causing solder joint hairline cracks or other componet structural damage",4,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":18},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Procedure, training","Staff shall be trained in proper handling techniques and handling procedures, including LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations) and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations).",4,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":20},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Low"},"Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system.",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2017-05-01"]
[null,"Srft-016","Sci Raft","Elec","Back substrate voltage","Drains are \"off\" and BS is \"On\" could cause a destructive current to appear ",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA 10747  Enable/Shorting  switch on  REB on allows application of BS after stable conditions satisfied - firmware and/or hardware control ",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,null,null,null,"2017-10-31",null,null,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/222724695/RTM-005%20RTM2%20VTS%20-%20Submitted.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1512941494000&api=v2"]
[null,"Srft-017","Sci Raft","Elec","Output Drain and Output Diode voltage","Output Drain and Output Diode :  always + with respect to FSS. Forward biasing of junction will cause damage of sensor ",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety feature","Add diode to prevent these from going very negative (>1.0V) ",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Audit","View placed diode",null,null,null,null,null,"2017-11-02",null,null,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/222724695/RTM-005%20RTM2%20VTS%20-%20Submitted.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1512941494000&api=v2"]
[null,"Srft-018","Sci Raft","Elec","Gate over-voltage","Excursions of transistor gates in the  CCD readout  structures  outside their allowable range could damage sensor",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10794,    Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller and REB outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller  or  REB at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure control - per LCA-10794.",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","View protection diodes. Audit ESD Program. ",null,null,null,null,null,"2017-05-03",null,null,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/222724695/RTM-005%20RTM2%20VTS%20-%20Submitted.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1512941494000&api=v2"]
[null,"Srft-019","Sci Raft","Elec","Power On & Back Bias activation","Activating the Back Substrate (step 5) before the Bias voltages (step 2) are set to minimal values may cause damage to the sensors",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify firmware tests for each raft (See Hazard Report 10747)",null,null,null,null,null,"2015-07-17",null,null,null,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/222724695/RTM-005%20RTM2%20VTS%20-%20Submitted.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1512941494000&api=v2"]
[null,"Srft-020","Sci Raft","Elec","On board circuit failure","On board circuit internal failure could cause damage to a sensor ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","Reliability issue. Addressed by  design,  calculation and lifetime testing of on board circuits - addressed in electronics reliability plan.",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,null,null,null,"2017-05-24",1,1,1,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/222724695/RTM-005%20RTM2%20VTS%20-%20Submitted.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1512941494000&api=v2"]
[null,"Srft-021","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from electronics due to overheating","Over heating of the electronics could cause outgassing and damage to the focal plane ",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Overcurrent detector, switch, or fuse in power supplies. (See Hazard Report LCA-10741)",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test overcurrent detector, switch, or fuse in power supplies","CPS",null,null,null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[null,"Srft-022","Sci Raft","Struc","Sensor loses thermal contact to raft","Failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and will have lock washer, or equivalent to prevent loosening.",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Process control","Design/build with prevention measures",null,null,null,null,null,"2017-11-01",1,1,1,null,"https://confluence.slac.stanford.edu/download/attachments/222724695/RTM-005%20RTM2%20VTS%20-%20Submitted.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1512941494000&api=v2"]
[null,"Srft-023","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","REB under-temperature","Unpowered REBs can suffer undertemperatures should the cold plate heater fail while cryoplate cooling continues running",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Put in place active monitoring and controls to shut down cryoplate and cold plate cooling upon cold plate under temperature",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify shutoff is effected by coldplate failure","CPS","Y",null,null,null,"2017-03-01"]
[null,"Srft-024","Sci Raft","Env","Overhumidity in clean room","Condensate from too-high humidity in clean roomcan collect on sensors, damaging sensors",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Warning device","Assign equipment monitoring staff for all activities. Upon humidity alarm, follow response procedures to place equipment into a safe state. ",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test humidity alarm system",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2017-03-01"]
[null,"Srft-025","Sci Raft","Env","Ambient particle count too high","In clean room, airborne particles from any source can accumulate and damage hardware",3,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":14},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Warning device","Assign equipment monitoring staff for all activities. Upon particle count alarm during exposure, follow response procedures to place equipment into a safe state. ",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test particle counter alarm",null,"Y",null,null,null,"2017-07-20"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,null,null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}}]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,null,null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}}]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},null,null,null,null,{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":{"$error":"#N/A"}}]
[]
[]
[null,null,"Tables for Data Validation"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"SUM(V218:V230)","v":203},null,"Sums:",{"$f":"SUM(Y8:Y213)","v":106},{"$f":"SUM(Z8:Z213)","v":106}]
[null,null,"Optics","Therm/Cryo",null,null,1,"A",null,"High","Eliminate hazard","Remove the hazard altogether",null,null,null,"High","Test","Functional test of installed system verifies mitigation functions correctly",null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Subsystem],X218)","v":18},null,"Optics",{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Opt*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":0},{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Opt*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":0}]
[null,null,"Filter-X","Press/Vac",null,null,2,"B",null,"Serious","Control hazard","Change design/manufacturing plans to reduce risk of mishap",null,null,null,"Serious","Inspection","Visual inspection or measurement verifies mitigation is applied as-req'd",null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Subsystem],X219)","v":19},null,"Filter-X",{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Fil*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":0},{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Fil*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":0}]
[null,null,"Shutter","Mech",null,null,3,"C",null,"Medium","Safety feature","Incorporate passive or static interveners to prevent a mishap",null,null,null,"Medium","Process control","Control parts/mat'l selection; qual/proof test; fab/ass'y process controls",null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Subsystem],X220)","v":7},null,"Shutter",{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Shu*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":0},{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Shu*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":0}]
[null,null,"Cryostat","Struc",null,null,4,"D",null,"Low","Safety device","Add active device or monitor to interrupt mishap sequence",null,null,null,"Low","Audit","Check of in situ mitigations verifies that they are being used",null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Subsystem],X221)","v":20},null,"Cryostat",{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Cry*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":20},{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Cry*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":20}]
[null,null,"Refrig","Elec",null,null,null,"E",null,null,"Warning device","Incorporate monitors and warning of incipient mishap",null,null,null,null,"Review","Review or analysis of mitigation plans indicates that they will reduce hazard level",null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Subsystem],X222)","v":14},null,"Refrig",{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Ref*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":14},{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Ref*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":14}]
[null,null,"Sci Raft","Control",null,null,null,null,null,null,"Procedure, training","Invoke special procedures, PPE, dedicated equipment",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Subsystem],X223)","v":25},null,"Sci Raft",{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Sci*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":13},{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Sci*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":13}]
[null,null,"CCS","Env",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Subsystem],X224)","v":1},null,"CCS",{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=CCS*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":0},{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=CCS*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":0}]
[null,null,"Com Cam","Fire",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Subsystem],X225)","v":14},null,"Com Cam",{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Com*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":12},{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Com*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":12}]
[null,null,"Crnr Raft","Matl's",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Subsystem],X226)","v":15},null,"Crnr Raft",{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Crn*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":0},{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Crn*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":0}]
[null,null,"Sys Elec",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Subsystem],X227)","v":4},null,"Sys Elec",{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Sys E*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":4},{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Sys E*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":4}]
[null,null,"Sensor",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Subsystem],X228)","v":16},null,"Sensor",{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Sens*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":0},{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Sens*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":0}]
[null,null,"I&T",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Subsystem],X229)","v":42},null,"I&T",{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=I&T*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":41},{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=I&T*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":41}]
[null,null,"Cam Bdy",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Subsystem],X230)","v":8},null,"Cam Bdy",{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Cam B*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":2},{"$f":"SUMIF(Hazards[Subsystem], \"=Cam B*\",$Y$8:$Y$213)","v":2}]
[]
[null,null,"Statistics on Hazards","Hazard Type"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"Risk Category",null,null,"Mitigation Strategy",null,null,null,null,null,"Verification Method"]
[null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Type],E234)","v":13},"Therm/Cryo",null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Risk Category],J234)","v":8},"High",{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Mitigation Strategy],L234)","v":16},{"$f":"K218","v":"Eliminate hazard"},null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Verif Method],R234)","v":72},{"$f":"Q218","v":"Test"}]
[null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Type],E235)","v":19},"Press/Vac",null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Risk Category],J235)","v":55},"Serious",{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Mitigation Strategy],L235)","v":69},"Control hazard",null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Verif Method],R235)","v":17},{"$f":"Q219","v":"Inspection"}]
[null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Type],E236)","v":46},"Mech",null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Risk Category],J236)","v":124},"Medium",{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Mitigation Strategy],L236)","v":21},"Safety feature",null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Verif Method],R236)","v":31},{"$f":"Q220","v":"Process control"}]
[null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Type],E237)","v":34},"Struc",null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Risk Category],J237)","v":7},"Low",{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Mitigation Strategy],L237)","v":37},"Safety device",null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Verif Method],R237)","v":41},{"$f":"Q221","v":"Audit"}]
[null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Type],E238)","v":33},"Elec",null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Mitigation Strategy],L238)","v":4},"Warning device",null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Verif Method],R238)","v":28},{"$f":"Q222","v":"Review"}]
[null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Type],E239)","v":4},"Control",null,null,null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Mitigation Strategy],L239)","v":43},"Procedure, training"]
[null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Type],E240)","v":21},"Env",null,null,null,{"$f":"SUM(I234:I239)","v":194},"Total",{"$f":"SUM(K234:K239)","v":190},"Total",null,null,null,null,{"$f":"SUM(Q234:Q239)","v":189},"Total"]
[null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Type],E241)","v":3},"Fire"]
[null,null,null,{"$f":"COUNTIF(Hazards[Type],E242)","v":19},"Matl's",null,null,null,{"$f":"IF(I240-$B$245=0,\"OK\",\"Not OK\")","v":"Not OK"},"Cross-check",{"$f":"IF(K240-$B$245=0,\"OK\",\"Not OK\")","v":"Not OK"},"Cross-check",null,null,null,null,{"$f":"IF(Q240-$B$245=0,\"OK\",\"Not OK\")","v":"Not OK"},"Cross-check"]
[null,null,null,{"$f":"SUM(D234:D242)","v":192},"Total"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"1A",1,"High"]
[null,{"$f":"COUNTA(Hazards['#])","v":201},"Total",{"$f":"IF(D243-$B$245=0,\"OK\",\"Not OK\")","v":"Not OK"},"Cross-check",null,null,"2A",3,"High"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"3A",7,"Serious"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"4A",13,"Medium"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"1B",2,"High"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"2B",5,"High"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"3B",9,"Serious"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"4B",16,"Medium"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"1C",4,"High"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"2C",6,"Serious"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"3C",11,"Medium"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"4C",18,"Low"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"1D",8,"Serious"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"2D",10,"Medium"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"3D",14,"Medium"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"4D",19,"Low"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"1E",12,"Medium"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"2E",15,"Medium"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"3E",17,"Medium"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"4E",20,"Low"]

{"sheet":"3. Hazard Assessment Tables","index":2,"n_rows":28,"n_cols":13,"rows_kept":28,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[17,2,19,2],[17,3,19,3],[15,7,19,7],[11,2,13,2],[11,3,13,3],[14,2,16,2],[14,3,16,3],[8,2,10,2],[8,3,10,3],[12,10,14,10],[12,11,14,11],[12,12,14,12],[11,9,11,12],[12,9,14,9]]}
[]
[null,null,null,null,{"$f":"'1.  Intro, Def''s, Change Log'!B10","v":"LSST Camera Hazard List"},null,null,{"$f":"'1.  Intro, Def''s, Change Log'!D3","v":"LCA-15-G"},"2014-09-09"]
[null,null,"3.  Hazard Assessment Tables"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"Print Date: ",{"$f":"NOW()","v":"2018-06-12T13:59:09.760"}]
[]
[]
[null,null,null,null,"Hazard Severity Classification"]
[null,null,"Class","Description","Potential Consequences"]
[null,null,1,"Catastrophic","Injury:  may cause death or permanently-disabling injury"]
[null,null,null,null,"Property damage:  near-complete loss of camera system"]
[null,null,null,null,"Environment:  irreversible severe environmental damage"]
[null,null,2,"Critical","Injury:   severe injury, occupational illness, or permanent partial disability",null,null,null,null,"Severity"]
[null,null,null,null,"Property damage:  major damage to system; loss of major subsystem(s)",null,null,null,null,"1—Catastrophic","2—Critical","3—Marginal","4—Negligible"]
[null,null,null,null,"Environment:  significant reversible environmental damage",null,null,null,"Mishap Risk Assessment Value"]
[null,null,3,"Marginal","Injury:  minor injury or occupational illness"]
[null,null,null,null,"Property damage:  minor damage to camera or subsystem, recoverable with minimal impact on program",null,null,"Prboability","A—Frequent",1,3,7,13]
[null,null,null,null,"Environment:  mitigatible environmental damage, where restoration activities can be accomplished",null,null,null,"B—Probable",2,5,9,16]
[null,null,4,"Negligible","Injury:  minor first aid treatment; personal health not affected",null,null,null,"C—Possible",4,6,11,18]
[null,null,null,null,"Property damage:  more than normal wear and tear; easily recoverable within scope of standard maintenance",null,null,null,"D—Remote",8,10,14,19]
[null,null,null,null,"Environment:  minimal environmental damage",null,null,null,"E—Improbable",12,15,17,20]
[]
[null,null,null,null,"Hazard Probability Level"]
[null,null,"Level","Frequency of Occurrence","Definition",null,null,null,"Mishap Risk Categories"]
[null,null,"A","Frequent","Likely to occur often in the life of the Camera (X > 10-1)",null,null,null,"Risk Assessment Value",null,"Description"]
[null,null,"B","Probable","Will occur several times in the life of the Camera  (10-1 > X > 10-2)",null,null,null,"1-5",null,"High"]
[null,null,"C","Possible","Likely to occur sometime in the life of the Camera (10-2 > X > 10-3)",null,null,null,"6-9",null,"Serious"]
[null,null,"D","Remote","Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of the Camera  (10-3 > X > 10-6)",null,null,null,"10-17",null,"Medium"]
[null,null,"E","Improbable","So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced",null,null,null,"18-20",null,"Low"]

{"sheet":"SubsysFileNames","index":3,"n_rows":11,"n_cols":3,"rows_kept":11,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["Workbook Names","Last save date"]
["Sensor_Hazards.xlsm","2014-05-14T12:20:38","Sensor"]
["SciRaft_Hazards.xlsm","2014-05-14T12:20:30","SciRaft"]
["Optics_Hazards.xlsm","2014-08-07T14:31:33","Optics"]
["IandT_Hazards.xlsm","2014-07-10T19:34:24","IandT"]
["EXCH_Hazards.xlsm","2014-08-29T10:31:26","EXCH"]
["ELX_Hazards.xlsm","2014-05-14T12:19:37","ELX"]
["Cryostat_Hazards.xlsm","2014-07-10T21:27:52","Cryostat"]
["CornerRaft_Hazards.xlsm","2014-07-10T18:50:44","CornerRaft"]
["CCS_Hazards.xlsm","2014-05-14T12:17:20","CCS"]
["CBM_Hazards.xlsm","2014-05-16T17:55:40","CBM"]

{"sheet":"Changelog","index":4,"n_rows":1789,"n_cols":24,"rows_kept":1789,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
[null,null,null,"Hazard Identification",null,"Un-Mitigated Hazard and Risk Level",null,null,null,null,null,"Mitigation Method / Updated Hazard and Risk Level",null,null,null,null,null,"Verification"]
[null,"#","Subsystem","Type","Title","Hazard Description","Severity","Probability","Risk Value","Risk Category","Mitigation Strategy","Mitigation Description","Severity","Probability","Risk Value","Risk Category","Verif Method","Verification Plan","Protection    System?","O&SHA?","Revision Date"]
[]
[]
["change log for date 8/5/2014 11:24:44 AM"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"IT-001","I&T","Mech","Sensor damaged during integration","Sensor collides with adjacent sensor, raft, or tooling during acceptance testing or integration",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training"," Lateral tolerance study performed, LCA-10738, used in design to maintain proper clearances.  Installation tooling design and assembly procedures for adequate clearance between sensors during assembly. ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","Verify no sensors have been damaged",null,null,"Revised 25-Mar-14"]
["To",null,null,null,"XX","XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"IT-001","I&T","Mech","Sensor damaged during (de)integration","Sensor collides with adjacent sensor, raft, or tooling during acceptance testing, integration or deintegration. Probable damage to sensor. Cost of 1+ sensors plus replacement time lost per occurance. source, mechanism, outcome",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training"," Lateral tolerance study performed, LCA-10738, used in design to maintain proper clearances.  Installation tooling design and assembly procedures for adequate clearance between sensors during assembly. ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","Verify no sensors have been damaged",null,null,"Revised 28-Jun-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"IT-010","I&T","Elec","Shock from unsafe electronics","If custom-designed electronics are not safely designe, then personnel may get shocked",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","Design to national standards; incorporate safety devices to limit max current",3,"E",17,"Medium","Review","Review design and as-built boards to ensure they are designed and built to national standards"]
["To",null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"IT-010","I&T","Elec","Shock from unsafe electronics","If custom-designed electronics are not safely designed, then personnel may get shocked. ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","Design to national standards; incorporate safety devices to limit max current",3,"E",17,"Medium","Review","Review design and as-built boards to ensure they are designed and built to national standards",null,null,"Revised 28-Jun-14"]
[]
["Risk added"]
[null,"IT-013","I&T","Matl's","Surface damage to lens","AR coating or glass surface damaged. Occurs by abrasion, or collision when exposed. Repolish or recoating could be needed depending on damage level.",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety device","Have optics covered by protective gear at all times when not in use.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Inspection","Visual checks of lens surfaces",null,null,"Revised 30-Jun-14"]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-001","Filter-X","Therm/Cryo","Carousel drive motor over-heating","Stall overheats and damages the motor",4,"C",18,"Low","Safety device","Torque monitor on motor drive shaft shuts off motor before reaching stall torque\nCurrent monitor shuts off motor if current exceeds a pre-tested max value",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Test torque and current monitors as part of carousel proof test ","CPS"]
["To",null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-001","Filter-X","Therm/Cryo","Carousel drive motor over-heating","This hazard is no longer current it is incorporated into hazard EXCH-021",4,"C",18,"Low","Safety device","Torque monitor on motor drive shaft shuts off motor before reaching stall torque\nCurrent monitor shuts off motor if current exceeds a pre-tested max value",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Test torque and current monitors as part of carousel proof test ",null,null,"2014-03-04"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-002","Filter-X","Therm/Cryo","Changer drive motor over-heating","Stall overheats and damages the motor",4,"C",18,"Low","Safety device","Torque monitor on motor drive shaft shuts off motor before reaching stall torque\nCurrent monitor shuts off motor if current exceeds a pre-tested max value",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Test torque and current monitors as part of carousel proof test ","CPS"]
["To",null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-002","Filter-X","Therm/Cryo","Changer drive motor over-heating","This hazard is no longer current it is incorporated into hazard EXCH-021",4,"C",18,"Low","Safety device","Torque monitor on motor drive shaft shuts off motor before reaching stall torque\nCurrent monitor shuts off motor if current exceeds a pre-tested max value",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Test torque and current monitors as part of carousel proof test ",null,null,"2014-03-04"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-003","Filter-X","Mech","Physical collision of exchange system parts","Inadvertant execution of an action while the system is in a state that is not safe for that action",2,"B",5,"High","Safety device","Switches monitor the condition of all actuatable systems, with positive signal required to enable an action",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Test instrumentation as part of exchange system performance verification","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-003","Filter-X","Mech","Physical collision of exchange system parts","Inadvertant execution of an action while the system is in a state that is not safe for that action",2,"B",5,"High","Safety device","Switches monitor the condition of all actuatable systems, with positive signal required to enable an action",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Test instrumentation as part of exchange system performance verification","CPS",null,"2014-10-02"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-004","Filter-X","Mech","Dropping a filter","During a filter hand-off, release of one set of filter clamps prior to the second set engaging",2,"B",5,"High","Safety device","Switches monitor the position of all clamps, with positive signal required to enable an action",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Test instrumentation as part of exchange system performance verification","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-004","Filter-X","Mech","Dropping a filter","Improper sequencing of clamps leaves a filter in an unsecured condition",2,"B",5,"High","Safety device","Switches monitor the position of all mechanisms, and will only open when system is in a safe state",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Test instrumentation as part of exchange system performance verification","CPS",null,"2014-03-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-005","Filter-X","Mech","Single-point failure","Mechanical failure of a single-point failure item:  axles, flip rails, filter latches, truck wheels, keys on drive shafts",2,"C",6,"Serious","Control hazard","Hardware purchased to national standards; proof testing",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","Proof test items and system; inspect as part of PM plans"]
["To",null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-005","Filter-X","Mech","Single-point failure","Mechanical failure of a single-point failure item:  axles, filter latches, truck wheels, keys on drive shafts",2,"C",6,"Serious","Control hazard","Design hardware in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard, ",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","Analysis, proof testing and inspection as part of PM plans",null,null,"2014-03-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-006","Filter-X","Mech","Wear/fatigue failure","Failure due to long-term wear or cyclic loading causing fatigue failure",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Perform periodic inspections and preventive maintenance to identify wear",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","Review inspection and PM plans",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-006","Filter-X","Mech","Wear/fatigue failure","Failure due to long-term wear or cyclic loading causing fatigue failure",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Design hardware in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard, perform periodic inspections to identify wear and preventive maintenance ",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","Review inspection and PM plans",null,null,"2014-10-04"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-007","Filter-X","Mech","Personnel injury","Pinch points, closing apertures, rolling and sliding parts are exposed to personnel working on the system",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Add engineering solutions to protect personnel, add lock-out/tag-out provisions, add sensors, add guards, add emergency shut-off",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","Inspect safety systems during verification testing; include in periodic inspection and PM plans","CPS Add-on",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-007","Filter-X","Mech","Personnel injury","Pinch points, closing apertures, rolling and sliding parts are exposed to personnel working on the system",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Engineered safety features  to protect personnel, lock-out/tag-out provisions,  sensors,   emergency shut-off",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","Inspect safety systems during verification testing; include in periodic inspection and PM plans","CPS",null,"2011-04-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-008","Filter-X","Struc","Linkage buckling","Buckling or structural failure of thin linkage members, causing damage to Shutter or filter",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Design linkage to carry loads consistent with stall force of motor",4,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","Proof test the linkage, then run verification tests as part of Changer testing"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX","XX",null,"XX","XX",null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-008","Filter-X","Struc","Linkage buckling","Buckling or structural failure of thin linkage members, causing damage to Shutter or filter",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Design linkage in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard to carry loads consistent with stall force of motor",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","Proof test the linkage, then run verification tests as part of Changer testing",null,null,"2014-02-24"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-009","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rotation of the Carousel","Inadvertant rotation of the carousel and collision of a filter by back-driving through the drive train; this can occur when an unbalanced load of filters places a torque on the Carousel",2,"C",6,"Serious","Eliminate hazard","Use a non-back-driveable gear train, or add a power-off brake to prevent uncommanded rotation, even when the power is off",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Proof test the Carousel to demonstrate that gear train can not be back-driven, even under seismic loads"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-009","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rotation of the Carousel","Inadvertant rotation of the carousel and collision of a filter by back-driving through the drive train; this can occur when an unbalanced load of filters places a torque on the Carousel",2,"C",6,"Serious","Eliminate hazard","Use a non-back-driveable gear train, or add a power-off brake to prevent uncommanded rotation, even when the power is off",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Proof test the Carousel to demonstrate that gear train can not be back-driven, even under seismic loads",null,null,"2011-04-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-010","Filter-X","Mech","Driving Carousel blind","Inadvertant collision and damage to a filter by losing or not tracking the position of the carousel while it is rotating",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety device","Rotator encoders or periodic switches establish the Carousel's rotary position during normal operation or after a loss of power or control",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that switches and controls prevent motions that would lead to collision","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-010","Filter-X","Mech","Driving Carousel blind","Inadvertant collision and damage to a filter by losing or not tracking the position of the carousel while it is rotating",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety device","Position sensors or periodic switches establish the Carousel's rotary position during normal operation or after a loss of power or control",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that switches and controls prevent motions that would lead to collision","CPS",null,"2014-03-24"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-011","Filter-X","Mech","Carousel misalignment","Carousel stops in the wrong place for a filter exchange, and filter is damaged by the Auto Changer ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety device","Position sensors will indicate when the Carousel is correctly located, and enable the Auto Changer to move; locking pins may also be used",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that switches and controls prevent motions that would lead to collision","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-011","Filter-X","Mech","Carousel misalignment","Carousel stops in the wrong place for a filter exchange, and filter is damaged by the Auto Changer ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety device","Position sensors will indicate when the Carousel is correctly located, and enable the Auto Changer to move",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that switches and controls prevent motions that would lead to collision","CPS",null,"2014-03-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-012","Filter-X","Mech","Carousel clamp failure","Carousel clamp inadvertently releases, dropping a filter and damaging it",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","Clamps are spring-load in the clamped position, so they are fail safe from loss of power or actuator force; clamps are designed to carry full seismic and handling loads of the filters",4,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that switches and controls prevent motions that would lead to collision"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,"XX","XX",null,"XX",null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-012","Filter-X","Mech","Carousel clamp failure","Carousel clamp inadvertently releases, dropping a filter and damaging it",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","Clamps are spring-load in the clamped position, so they are fail safe from loss of power or actuator force; clamps are designed to carry full seismic and handling loads of the filters",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Proof test the carousel clamps, run verification tests as part of Carousel testing ",null,null,"2014-03-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-013","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rolling of filter in Auto Changer","Inadvertant rolling of the filter on the Auto Changer trucks by back-driving through the drive train, leading to collision of the filter with another filter",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Use a non-back-driveable drive train, or add a power-off brake to prevent uncommanded motion even when the power is off",4,"E",20,"Low","Process control","Proof test the Auto Changer to demonstrate that drive train can not be back-driven"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-013","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rolling of filter in Auto Changer","Inadvertant rolling of the filter on the Auto Changer trucks by back-driving through the drive train, leading to collision of the filter with another filter",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Use a non-back-driveable drive train, or add a power-off brake to prevent uncommanded motion even when the power is off",4,"E",20,"Low","Process control","Proof test the Auto Changer to demonstrate that drive train can not be back-driven",null,null,"2014-03-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-014","Filter-X","Mech","Dropping filter off Auto Changer truck","Latch mechanism that holds the filter releases and drops the filter, damaging it and L2, L3, or the Shutter",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","Latch mechansim is spring-loaded into the normally-latched position to prevent a drop; power and an enable signal is required to unlatch a filter",3,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Run proof tests to verify that latch can carry max load without unlatching"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX","XX",null,"XX",null,null,null,"XX",null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-014","Filter-X","Mech","Dropping filter off Auto Changer truck","Latch mechanism that holds the filter releases and drops the filter, damaging it and L2, L3, or the Shutter",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","Power and an enable signal is required to unlatch a filter",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Run proof tests to verify that latch can carry max load without unlatching","CPS",null,"2014-03-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-015","Filter-X","Mech","Driving filter off the end of Auto Changer rails","If the flip rail is flipped flat, the Auto Changer could drive a filter right off the end of the fixed-rail segment, damaging the filter and Carousel",2,"D",20,"Low","Safety device","Limit switches on the flip rail positively determine when the rail is in place and ready; these provide an \"enable\" signal to allow the Auto Changer to move",3,"E",20,"Low","Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that limit switches prevent motions that would lead to driving off the rail","CPS"]
["To",null,null,null,null,"XX","XX","XX","XX","XX",null,null,"XX",null,"XX","XX",null,null,"XX",null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-015","Filter-X","Mech","Driving filter off the end of Auto Changer rails","This hazard is eliminated due to the design change that eliminated the flip rails",4,"E",20,"Low","Safety device","Limit switches on the flip rail positively determine when the rail is in place and ready; these provide an \"enable\" signal to allow the Auto Changer to move",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that limit switches prevent motions that would lead to driving off the rail",null,null,"2014-03-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-016","Filter-X","Mech","Flip Rails fail, dropping a filter","During a filter hand-off, if the flip-rails flip flat or unlock, the filter and trucks can move around, damaging the filter and neighboring filters",3,"D",20,"Low","Eliminate hazard","Latch mechanism on the flip rails are normally-latched or bi-stable overcenter latches which prevent flip rails from rotating, even at loss of power",4,"E",20,"Low","Process control","Proof test the flip rail mechanism to ensure it cannot flip flat due to an accidental overload",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,"XX","XX","XX","XX","XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-016","Filter-X","Mech","Flip Rails fail, dropping a filter","This hazard is eliminated due to the design change that eliminated the flip rails",4,"E",20,"Low","Eliminate hazard","Latch mechanism on the flip rails are normally-latched or bi-stable overcenter latches which prevent flip rails from rotating, even at loss of power",4,"E",20,"Low","Process control","Proof test the flip rail mechanism to ensure it cannot flip flat due to an accidental overload",null,null,"2014-03-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-017","Filter-X","Mech","Rotator starts to move Camera","Telescope rotator rotates Camera while Auto Changer is transporting a filter; possibly damaging trucks or filter mount",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","Tiltmeter and accelerometer on housing monitors orientation of Camera and stop changer",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Test functionality of tiltmeter during system testing","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-017","Filter-X","Mech","Rotator starts to move Camera","Telescope rotator rotates Camera while Auto Changer is transporting a filter; possibly damaging trucks or filter mount",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","Tiltmeter or accelerometer on camera housing monitors orientation of Camera and stops changer",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Test functionality of tiltmeter during system testing","CPS",null,"2014-03-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-018","Filter-X","Mech","Drive screw buckling","Long drive ball screw is in compression during parts of the change and could buckle if load is high enough",3,"E",14,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","Size drive screw with conservative margins even under seismic and motor stall loads",4,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Qual test bearings with max stall loads at critical carriage position where buckling loads are highest"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX","XX",null,null,null,"XX",null,"XX","XX",null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-018","Filter-X","Mech","Drive screw buckling","Long drive ball screw is in compression during parts of the change and could buckle if load is high enough",3,"D",14,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","Size drive screw with conservative margins even under seismic and motor stall loads",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Qual test bearings with max stall loads at critical carriage position where buckling loads are highest",null,null,"2014-03-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-019","Filter-X","Mech","Changer rail mount overload","Rails/support differential CTC causes rails to bow towards each other, pinching filter and trucks, possibly damaging trucks or filter mount",4,"E",19,"Low","Eliminate hazard","Design rail mount to minimize bi-metallic bending effect; tolerance trucks to allow for deviation in position with respect to filter",4,"E",20,"Low","Review","Review design and analysis to ensure thermal distortion is accommodated"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX","XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-019","Filter-X","Mech","Changer rail mount overload","Rails/support differential CTC causes rails to bow towards each other, pinching filter and trucks, possibly damaging trucks or filter mount",4,"D",19,"Low","Eliminate hazard","Design rail mount to minimize bi-metallic bending effect; tolerance trucks to allow for deviation in position with respect to filter",4,"E",20,"Low","Review","Review design and analysis to ensure thermal distortion is accommodated",null,null,"2014-03-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"EXCH-020","Filter-X","Mech","Changer rail misalignment","If Auto Changer rail interface to Carousel is not repeatible at re-installation, then filter could jamb and be damaged during a subsequent exchange",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Incorporate repeatible locating pins to establish correct location of the Changer",4,"E",20,"Low","Process control","Test repeatibility of Changer postioning after re-installation"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"EXCH-020","Filter-X","Mech","Changer rail misalignment","If Auto Changer rail interface to Carousel is not repeatible at re-installation, then filter could jamb and be damaged during a subsequent exchange",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Incorporate repeatable locating pins to establish correct location of the Changer",4,"E",20,"Low","Process control","Test repeatibility of Changer postioning after re-installation"]
[]
["Risk added"]
[null,"EXCH-021","Filter-X","Therm/Cryo","Drive motor overheats ","Stalled motor overheats resulting in damage. This applies to all the motors in the three subsystems (Carousel, AutoChanger, Loader)",4,"C",18,"Low","Control hazard","Current monitor shuts off motor if current exceeds a preset max value. Current preset limit will be defined in the motor controllers.",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Test torque and current monitors as part of carousel proof test ",null,null,"2014-03-14"]
["Risk added"]
[null,"EXCH-022","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rolling of the filter in the Loader","Inadvertant rolling of the filter on the Loader by back driving through the drive train leading to a collision with another filter of the AutoChanger components",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Use a non-back-driveable drive train, or add a power-off brake to prevent uncommanded rotation even when the power is off",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","Proof test the loader to demonstrate that the drive train can not be back-driven",null,null,"2014-03-14"]
["Risk added"]
[null,"ELX-006","Sys Elec","Elec","Raft power supply failure ","Raft power supply failes and sends wrong voltages to the rafts resulting in non operation or damage to the raft",2,"D",10,"Medium",null,"Fault detection and over voltage protection on the power supplies and protection circuits on the REB boards",2,"D",10,"Medium"]
["Risk added"]
[null,"ELX-007","Sys Elec","Elec","Raft power supply loss of AC power","loss of AC power to the raft power supply could lead to undefined transient voltages damaging rafts",2,"D",10,"Medium",null,"REB boards include protection circuits for CCDs for wrong power sequence; Power supply design includes over voltage protection (zehner diodes) and fast shut down capability",2,"D",10,"Medium"]
["Risk added"]
[null,"ELX-008","Sys Elec","Elec","Raft power supply sequence","Wrong  power on or power off sequence could damage the raft electronics",2,"D",10,"Medium",null,"Power supply design includes fixed sequencing in hardware/firmware",2,"D",10,"Medium"]
["Risk added"]
[null,"ELX-009","Sys Elec","Elec","control communication failure","Failure of communication to the electronics inside the Utility Trunk prevents control by CCS and causes the camera to reach a damaging state",2,"D",10,"Medium",null,"Camera Protection System prevents damage to the camera. Communication Infrastructure uses established reliability components and Ethernet infrastructure with remote management features. Ethernet switch location will be easily accessible.",2,"D",10,"Medium"]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-001","Cryostat","Press/Vac","Uncontrolled venting of cryostat","Failure of a vacuum seal in the cryostat leads to uncontrolled venting of the cryostat, possibly introducing contaminants and water vapor into the cryostat which could damage the detectors",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","Use double O-ring seals with an intermediate vacuum groove at all bolted joints. Failure of one seal can be detected. Clean camera volume gas ensures that very clean and dry gas would be ingested into the cryostat",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Test vacuum-tightness of each of the double O-ring seals",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-001","Cryostat","Press/Vac","Uncontrolled venting of cryostat","Failure of a vacuum seal in the cryostat leads to uncontrolled venting of the cryostat, possibly introducing contaminants and water vapor into the cryostat which could damage the detectors",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1-Use double O-ring seals with an intermediate vacuum groove at all bolted joints. Failure of one seal can be detected. \n2-use of all metal seals wherever possible\n3-ensure all valve are normally closed / fail to safe configuration\n4-ensure redundant valve for all critical locations,\n5- implement control system with valve sequencing ensuring proper operation\n6-tst and verification of vacuum control system with double check function confirmation to enusre no unintended vent\n&- implement emergency purge and backfill with clean dry gas ensures that very clean and dry gas would be ingested into the cryostat",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","1-Test vacuum-tightness of each of the double O-ring seals\n2-design reviews of system to ensureproper component selection\n",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-002","Cryostat","Struc","Cryo Plate structural failure","Damage to the Cryo Plate can result from contraction of the plate as it cools down",3,"D",14,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","Use flexures to allow for differential motion between the cold cryo plate and warm cryostat wall",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Analyze and test cryo plate to its survival temperature"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-002","Cryostat","Struc","Cryo Plate structural failure","Damage to the Cryo Plate can result from contraction of the plate as it cools down",3,"D",14,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","1-Use flexures to allow for differential motion between the cold cryo plate and warm cryostat wall\n2-test and verify flexure rigidity / flexibilty per spec\n3-verify thermal performance and differential motion per spec in cryotest facility",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","1-Analyze and test cryo plate and flexures to maximum differential (survival) temperatures"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-003","Cryostat","Struc","Cold Plate structural failure","Damage to the Cold Plate can result from contraction of the plate as it cools down",3,"D",14,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","Use flexures to allow for differential motion between the cold cold plate and warm cryostat wall",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Analyze and test cold plate to its survival temperature"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-003","Cryostat","Struc","Cold Plate structural failure","Damage to the Cold Plate can result from contraction of the plate as it cools down",3,"D",14,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","1-redeisgn of coldplate now non-rigid structrue and compliant to thermal excursinos of support system\n2-verify compliance in cryo-test facility",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","1-Analyze and test cold plate and flexures to maximum differential (survival) temperatures"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-004","Cryostat","Struc","Brittle failure of cryostat parts","Structural failure of components with materials that embrittle as they cool down",3,"D",14,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","Use only materials that do not get brittle at our survival temperatures; if necessary, test materials to ensure compatibility with our temperatures",4,"E",20,"Low","Review","Analyze material behavior as part of material selection process"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-004","Cryostat","Struc","Brittle failure of cryostat parts","Structural failure of components with materials that embrittle as they cool down",3,"D",14,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","1-Use only materials that do not get brittle at our survival temperatures; \n2-complete design and analysis using spec safety factors for critical material / components\n3-test undocumented materials to ensure strength and toughness properties understood / known at operational temperatures\n4-instrument and monitor strains and deflections (implying loads) during test cool downs in cryo test facility",4,"E",20,"Low","Review","1-Analyze material behavior as part of material selection process\n2-review test results to ensure adequate margin with respect to analysis of required material properties\n3-review test results of strain and defelction of camera hardware in cryotest facility"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-005","Cryostat","Struc","Brittle failure of ceramic Grid","Grid is manufactured from SiC ceramic, making it less fracture-tough than metals and making it more susceptible to catastrophic brittle failure",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Design the Grid with large safety factors and test any high-stress regions",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","Analyze and test Grid structure",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-005","Cryostat","Struc","Brittle failure of ceramic Grid","Grid is manufactured from SiC ceramic, making it less fracture-tough than metals and making it more susceptible to catastrophic brittle failure",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","1-design the Grid with large safety factors and test any high-stress regions\n2- complete cold temperature strength and toughness testing on samples\n3-design grid to eliminate joints and elements with potential stress concentrations",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","1-Analyze and test Grid structure\n2-review results of material strength and fracture toughness at operaitn temperature",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-006","Cryostat","Struc","Buckling of flexure","Buckling of a Grid, Cryo or Cold Plate thin-bladed flexure could severely damage the cryostat contents",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","Design flexures with large safety factors; load-test all flexure designs",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","Qual test all flexure designs",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-006","Cryostat","Struc","Buckling of flexure","Buckling of a Grid, Cryo or Cold Plate thin-bladed flexure could severely damage the cryostat contents",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1-design flexures with large safety factors; \n2-load test all flexure designs",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","1-Qualification / acceptance test all flexure designs",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-007","Cryostat","Elec","Heater short to ground","Cryo or Cold Plate heater shorts to ground, overheating the element and possibly causing it to melt",4,"D",19,"Low","Safety device","Use over-current protection and current monitoring to ensure that heater circuits shut off if a short to ground occurs",4,"E",20,"Low","Inspection","Verify that protection circuits are functioning","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-007","Cryostat","Elec","Heater short to ground","Cryo or Cold Plate heater shorts to ground, overheating the element and possibly causing it to melt",4,"D",19,"Low","Safety device","1-electrically isolate heaters from camera ground plane\n2-Use over-current protection and current monitoring to ensure that heater circuits shut off if a short to ground occurs\n3-wire heaters in parallel to ensure shorted heater does not short entire heater system",4,"E",20,"Low","Inspection","1-complete grounding / isolation tests of heater as installed and at operational temperature testing\n2- Verify that protection circuits are functioning","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-008","Cryostat","Control","Cryostat uncontrolled vent","Damage to the cryostat vacuum system and uncontrolled vent due to loss of backing vacuum on turbo-pump",2,"D",10,"Medium","Safety device","Vacuum gauge monitors vacuum; isolation valve closes if pump trips off or pressure rises",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Verify that vacuum gauge and isolation valve function","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-008","Cryostat","Control","Cryostat uncontrolled vent","Damage to the cryostat vacuum system and uncontrolled vent due to loss of backing vacuum on turbo-pump",2,"D",10,"Medium","Safety device","1-ensure all elements, specifcally valves and actuators, fail to a safe conditon, presumably \"closed\" in all cases.\n2-ensure all valves and actuators are redundant where possible, low pressure pumps and high pressure pumps valves between so one inproperly actuated valve does not vent the cryostat\n3-ensure critical vlaves are interlocked to pressure gauging such that inadvertant operation cannot vent the cryostat\n4-complete design of vacuum control systeem / logic to ensure no improper operation of critical valves or actuators.\n5-incorporate \"double check\" system of alerts and quarries / confirmation of valves operations.\n6-do not imbed valve operation in higher level sequence without incorporating descrete \"yes/ no\" provision / quarries in routine.",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","1- Verify isolation valve function and failure state\n2-review system level functional diagrams and ensure fault tree is consitent with operaitonal modes and function\n3-test pressure interlock function for ciritcal valves prior to sensor I&T\n4-complete extensive testing on vacuum control systeem / logic to ensure no improper operation of critical valves or actuators.\n","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-009","Cryostat","Control","Cryo, Cold Plate under-temp","Cryo or Cold Plate drop below their min operating limits",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","Temp sensors on Cryo and Cold plates provide feedback; under-temp switches turn off Refrig Systems, turn on plate heaters; design and test components to survival temp",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Test monitoring feedback control and under-temp switches","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-009","Cryostat","Control","Cryo, Cold Plate under-temp","Cryo or Cold Plate drop below their min operating limits",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","1-design hardware to survive minimum refrigeration temperature.\n2-Temp sensors on Cryo and Cold plates provide feedback to heaters and refigeration;\n3-under-temp switches turn off Refrig Systems, turn on plate heaters;\n4- design and test components to survival temp",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1-Test monitoring feedback control and under-temp switches","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-010","Cryostat","Control","Cryo, Cold Plate over-temp","Cryo or Cold Plate exceed their max operating limits",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","Temp sensors on Cryo and Cold plates provide feedback; over-temp switches cut power to heaters and RCM power supplies",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Test montiroing feedback control and over-temp switches","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-010","Cryostat","Control","Cryo, Cold Plate over-temp","Cryo or Cold Plate exceed their max operating limits",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","1-design hardware to survive maximum possible temperature with heaters on / refrig lower cooling cpacity\n2- Temp sensors on Cryo and Cold plates provide feedback; over-temp switches cut power to heaters and RCM power supplies",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1-Test montiroing feedback control and over-temp switches","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-011","Cryostat","Env","GN2 purge asphyxiant hazard","Nitrogen purge on the cryostat during backfills and personnel access could generate a low-oxygen volume hazardous for personnel",2,"D",10,"Medium","Procedure, training","Use oxygen-deficiency monitors near the cryostat during accesses to ensure that personnel are not at risk of asphyxiation",2,"E",15,"Medium","Audit","Test ODM perodically, verify alarm setpoint, train personnel in use ",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-011","Cryostat","Env","GN2 purge asphyxiant hazard","Nitrogen purge on the cryostat during backfills and personnel access could generate a low-oxygen volume hazardous for personnel",2,"D",10,"Medium","Procedure, training","1-use highly reliable all metal sealing of all GN2 containers, transfer lines and connections to minimize possibility of leak\n2-use low pressure (dewar boil off or bottle) GN2 supply to limit possibilty of leak.\n3-use low volume (small) bottles / dewars to limit maximum supply available.\n4-employ flow meter to limit maximum normal mass flow.\n3-Use oxygen-deficiency monitors near the cryostat during accesses to ensure that personnel are not at risk of asphyxiation",2,"E",15,"Medium","Audit","1-design review to ensure proper material and component selection\n2-system level check of hardware funstion and conformance prior to interduction of \"hazardous\" materials\n3-Test ODM perodically, verify alarm setpoint, train personnel in use ",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-012","Cryostat","Matl's","Release of refrigerant","Refrigerant may be harmful to the CCD detectors and severely impact the cleanliness of the cryostat; gases may be greenhouse gases",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","Release of refrigerant minimized by designing all fluid-vacuum joints with a double-seal; this includes two separate brazed joints with an intermediate pump-out that is monitored",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","Leak check cooling channels and pump-out to verify they are leak-tight",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-012","Cryostat","Matl's","Release of refrigerant","Refrigerant may be harmful to the CCD detectors and severely impact the cleanliness of the cryostat; gases may be greenhouse gases",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1-use single mill run lengths of tubing for refrigeration system in cryostat, no tubing joints in cryostat.\n2-design with high safety factors for burst pressure for all tubing in cryostat.\n3-implement pressure relieve vavle and burst disc in system,outside cryostat, to limit maximum system pressure to safe levels.",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","2-pressure test plumbing repeatedly during construction of system\n2-ensure process and procedure documentaiton details requirments for hook up and compoonent selection\n3-Leak check cooling channels and pump-out to verify they are leak-tight",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-013","Refrig","Therm/Cryo","Icing of refrig return lines","Icing due to overcooling of refrig outlet lines drips water on system elec, possibly causing shorts",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Use temp sensors and insulation on return lines",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Test temp sensors as part of verif test process",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-013","Refrig","Therm/Cryo","Icing of refrig return lines","Icing due to overcooling of refrig outlet lines drips water on system elec, possibly causing shorts",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","1-enclose and protect all sensitive hardware from moisture entrusion\n2-do not route refrigeration lines intemately with or past sensitive hardware\n3-encorporate line heaters to maintian transfer lines at or above ambient (per Telescope-camera ICD) and keep transfer lines above dew point.\n4-complete high efficiency heat exchanger design to limit low temperature return flow.",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1-Test temp sensors as part of verif test process",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-014","Refrig","Therm/Cryo","Heat-X Can leak causes icing","Icing of Heat Exchanger Can due to vacuum leak drips water on system elec, possibly causing shorts",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","Design Heat-X Can to be vacuum tight; use vac gauge to turn on pumps and turn off refrig system",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Leak test Heat-X Can; verify functionality of vacuum gauge","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX","XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-014","Refrig","Therm/Cryo","Heat-X Can leak causes icing","Icing of Heat Exchanger Can due to vacuum leak drips water on system elec, possibly causing shorts",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","1-enclose and protect all sensitive hardware from moisture entrusion\n2-locate heat exchangers in vacuum insulating tank (functional requirement for refrig system)\n3-install radiation insulation to limit heat ransfer.\n4-complete high efficiency heat exchanger design to limit low temperature return flow.",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1-Leak test Heat-X Can\n2- verify functionality vacuum system for thermal insulation","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-015","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Overpressure due to orifice ice plug, inadvertent valve-off, or pinched line causes rupture in a line",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Design entire system to max operating press of compressor",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Pressure test the as-installed system",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-015","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Overpressure due to orifice ice plug, inadvertent valve-off, or pinched line causes rupture in a line",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","1-Design entire system to max pressure differential of compressor plus safety factor\n2-incorporate bust discs and or pressure relief valves\n3-enusre system only connected to charge bottles with max PSI beloew system limt.\n4-if ever connected to purge or backfill system ensure that auxilary system is protected from over pressure via burst disc, pressure reliefe valve(s) and / or max charge system limit.",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1-Pressure test relief valves and verify burst disc parameters\n2- ensure documentation defines requirements for component connection and parameters of operation\n",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-016","Refrig","Press/Vac","Heat-X Can over-pressure","Heat-X Can fails due to over-pressure from refrigerant leaking from a heat exchanger",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","Pressure-test heat exchangers; size vacuum pump to handle a moderate leak; add pressure switch and relief valve to Heat-X Can",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","Pressure test Heat-X Can and relief valve; verify funtionality of pressure switch","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-016","Refrig","Press/Vac","Heat-X Can over-pressure","Heat-X Can fails due to over-pressure from refrigerant leaking from a heat exchanger",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","1-design the system such that by boyles law (P1V1=P2V2) it is impossible to overpressure the heat exchanger system due to a refrigerant leak\n2-design pumping syste with sufficient capacity (speed) to overcome pressure increase due to large refrigerant leak\n3-incorporate burst dics and / or pressure relief valves in system\n4-Pressure-test heat exchangers\n5-add pressure switch and relief valve to Heat-X Can",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","1- Pressure test Heat-X Can, relief valve;  \n2- verify burst disc parameters","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-017","Refrig","Fire","Refrigerant fire at a leak in system","Leaking refrigerant at an ignition point starts a fire in cable trays or on telescope",2,"D",10,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","Use only non-flammable refrigerant, so there is no possibility of fire",4,"E",20,"Low","Review","Verify that non-flammable refrigerant is used",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-017","Refrig","Fire","Refrigerant fire at a leak in system","Leaking refrigerant at an ignition point starts a fire in cable trays or on telescope",2,"D",10,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","1-Use only non-flammable refrigerant, so there is no possibility of fire",4,"E",20,"Low","Review","1-Verify that non-flammable refrigerant is used",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-018","Refrig","Matl's","Hazardous gas released by burning refrigerant","Fumes and combustion products from burning refrigerant are harmful to health and the environment",2,"D",10,"Medium","Procedure, training","Add over-temp switches to compressors ; include materials in emergency procedures for summit fire",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","Check over-temp switches; review emergency procedures and suppression system","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-018","Refrig","Matl's","Hazardous gas released by burning refrigerant","Fumes and combustion products from burning refrigerant are harmful to health and the environment",2,"D",10,"Medium","Procedure, training","1-Use only non-flammable refrigerant, so there is no possibility of fire\n2-Add over-temp switches to compressors\n3-include necassary health and safety warning per refrigernat MSDS recommnedaitns to area signage reference \"in case of fire\".",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","1-Check over-temp switches\n2- review emergency procedures, suppression system and safety signage","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-019","Refrig","Matl's","Refrigerant leak in Utility Trunk","Refrigerant leaking in the Utility Trunk vaporizes and coats the M2 mirror",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Design system using high-reliability connections to ensure they seal",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Pressure test the as-installed system"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-019","Refrig","Matl's","Refrigerant leak in Utility Trunk","Refrigerant leaking in the Utility Trunk vaporizes and coats the M2 mirror",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","1-Design system using high-reliability connections to ensure they seal",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1-Pressure test the as-installed system"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-020","Cryostat","Struc","Overpressure failure of cryostat ","Structural failure of cryostat due to overpressure during a purge-venting operation",1,"D",8,"Serious","Procedure, training","Design cryostat for overpressure loads; add burst disk or relief valve in cryostat and purge-vent line",1,"E",12,"Medium","Audit","Proof test cryostat to overpressure; verify that burst disk operates",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-020","Cryostat","Struc","Overpressure failure of cryostat ","Structural failure of cryostat due to overpressure during a purge-venting operation",1,"D",8,"Serious","Procedure, training","1-Design cryostat for overpressure loads with recommended safety factors\n2-include burst disk and or pressure relief valve on cryostat vacuum system\n3-restrict purge and backfill connection to low pressure systems\n4-restrict purge and backfill connection to low volume bottles and or dewars.",1,"E",12,"Medium","Audit","1-Proof test cryostat to overpressure\n2-proof test pressure relief valve\n3- verify that burst disk parameters  are consistent with design specifications. test representative burst disc for proper function.\n4-review documentation and trianing to ensure only approved bottles and components will be connected to system\n5-design and or select interconnect hardware to minimize risk of unapproved hardware connecitons\n",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-021","Cryostat","Matl's","Asphyxiation due to release of refrigerant","Release of refrigerant in Utility Room may displace air, causing asphyxiation of personnel entering the room",1,"D",8,"Serious","Warning device","Use oxygen deficiency monitor and auxiliary ventilation - six separate refrigeration systems will limit volume of a credible refrigerant leak",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","Test ODM periodically, verify alarm setpoint, train personnel in use","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-021","Cryostat","Matl's","Asphyxiation due to release of refrigerant","Release of refrigerant in Utility Room may displace air, causing asphyxiation of personnel entering the room",1,"D",8,"Serious","Warning device","1-provide ventilation of room suffcient to remove limiited refrigerant quantity of system charge\n2-employ oxygen deficiency monitor in utility room",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","1-test ventilation system for adquate (as designed) performance for air change rate\n-Test ODM periodically, verify alarm setpoint\n3- ensure training is adequate and retrining frequency is consistent with needs.","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-022","Cryostat","Struc","Cryostat vacuum-pressure failure","Cryostat vacuum envelope structural failure due to total differential pressure",2,"C",6,"Serious","Control Hazard","Complete sturctural analysis using maximum differential pressure possible with inclusion of safety factor",2,"E",15,"Medium","Review","Complete full design review",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-022","Cryostat","Struc","Cryostat vacuum-pressure failure","Cryostat vacuum envelope structural failure due to total differential pressure",2,"C",6,"Serious","Control Hazard","1- Complete sturctural analysis using maximum differential pressure possible with inclusion of safety factor",2,"E",15,"Medium","Review","1-Complete full design review",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-023","Cryostat","Press/Vac","Cryostat Manual Vant","Inadvertent vent of cryostat vacuum system by technician manipulation of a manual valve in an incorrect time / manner.",2,"D",10,"Medium","Procedure, training","Add clear labeling and signage to all manually controlled vent and purge system components, insure training documents highlight hazard.",2,"E",15,"Medium","Audit","Complete full review of operations training manuals and training records",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Cryo-023","Cryostat","Press/Vac","Cryostat Manual Vent","Inadvertent vent of cryostat vacuum system by technician manipulation of a manual valve in an incorrect time / manner.",2,"D",10,"Medium","Procedure, training","1-Add clear labeling and signage to all manually controlled vent and purge system components, insure training documents highlight hazard.\n2-ensure all personnel trained on operations of vacuum system\n3-automate common functions for system operation\n4-create resdundant sealing of valve system to ensure one inproper valve setting does not vent system completely",2,"E",15,"Medium","Audit","1-Complete full review of operations training manuals and training records",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Crft-001","Crnr Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower/RCM drops below min operating temp","Raft tower or RCM module drops below min operating temp",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Modules mounted to Cryo/Cold Plate heat sinks, which establish min possible temp (see #50); test modules to cold-survival temp",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Run verification tests on temp gradients of as-installed modules; run under-temp survival tests on all modules",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Crft-001","Crnr Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower/RCM drops below min operating temp","Raft tower or RCM module drops below min operating temp",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Modules mounted to Cryo/Cold Plate heat sinks, which establish min possible temp (see #50); test modules to cold-survival temp.Hazard Report LCA-10795",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Run verification tests on temp gradients of as-installed modules; run under-temp survival tests on all modules",null,null,"Revised 7/10/2014"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Crft-002","Crnr Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower/RCM exceeds max operating temp","Raft tower or RCM exceeds max operating temp",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Modules mounted to Cryo/Cold Plate heat sinks with multiply-redundant connections; Plates actively controlled (see #51); test modules to hot-survival temp",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Run verification tests on contact resistance and temp gradients up as-installed modules; run over-temp survival tests on all modules",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Crft-002","Crnr Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower/RCM exceeds max operating temp","Raft tower or RCM exceeds max operating temp",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Modules mounted to Cryo/Cold Plate heat sinks with multiply-redundant connections; Plates actively controlled (see #51); test modules to hot-survival temp. Hazard Report LCA-10795",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Run verification tests on contact resistance and temp gradients up as-installed modules; run over-temp survival tests on all modules",null,null,"Revised 7/10/2014"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Crft-007","Crnr Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower",3,"B",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","Use ESD safety precautions when handling all hardware (not just the electronics).",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","Check that procedures and precautions are in place at facilities"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX","XX","XX","XX","XX",null,null,null,null,"XX","XX",null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Crft-007","Crnr Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","Hazard Report LCA-10794    Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller and GREB/WREB outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller  or  GREB/WREB at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure control - per LCA-10794.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,"Revised 7/10/2014"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Crft-008","Crnr Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from materials","Materials or parts with volatile compounds outgas off vapor that plates onto sensors, possibly damaging them permanently",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Test all parts, materials, and processes used for raft tower assembly; acceptance test all completed assemblies against outgassing standards",4,"E",20,"Low","Audit","Verify by QA records that all parts being used have passed tests; check AT test records to ensure that assembly meets outgassing req's"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Crft-008","Crnr Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from materials","Materials or parts with volatile compounds outgas off vapor that plates onto sensors, possibly damaging them permanently",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Test all parts, materials, and processes used for raft tower assembly; acceptance test all completed assemblies against outgassing standards. Hazard Report LCA-10741",4,"E",20,"Low","Audit","Verify by QA records that all parts being used have passed tests; check AT test records to ensure that assembly meets outgassing req's"]
[]
["Risk added"]
[null,"Crft-011","Crnr Raft","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable and REB",4,"C",18,"Low","Procedure, training","Assembly procedures ensure proper connector mating and handling",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system.",null,null,"Added 07/10/2014"]
["Risk added"]
[null,"Crft-012","Crnr Raft","Elec","CABAC death","CABAC internal failure could cause damage to a sensor ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","Reliability issue. Addressed by  design,  calculation and lifetime testing of CABAC - addressed in electronics reliability plan.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,"Added 07/10/2014"]
["Risk added"]
[null,"Crft-013","Crnr Raft","Elec","GREB/WREB power on sequence","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed;\nActivating the Back Substrate (step 5) before the Bias voltages (step 2) are set to minimal values may cause damage to the sensors.\nDrains are \"off\" and BS is \"On\" could cause a destructive current to appear;\nOutput Drain and Output Diode :  always + with respect to FSS. Forward biasing of junction will cause damage of sensor;",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","Hazard Report LCA-10747\nBS enable switch on the REB board allows application of BS after stable conditions satisfied - firmware and/or hardware control  from CABAC.\nAdd GND diode to output drain and output diode to prevent these potentials from going very negative (>0.3V)",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","see Hazard Report",null,null,"Added 07/10/2014"]
["Risk added"]
[null,"Crft-014","Crnr Raft","Mech","Sensor looses thermal contact to raft","failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat, in particular the guide sensors when read at 9Hz.",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and will have lock washer, or equivalent to prevent loosening.",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","Run thermal cycling tests on the full sensor mech assembly",null,null,"Added 07/10/2014"]
["Risk added"]
[null,"Crft-015","Crnr Raft","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up","CCD's preferentially getter contaminant during warm-up since it can't keep up with ramp-up rate of Cryo Plate and Grid, causing degradation in sensor performance",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Process control","see Hazard Report",null,null,"Added 07/10/2014"]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-005","Cam Bdy","Struc","Housing over-pressure","The camera housing, shroud, and L1-L2 Assembly form an enclosure that is pressurized at a slight positive pressure.  If this were over-pressured, the structure would be stressed above its normal operating stresses",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","1. Use a pressure-relief valve to ensure that camera volume pressure never exceeds its limits\n2. Use a pressure switch to turn off purge flow if pressure increases",4,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1. Test relief valve to verify that it operates correctly\n2. Test pressure switch to verify that it operates correctly",null,null,"2014-05-09"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX","XX",null,"XX","XX"]
[null,"CB&M-005","Cam Bdy","Struc","Housing over-pressure","The camera housing, shroud, and L1-L2 Assembly form an enclosure that is pressurized at a slight positive pressure.  If this were over-pressured, the structure would be stressed above its normal operating stresses",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","1. Use a pressure-relief device to ensure that camera volume pressure never exceeds its limits\n2. Use a pressure switch to turn off purge flow if pressure increases",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1. Test relief valve to verify that it operates correctly\n2. Test pressure switch to verify that it operates correctly",null,null,"2014-05-09"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-008","Cam Bdy","Env","Camera volume low-oxygen","Dry nitrogen is used as the purge gas, so the camera volume will be oxygen-deficient and a hazard for personnel accessing the camera for servicing",2,"C",6,"Serious","Procedure, training","1. Analyze oxygen level around camera during maintenance to set access req's;\n2. Use an ODM during any access;\n3. Contain opening with blow-down clean-air tent to flush GN2 and keep air clean",4,"E",15,"Medium","Audit","Verify operational procedures",null,null,"2014-05-09"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,"XX","XX"]
[null,"CB&M-008","Cam Bdy","Env","Camera volume low-oxygen","Dry nitrogen is used as the purge gas, so the camera volume will be oxygen-deficient and a hazard for personnel accessing the camera for servicing",2,"C",6,"Serious","Procedure, training","1. Analyze oxygen level around camera during maintenance to set access req's;\n2. Use an ODM during any access;\n3. Contain opening with blow-down clean-air tent to flush GN2 and keep air clean",2,"E",15,"Medium","Audit","Verify operational procedures",null,null,"2014-05-09"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-011","Cam Bdy","Env","Glycol leak in purge unit","Glycol coolant is used for cooling purge gas air in the purge unit, located in the utility trunk; if a glycol line leaks, it could contaminate many camera components",1,"C",6,"Serious","Safety feature","1. Use high-integrity fittings for glycol lines\n2. Make the purge unit cabinet water-tight;\n3. Add a hygrometer in the purge unit",3,"E",15,"Medium","Test","1. Leak test purge unit glycol lines;\n2. Verify that purge unit is water-tight;\n3. Test functionality of hygrometer",null,null,"2014-05-09"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,"XX","XX",null,null,"XX",null,"XX",null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"CB&M-011","Cam Bdy","Env","Glycol leak in purge unit","Glycol coolant is used for cooling purge gas air in the purge unit, located in the utility trunk; if a glycol line leaks, it could contaminate many camera components",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety feature","1. Use high-integrity fittings for glycol lines\n2. Make the purge unit cabinet water-tight;\n3. Add a hygrometer in the purge unit",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","1. Leak test purge unit glycol lines;\n2. Verify that purge unit is water-tight;\n3. Test functionality of hygrometer","CPS",null,"2014-05-09"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-012","Cam Bdy","Env","Purge unit re-heater over-current","If a purge gas re-heater in the purge unit shorts to ground or over-heats, it could start an electrical fire in the utility trunk",1,"C",6,"Serious","Safety device","Add over-current protection on the heater circuit",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Test that over-current protection circuit functions",null,null,"2014-05-09"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,"XX","XX",null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"CB&M-012","Cam Bdy","Env","Purge unit re-heater over-current","If a purge gas re-heater in the purge unit shorts to ground or over-heats, it could start an electrical fire in the utility trunk",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety device","1. Add over-current protection on the heater circuit;\n2. Add smoke detectors in Utility Trunk interlocked to power supplies",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Test that over-current protection circuit functions","CPS",null,"2014-05-09"]
[]
["change log for date 8/29/2014 10:39:08 AM"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Opt-011","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive internal pressure from within the cyrostat, due to overpressurizing the cryostat during backfill and purge operations",1,"D",8,"Serious","Procedure, training","1.  Design L3 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety\n2.  Use a pressure-relief valve in the pump/ purge lines to limit the internal pressure on L3 (Pressure relief valve on cryostat housing?)",1,"D",15,"Medium","Test","Qual test L3 Assembly at extremes of temperature and pressure;\nTest pressure-relief valve prior to every vent as part of set-up procedure",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX","XX","XX","XX","XX","XX",null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Opt-011","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive internal pressure from within the cyrostat, due to overpressurizing the cryostat during backfill and purge operations",1,"D",8,"Serious","Safety device","1. Regulate purge pressure to less than 3kPa (TBD).\n2. Size purge system pump to limit max pressure.\n3. Design L3 lens to survive the mas purge system pressure differential, using a large factor of safety\n4.  Use a pressure-relief valve in the pump/ purge lines to limit the internal pressure on L3 (Pressure relief valve on cryostat housing?)",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Qual test L3 Assembly at extremes of temperature and pressure;\nTest pressure-relief valve prior to every vent as part of set-up procedure",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11\nUpdated 7-Aug-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Opt-012","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L1 lens","Overload of L1 due to excessive internal pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety device","1.  Design L1 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n2.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 ",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Acceptance test pressure switch and relief valve;\nAnalyze L1 lens for max over-pressure load","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Opt-012","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L1 lens","Overload of L1 due to excessive internal pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety device","1.  Regulate purge pressure to less than 3kPa (TBD).\n2. Size purge system pump to limit max pressure.\n3. Design L1 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n4.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 ",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Acceptance test pressure switch and relief valve;\nAnalyze L1 lens for max over-pressure load","CPS",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11\nUpdated 7-Aug-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Opt-017","Optics","Struc","L3 micro-crack leads to failure","A flaw or micro-crack in the glass on the inner surface could cause a failure of the lens, since it is under continuous stress due to vacuum/purge pressure loads",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","Perform fracture analysis to determine the largest acceptable crack size; use large factors of safety (limit max differential pressure per Haz # 19) (AR coating will provide limited protection for unintended contact)",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","Qual and proof test L3 lenses; Inspect to verify that any cracks are smaller than the critical crack size",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,null,"XX",null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"Opt-017","Optics","Struc","L3 micro-crack leads to failure","A flaw or micro-crack in the glass on the inner surface could cause a failure of the lens, since it is under continuous stress due to vacuum/purge pressure loads",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","1. Perform fracture analysis to determine the largest acceptable crack size; use large factors of safety (limit max differential pressure per Haz # 19) (AR coating will provide limited protection for unintended contact)\n2. Perform period inspections to verify surface condition",3,"E",17,"Medium","Inspection","Qual and proof test L3 lenses; Inspect to verify that any cracks are smaller than the critical crack size",null,null,"Revised 4-Oct-11\nUpdated 7-Aug-14"]
[]
["Risk added"]
[null,"Opt-019","Optics","Mech","Filter or L3 metal to glass contact","If the optic shifts in its mount (due to not having any deterministic hard-stops in the present design), the optic could impact with the metal frame, creating a stress concentration and crack in the optic.",2,"D",10,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","By incorporating a polymer hardstop into the opto-mechanical design, the motion of the glass is physically prevented from impacting the metal.  Instead, the glass would impact with the softer polymer material",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","Review manufacturing logs to verify that the polymer hardstops have been installed in the assembly.",null,null,"Added 8/7/14"]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-007","Cam Bdy","Env","Camera volume contamination","Failure of any one of the housing seals could introduce contaminants into the camera volume",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","1. Over-pressured camera volume to ensure that any leaks result in a net outward flow; \n2. Use instrumentation to monitor internal pressure and flow rate of purge gas, to identify any leaks",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1. Functionally test purge system to demonstrate ability to hold min over-pressure;\n2. Test pressure gauge and flow meter to verify that they have sensitivity to detect a leak of a min leak rate",null,null,"2011-04-11"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"XX"]
[null,"CB&M-007","Cam Bdy","Env","Camera volume contamination","Failure of any one of the housing seals could introduce contaminants into the camera volume",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","1. Over-pressured camera volume to ensure that any leaks result in a net outward flow; \n2. Use instrumentation to monitor internal pressure and flow rate of purge gas, to identify any leaks",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1. Functionally test purge system to demonstrate ability to hold min over-pressure;\n2. Test pressure gauge and flow meter to verify that they have sensitivity to detect a leak of a min leak rate",null,null,"2014-05-09"]
[]
["Risk deleted"]
[null,"ELX-009","Sys Elec","Elec","control communication failure","Failure of communication to the electronics inside the Utility Trunk prevents control by CCS and causes the camera to reach a damaging state",2,"D",10,"Medium",null,"Camera Protection System prevents damage to the camera. Communication Infrastructure uses established reliability components and Ethernet infrastructure with remote management features. Ethernet switch location will be easily accessible.",2,"D",10,"Medium"]
["Risk deleted"]
[null,"ELX-008","Sys Elec","Elec","Raft power supply sequence","Wrong  power on or power off sequence could damage the raft electronics",2,"D",10,"Medium",null,"Power supply design includes fixed sequencing in hardware/firmware",2,"D",10,"Medium"]
["Risk deleted"]
[null,"ELX-007","Sys Elec","Elec","Raft power supply loss of AC power","loss of AC power to the raft power supply could lead to undefined transient voltages damaging rafts",2,"D",10,"Medium",null,"REB boards include protection circuits for CCDs for wrong power sequence; Power supply design includes over voltage protection (zehner diodes) and fast shut down capability",2,"D",10,"Medium"]
["Risk deleted"]
[null,"ELX-006","Sys Elec","Elec","Raft power supply failure ","Raft power supply failes and sends wrong voltages to the rafts resulting in non operation or damage to the raft",2,"D",10,"Medium",null,"Fault detection and over voltage protection on the power supplies and protection circuits on the REB boards",2,"D",10,"Medium"]
[]
["change log for date 7/9/2015"]
[]
["Risk added"]
[null,"Srft-23","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","Cold plate under-temperatures","Unpowered REBs can suffer undertemperatures should the cold plate fail while cryoplate continues running",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard",null,3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify shutoff is effected by coldplate failure","CPS"]
["Risk added"]
[null,"EXCH-023","Filter-X","Mech","Loose items damage Filter-X or L2","Exchange system and L2 could be damaged by a loosened (by motion cycling) Exchange-system part (screw, bolt, fastener, etc.) rolling around inside the camera body  ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Threaded fasteners will have lock washers or equivalent",3,"D",14,"Medium","Inspection","Inspect each fastener as installed  to assure redundant capturing"]
["Risk added"]
[null,"CB&M-013","Cam Bdy","Env","Purge system failure or filter failure","Purge system failure blows contaminated air into CB",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety feature","1. Place supply-line pressure switch upstream of filter (to shut down upon overpressure)\n2. Monitor and trend airline flow",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Verify pressure switch operation","CPS"]
["Risk added"]
[null,"CB&M-014","Cam Bdy","Mech","Simultaneous turbo-pump operation and camera motion","If the telescope moves while a turbo-pump is running, the pump could be destroyed.",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety device","Add protection where a single key operates either the turbo pump or slewing",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Perform zero-voltage verification in both vacuum-pump-on and camera-motion on states"]
["Risk changed from "]
[null,"Cryo-009","Cryostat","Control","Cryo cold plate under-temp","Cryo- or cold plate temps drop below their minimum operating limits",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","1-design hardware to survive minimum refrigeration temperature.        2-Temperature sensors on cryo- and cold-plates provide feedback to heaters and refrigeration.          3-under temp switches turn off Refrig Systems, turn on plate heaters        4-Design and test components to survival temp",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Test monitoring feedback control and under-temperature controller","CPS"]
["To"]
[null,"Cryo-009","Cryostat","Control","Cryo cold plate under-temp","Cryo- or cold plate temps drop below their minimum operating limits",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","1-Temperature sensors on cryo- and cold-plates provide feedback to heaters and refrigeration.          2-Upon temperature excursion, turn off refrigeration systems, turn on plate heaters        3-Design and test components to survival temperature",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Test monitoring feedback control and under-temperature controller","CPS"]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-010","Cryostat","Control","Cryo, Cold Plate over-temp","Cryo or Cold Plate exceed their max operating limits",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","1-design hardware to survive maximum possible temperature with heaters on / refrig lower cooling cpacity\n2- Temp sensors on Cryo and Cold plates provide feedback; over-temp switches cut power to heaters and RCM power supplies",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1-Test montiroing feedback control and over-temp switches","CPS"]
["To"]
[null,"Cryo-010","Cryostat","Control","Cryo, Cold Plate over-temp","Cryo or Cold Plate exceed their max operating limits",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","Temp sensors on Cryo and Cold plates provide feedback; upon over-temp, cut power to heaters and RCM power supplies",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1-Test montiroing feedback control and over-temp switches","CPS"]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"ELX-001","Sys Elec","Therm/Cryo","Loss of cooling","If Utility Trunk cooling were to fail, the temperature of  support electronics would rise to levels that could damage the electronics",3,"B",9,"Serious","Safety device","Use temperature switches on any rack with high-power electronics to shut off power if it overheats",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Test temperature switches","CPS"]
["To"]
[null,"ELX-001","Sys Elec","Therm/Cryo","Loss of cooling","If Utility Trunk cooling were to fail, the temperature of  support electronics would rise to levels that could damage the electronics",3,"B",9,"Serious","Safety device","Use temperature sensors on any rack with high-power electronics to shut off power if it overheats",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Test temperature switches","CPS"]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Srft-23","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","Cold plate fails while cryo plate continues running ","REBs can suffer undertemperatures should the cold plate fail while cryoplate continues running",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Put in place active monitoring and controls to shut down cryoplate in case of cold plate failure",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify shutoff is effected by coldplate failure","CPS"]
["To"]
[null,"Srft-23","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","Cold plate fails while cryo plate continues running ","REBs can suffer undertemperatures should the cold plate heater fail while cryoplate cooling continues running",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Put in place active monitoring and controls to shut down cryoplate cooling upon cold plate heater failure",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify shutoff is effected by coldplate failure","CPS"]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-001","Shutter","Mech","Leading edge blades collide","Leading-edge blades collide during activation, destroying the blades and damaging the L3 lens or filter",2,"D",10,"Medium","Safety device","Use limit switches to only enable blade motion when the opposing blade stack is in its parked position",3,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Run protection certification tests to verify that limit switches only enable motion when blades are parked","CPS"]
["To"]
[null,"CB&M-001","Shutter","Mech","Leading edge blades collide","Leading-edge blades collide during activation, destroying the blades and damaging the L3 lens or filter",2,"D",10,"Medium","Safety device","Use limit switches to only enable blade motion when the opposing blade stack is in its parked position",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Run protection certification tests to verify that limit switches only enable motion when blades are parked","CPS"]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-002","Shutter","Mech","Blades collide","Blades within a stack collide when a timing belt breaks, damaging the blades",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1. Add bumpers on blade carriages to absorb energy of leading and trailing blades colliding\n2. Add capture block at blade root to prevent trailing blade to fall away from leading blade",4,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Run test of failed-state with one carriage disconnected from its timing belt"]
["To"]
[null,"CB&M-002","Shutter","Mech","Blades collide","Blades within a stack collide when a timing belt breaks, damaging the blades",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1. Add bumpers on blade carriages to absorb energy of leading and trailing blades colliding\n2. Add capture block at blade root to prevent trailing blade to fall away from leading blade",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Run test of failed-state with one carriage disconnected from its timing belt"]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-006","Cam Bdy","Struc","Housing structural failure","The camera housing and back flange provide the primary structural support for the camera; over-stressing or failure of one structural element could result in large-scale damage or collapse",1,"D",8,"Serious","Eliminate hazard","1. Use multiply-redundant bolted connections to ensure that no single failure can endanger the camera structure;\n2. Design back flange and housing with conservative factors of safety, even under seismic loads, per LCA-280, \"Camera Mech Std's\"",1,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","1. Use FEA analysis to set bolt limit loads; analyze pre-load per LCA-280;\n2. Verify bolt torques during assembly;\n3. Perform proof load test to demonstrate that structure can carry max loads "]
["To"]
[null,"CB&M-006","Cam Bdy","Struc","Housing structural failure","The camera housing and back flange provide the primary structural support for the camera; over-stressing or failure of one structural element could result in large-scale damage or collapse",1,"D",8,"Serious","Eliminate hazard","1. Use multiply-redundant bolted connections to ensure that no single failure can endanger the camera structure;\n2. Design back flange and housing with conservative factors of safety, even under seismic loads, per LCA-280, \"Camera Mech Std's\"",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","1. Use FEA analysis to set bolt limit loads; analyze pre-load per LCA-280;\n2. Verify bolt torques during assembly;\n3. Perform proof load test to demonstrate that structure can carry max loads "]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-009","Shutter","Mech","Leading blade overruns end of travel","Leading-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation, damaging blades and possibly the L3 lens or filter",2,"D",10,"Medium","Safety device","1. Use over-travel switch to cut power to blade;\n2. Add garage plates to contain blades at their end of travel",3,"E",15,"Medium","Test","1. Run protection certification tests to verify over-travel switch function","CPS"]
["To"]
[null,"CB&M-009","Shutter","Mech","Leading blade overruns end of travel","Leading-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation, damaging blades and possibly the L3 lens or filter",2,"D",10,"Medium","Safety device","1. Use over-travel switch to cut power to blade;\n2. Add garage plates to contain blades at their end of travel",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","1. Run protection certification tests to verify over-travel switch function","CPS"]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-010","Shutter","Mech","Trailing blade overruns end of travel","Trailing-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation, damaging blade and the L3 lens",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1. Add blade stop to limit motion in the event of belt breakage;\n2. Use over-travel switch to cut power to blade",3,"E",15,"Medium","Test","1. Measure blade location when at the stop to confirm it clears L3 lens\n2. Run protection certification tests to verify over-travel switch function","CPS"]
["To"]
[null,"CB&M-010","Shutter","Mech","Trailing blade overruns end of travel","Trailing-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation, damaging blade and the L3 lens",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1. Add blade stop to limit motion in the event of belt breakage;\n2. Use over-travel switch to cut power to blade",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","1. Measure blade location when at the stop to confirm it clears L3 lens\n2. Run protection certification tests to verify over-travel switch function","CPS"]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Opt-009","Optics","Therm/Cryo","Excessive raidative cooling of L3 lens","If the radiative cooling off of L3 were significantly more than predicted, the lens may cool down,  Ultimately, embrittling the glass or causing thermal contraction beyond the range of accommodation of the perimeter gasket.  In either case, this may generate stresses in the glass above allowable limits which could ultimately result in failure",1,"E",12,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","Analysis of the black-body radiative cooling, which is the maximum radiative heat transfer possible, shows only slightly more cooling than the nominal condition.  Thus, we are already designing for near-worst-case conditions, and even the worst-case temperatures possible do not pose a hazard to the lens",4,"E",20,"Low","Review","Qual test L3 Assembly at extremes of temperature and pressure"," "]
["To"]
[null,"Opt-009","Optics","Therm/Cryo","Excessive raidative cooling of L3 lens","If the radiative cooling off of L3 were significantly more than predicted, the lens may cool down,  Ultimately, embrittling the glass or causing thermal contraction beyond the range of accommodation of the perimeter gasket.  In either case, this may generate stresses in the glass above allowable limits which could ultimately result in failure",1,"E",12,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","Analysis of the black-body radiative cooling, which is the maximum radiative heat transfer possible, shows only slightly more cooling than the nominal condition.  Thus, we are already designing for near-worst-case conditions, and even the worst-case temperatures possible do not pose a hazard to the lens",4,"E",20,"Low","Review","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.              2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures"," "]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Opt-010","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive external pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",1,"C",4,"High","Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10745,  1.  Design L3 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n2.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 (after I&T observatory located at approx 8000 feet ASL, atmospheric pressure is 75% of SL, this reduces press diff)",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","Qual test L3 Assembly at extremes of temperature and pressure;\nAcceptance test pressure switch and relief valve on camera","CPS"]
["To"]
[null,"Opt-010","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive external pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",1,"C",4,"High","Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10745,  1.  Design L3 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n2.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 (after I&T observatory located at approx 8000 feet ASL, atmospheric pressure is 75% of SL, this reduces press diff)",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.             2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures","CPS"]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"CB&M-004","Shutter","Mech","Pinching","During access or servicing, personnel could be injured by shutter blade or carriage pinching a finger while it is closing"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"CB&M-008","Cam Bdy","Env","Camera volume low-oxygen","Dry nitrogen is used as the purge gas, so the camera volume will be oxygen-deficient and a hazard for personnel accessing the camera for servicing"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"CB&M-012","Cam Bdy","Env","Purge unit re-heater over-current","If a purge gas re-heater in the purge unit shorts to ground or over-heats, it could start an electrical fire in the utility trunk"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"CCS-001","CCS","Control","Erroneous commands","Erroneous commands could result in unsafe behavior by various camera components"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Crft-007","Crnr Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Cryo-011","Cryostat","Env","GN2 purge asphyxiant hazard","Nitrogen purge on the cryostat during backfills and personnel access could generate a low-oxygen volume hazardous for personnel"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Cryo-017","Refrig","Fire","Refrigerant fire at a leak in system","Leaking refrigerant at an ignition point starts a fire in cable trays or on telescope"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Cryo-018","Refrig","Matl's","Hazardous gas released by burning refrigerant","Fumes and combustion products from burning refrigerant are harmful to health and the environment"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Cryo-020","Cryostat","Struc","Overpressure failure of cryostat ","Structural failure of cryostat due to overpressure during a purge-venting operation"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Cryo-021","Cryostat","Matl's","Asphyxiation due to release of refrigerant","Release of refrigerant in Utility Room may displace air, causing asphyxiation of personnel entering the room"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"ELX-003","Sys Elec","Elec","Cable Abrasion or Stress","If a power or signal cable is abraded or stressed the insulation could be compromised or the connections could be broken, possibly resulting in a short circuit, overheating, and fire at worst"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"ELX-004","Sys Elec","Fire","Electrical Fire","Local overheating of electronics components could cause fire"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"ELX-005","Sys Elec","Elec","Electrical Safety","Personnel hazard from high voltages or high currents."]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"EXCH-003","Filter-X","Mech","Physical collision of exchange system parts","Inadvertant execution of an action while the system is in a state that is not safe for that action"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"EXCH-005","Filter-X","Mech","Single-point failure","Mechanical failure of a single-point failure item:  axles, filter latches, truck wheels, keys on drive shafts"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"EXCH-006","Filter-X","Mech","Wear/fatigue failure","Failure due to long-term wear or cyclic loading causing fatigue failure"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"EXCH-007","Filter-X","Mech","Personnel injury","Pinch points, closing apertures, rolling and sliding parts are exposed to personnel working on the system"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"EXCH-012","Filter-X","Mech","Carousel clamp failure","Carousel clamp inadvertently releases, dropping a filter and damaging it"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"IT-001","I&T","Mech","Sensor damaged during (de)integration","Sensor collides with adjacent sensor, raft, or tooling during acceptance testing, integration or deintegration. Probable damage to sensor. Cost of 1+ sensors plus replacement time lost per occurance. source, mechanism, outcome"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"IT-002","I&T","Matl's","Cut from broken glass","If a glass optical element breaks, then broken glass could cut or abrade nearby personnel"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"IT-003","I&T","Matl's","Cut from broken silicon CCD","If a silicon CCD sensor breaks, then broken silicon could cut or cause an eye injury to personnel"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"IT-004","I&T","Matl's","Cut from broken Grid chip","If the silicon-carbide Grid is damaged from sharp impact to it, then the resulting chip or sharp edge could cut personnel"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"IT-005","I&T","Matl's","Cut from broken CFC strut","If a strut structurally fails, then released carbon fibers could cut personnel"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"IT-006","I&T","Matl's","Spraying refrigerant","If a refrigerant line ruptures, then refrigerant spray could cause eye injury"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"IT-007","I&T","Therm/Cryo","Frostbite","If surfaces at cryogenic temperatures are exposed, then personel who touch them could get frostbite"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"IT-008","I&T","Env","Asphyxiation due to release of N2","If gaseous nitrogen purge gas free-flows into a confined space, then personnel could be exposed to low-oxygen environment"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"IT-009","I&T","Elec","Shock from exposed leads","If high-current or high-voltage motor leads are easily exposed, then personnel may get shocked"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"IT-010","I&T","Elec","Shock from unsafe electronics","If custom-designed electronics are not safely designed, then personnel may get shocked. "]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"IT-011","I&T","Mech","Crushing from entrapment","If a moving member of a fixture entraps a limb during a re-orientation or rigging operation, then personnel could be injured"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"IT-012","I&T","Struc","Injury from falling equipment","If equipment falls or moves during an earthquake, then personnel could be injured"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Opt-014","Optics","Mech","L1 damage during personnel access","The L1 lens is open to the dome and is at risk of damage during personnel access, due to a direct collision or contact with the lens by personnel, tools, or related equipment or gear"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Opt-015","Optics","Mech","L2 or L3 damage during personnel access","To remove the Shutter or Auto Changer from the camera, the region between L2 and L3 is accessed by personnel and handling hardware, when personnel, tools, or handling fixtures could contact L2 or L3.  Such a contact could damage either the coating or even scratch the lens"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Sensor-001","Sensor","Struc","Sensor Handling Damage during acceptance","During acceptance testing, damage could occur on sensor (dropping sensor, breaking edges)"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Sensor-009","Sensor","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins during acceptance","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable, connector saver, and test stand cabling"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Sensor-014","Sensor","Env","Radiation","Personnel hazard from exposure to Iron 55 Radiation Source "]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Sensor-015","Sensor","Press/Vac","Test Stand #3 Dewar hazards","Personnel hazard associated with the Test Stand # 3 Dewar inclued: ODH, cryo burns, personel injury due to window failure durng purge  "]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Srft-006","Sci Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Srft-014","Sci Raft","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable and REB"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Srft-015","Sci Raft","Struc","Mechanical damage to REB's","Boards can be mechanically damaged during handling causing solder joint hairline cracks or other componet structural damage"]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"IT-013","I&T","Matl's","Surface damage to lens","AR coating or glass surface damaged. Occurs by abrasion, or collision when exposed. Repolish or recoating could be needed depending on damage level."]
[]
["Moved to O&SHA Hazard List tab:"]
[null,"Crft-011","Crnr Raft","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable and REB"]
[]
["change log for date 7/14/2015"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"Srft-005","Sci Raft","Elec","Over-current damage to REB or sensor or raft","Loss of a sensor or raft due to uncontrolled short to ground or over-current condition",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","Over-current protection in power supplies protect REB and  raft from short",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Run qualification test on system","CPS"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-005","Sci Raft","Elec","Over-current damage to REB or sensor or raft","Loss of a sensor or raft due to uncontrolled short to ground or over-current condition",2,"D",10,"Medium","Safety device","Over-current protection in power supplies protect REB and  raft from short",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Run qualification test on system","CPS",null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-001","Shutter","Mech","Leading edge blades collide","Leading-edge blades collide during activation, destroying the blades and damaging the L3 lens or filter",2,"D",10,"Medium","Safety device","Use limit switches to only enable blade motion when the opposing blade stack is in its parked position",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Run protection certification tests to verify that limit switches only enable motion when blades are parked","CPS"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"CB&M-001","Shutter","Mech","Leading edge blades collide","Leading-edge blades collide during activation, destroying the blades and damaging the L3 lens or filter",2,"D",10,"Medium","Safety device","Use limit switches to only enable blade motion when the opposing blade stack is in its parked position",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Run protection certification tests to verify that limit switches only enable motion when blades are parked","CPS",null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-002","Shutter","Mech","Blades collide","Blades within a stack collide when a timing belt breaks, damaging the blades",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1. Add bumpers on blade carriages to absorb energy of leading and trailing blades colliding\n2. Add capture block at blade root to prevent trailing blade to fall away from leading blade",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Run test of failed-state with one carriage disconnected from its timing belt"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x","x"]
[null,"CB&M-002","Shutter","Mech","Blades collide","Blades within a stack collide when a timing belt breaks, damaging the blades",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1. Add bumpers on blade carriages to absorb energy of leading and trailing blades colliding\n2. Add capture block at blade root to prevent trailing blade to fall away from leading blade",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Run test of failed-state with one carriage disconnected from its timing belt",null,null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-006","Cam Bdy","Struc","Housing structural failure","The camera housing and back flange provide the primary structural support for the camera; over-stressing or failure of one structural element could result in large-scale damage or collapse",1,"D",8,"Serious","Eliminate hazard","1. Use multiply-redundant bolted connections to ensure that no single failure can endanger the camera structure;\n2. Design back flange and housing with conservative factors of safety, even under seismic loads, per LCA-280, \"Camera Mech Std's\"",1,"E",12,"Medium","Process control","1. Use FEA analysis to set bolt limit loads; analyze pre-load per LCA-280;\n2. Verify bolt torques during assembly;\n3. Perform proof load test to demonstrate that structure can carry max loads "]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"CB&M-006","Cam Bdy","Struc","Housing structural failure","The camera housing and back flange provide the primary structural support for the camera; over-stressing or failure of one structural element could result in large-scale damage or collapse",1,"D",8,"Serious","Eliminate hazard","1. Use multiply-redundant bolted connections to ensure that no single failure can endanger the camera structure;\n2. Design back flange and housing with conservative factors of safety, even under seismic loads, per LCA-280, \"Camera Mech Std's\"",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","1. Use FEA analysis to set bolt limit loads; analyze pre-load per LCA-280;\n2. Verify bolt torques during assembly;\n3. Perform proof load test to demonstrate that structure can carry max loads ",null,null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-009","Shutter","Mech","Leading blade overruns end of travel","Leading-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation, damaging blades and possibly the L3 lens or filter",2,"D",10,"Medium","Safety device","1. Use over-travel switch to cut power to blade;\n2. Add garage plates to contain blades at their end of travel",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1. Run protection certification tests to verify over-travel switch function","CPS"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"CB&M-009","Shutter","Mech","Leading blade overruns end of travel","Leading-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation, damaging blades and possibly the L3 lens or filter",2,"D",10,"Medium","Safety device","1. Use over-travel switch to cut power to blade;\n2. Add garage plates to contain blades at their end of travel",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","1. Run protection certification tests to verify over-travel switch function","CPS",null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Risk changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-010","Shutter","Mech","Trailing blade overruns end of travel","Trailing-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation, damaging blade and the L3 lens",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1. Add blade stop to limit motion in the event of belt breakage;\n2. Use over-travel switch to cut power to blade",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1. Measure blade location when at the stop to confirm it clears L3 lens\n2. Run protection certification tests to verify over-travel switch function","CPS"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"CB&M-010","Shutter","Mech","Trailing blade overruns end of travel","Trailing-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation, damaging blade and the L3 lens",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1. Add blade stop to limit motion in the event of belt breakage;\n2. Use over-travel switch to cut power to blade",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","1. Measure blade location when at the stop to confirm it clears L3 lens\n2. Run protection certification tests to verify over-travel switch function","CPS",null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"CB&M-013","Cam Bdy","Env","Purge system failure or filter failure","Purge system failure blows contaminated air into CB",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety feature","1. Place supply-line pressure switch upstream of filter (to shut down upon overpressure)\n2. Monitor and trend airline flow",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Verify pressure switch operation","CPS"]
[]
["Changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-009","Cryostat","Control","Cryo, Cold Plate under-temp","Cryo or Cold Plate drop below their min operating limits",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","1-design hardware to survive minimum refrigeration temperature.\n2-Temp sensors on Cryo and Cold plates provide feedback to heaters and refigeration;\n3-under-temp switches turn off Refrig Systems, turn on plate heaters;\n4- design and test components to survival temp",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1-Test monitoring feedback control and under-temp switches","CPS"]
["To",null,null,null,"x","x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-009","Cryostat","Control","Cryo cold plate under-temp","Cryo- or cold plate temps drop below their minimum operating limits",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","1-Temperature sensors on cryo- and cold-plates provide feedback to the protection system.         2-Upon under temperature excursion of the cold-plate, turn off all refrigerators; upon under temperature of the cryo-plate, turn off the cryo-refrigerators.          3-Design and test components to survival temperature",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Test monitoring feedback control and under-temperature controller","CPS",null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Changed from"]
[null,"Cryo-010","Cryostat","Control","Cryo, Cold Plate over-temp","Cryo or Cold Plate exceed their max operating limits",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","1-design hardware to survive maximum possible temperature with heaters on / refrig lower cooling cpacity\n2- Temp sensors on Cryo and Cold plates provide feedback; over-temp switches cut power to heaters and RCM power supplies",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1-Test montiroing feedback control and over-temp switches","CPS"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-010","Cryostat","Control","Cryo, Cold Plate over-temp","Cryo or Cold Plate exceed their max operating limits",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","Temp sensors on Cryo and Cold plates provide feedback; upon over-temp, cut power to heaters and RCM power supplies",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1-Test montiroing feedback control and over-temp switches","CPS",null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Changed from"]
[null,"ELX-001","Sys Elec","Therm/Cryo","Loss of cooling","If Utility Trunk cooling were to fail, the temperature of  support electronics would rise to levels that could damage the electronics",3,"B",9,"Serious","Safety device","Use temperature switches on any rack with high-power electronics to shut off power if it overheats",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Test temperature switches","CPS"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"ELX-001","Sys Elec","Therm/Cryo","Loss of cooling","If Utility Trunk cooling were to fail, the temperature of  support electronics would rise to levels that could damage the electronics",3,"B",9,"Serious","Safety device","Use temperature sensors on any rack with high-power electronics to shut off power if it overheats",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Test temperature switches","CPS",null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Changed from"]
[null,"Opt-003","Optics","Struc","L2 flexure failure","Failure of an L2 flexure due to excessive radial flex'ing or overload - possible damage to L1 and filter ",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Design flexures with safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to survive a broad survival temperature range, much larger than they should ever see",1,"E",12,"Medium","Process control","Perform qualification testing of the fleuxre and acceptance testing of all assemblies"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-003","Optics","Struc","L2 flexure failure","Failure of an L2 flexure due to excessive radial flex'ing or overload - possible damage to L1 and filter ",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Design flexures with safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to survive a broad survival temperature range, much larger than they should ever see",1,"E",12,"Medium","Process control","Perform qualification testing of the flexure and acceptance testing of all assemblies",null,null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Changed from"]
[null,"Opt-009","Optics","Therm/Cryo","Excessive raidative cooling of L3 lens","If the radiative cooling off of L3 were significantly more than predicted, the lens may cool down,  Ultimately, embrittling the glass or causing thermal contraction beyond the range of accommodation of the perimeter gasket.  In either case, this may generate stresses in the glass above allowable limits which could ultimately result in failure",1,"E",12,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","Analysis of the black-body radiative cooling, which is the maximum radiative heat transfer possible, shows only slightly more cooling than the nominal condition.  Thus, we are already designing for near-worst-case conditions, and even the worst-case temperatures possible do not pose a hazard to the lens",4,"E",20,"Low","Review","Qual test L3 Assembly at extremes of temperature and pressure"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-009","Optics","Therm/Cryo","Excessive raidative cooling of L3 lens","If the radiative cooling off of L3 were significantly more than predicted, the lens may cool down,  Ultimately, embrittling the glass or causing thermal contraction beyond the range of accommodation of the perimeter gasket.  In either case, this may generate stresses in the glass above allowable limits which could ultimately result in failure",1,"E",12,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","Analysis of the black-body radiative cooling, which is the maximum radiative heat transfer possible, shows only slightly more cooling than the nominal condition.  Thus, we are already designing for near-worst-case conditions, and even the worst-case temperatures possible do not pose a hazard to the lens",4,"E",20,"Low","Review","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.              2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures",null,null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Changed from"]
[null,"Opt-010","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive external pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",1,"C",4,"High","Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10745,  1.  Design L3 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n2.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 (after I&T observatory located at approx 8000 feet ASL, atmospheric pressure is 75% of SL, this reduces press diff)",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","Qual test L3 Assembly at extremes of temperature and pressure;\nAcceptance test pressure switch and relief valve on camera","CPS"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-010","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive external pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",1,"C",4,"High","Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10745,  1.  Design L3 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n2.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 (after I&T observatory located at approx 8000 feet ASL, atmospheric pressure is 75% of SL, this reduces press diff)",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.             2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures","CPS",null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Changed from"]
[null,"Srft-013","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up","CCD's preferentially getter contaminant during warm-up since it can't keep up with ramp-up rate of Cryo Plate and Grid, causing degradation in sensor performance",2,"C",6,"Serious","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",2,"D",10,"Medium",null,"see Hazard Report"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-013","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up","CCD's preferentially getter contaminant during warm-up since it can't keep up with ramp-up rate of Cryo Plate and Grid, causing degradation in sensor performance",2,"C",6,"Serious","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",2,"D",10,"Medium","Test","see Hazard Report",null,null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Changed from"]
[null,"Srft-020","Sci Raft","Elec","CABAC death","CABAC internal failure could cause damage to a sensor ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","Reliability issue. Addressed by  design,  calculation and lifetime testing of CABAC - addressed in electronics reliability plan.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates"]
["To",null,null,null,"x","x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-020","Sci Raft","Elec","On board circuit failure","On board circuit internal failure could cause damage to a sensor ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","Reliability issue. Addressed by  design,  calculation and lifetime testing of on board circuits - addressed in electronics reliability plan.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Srft-023","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","REB under-temperature","Unpowered REBs can suffer undertemperatures should the cold plate heater fail while cryoplate cooling continues running",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Put in place active monitoring and controls to shut down cryoplate and cold plate cooling upon cold plate under temperature",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify shutoff is effected by coldplate failure","CPS"]
[]
["Changed from"]
[null,"Crft-012","Crnr Raft","Elec","CABAC death","CABAC internal failure could cause damage to a sensor ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","Reliability issue. Addressed by  design,  calculation and lifetime testing of CABAC - addressed in electronics reliability plan.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates"]
["To",null,null,null,"x","x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Crft-012","Crnr Raft","Elec","On board circuit failure","On board circuit internal failure could cause damage to a sensor ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","Reliability issue. Addressed by  design,  calculation and lifetime testing of on board circuits - addressed in electronics reliability plan.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"CB&M-004","Shutter","Mech","Pinching","During access or servicing, personnel could be injured by shutter blade or carriage pinching a finger while it is closing",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","1. During personnel access, lock out the shutter; \n2. Add rail lock to prevent pinching during shutter work",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","1. Verify that LOTO procedures are in place;\n2. Confirm that rail lock is used","CPS"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"CB&M-008","Cam Bdy","Env","Camera volume low-oxygen","Dry nitrogen is used as the purge gas, so the camera volume will be oxygen-deficient and a hazard for personnel accessing the camera for servicing",2,"C",6,"Serious","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10744. Analyze oxygen level around camera during maintenance to set access req's;\n2. Use an ODM during any access;\n3. Contain opening with blow-down clean-air tent to flush GN2 and keep air clean",2,"E",15,"Medium","Audit","Verify operational procedures",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-014","Cam Bdy","Mech","Simultaneous turbo-pump operation and camera motion","If the telescope moves while a turbo-pump is running, the pump could be destroyed.",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety device","Add protection where a single key operates either the turbo pump or slewing",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Perform zero-voltage verification in both vacuum-pump-on and camera-motion on states",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Crft-007","Crnr Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","Hazard Report LCA-10794    Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller and GREB/WREB outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller  or  GREB/WREB at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure control - per LCA-10794.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-011","Cryostat","Env","GN2 purge asphyxiant hazard","Nitrogen purge on the cryostat during backfills and personnel access could generate a low-oxygen volume hazardous for personnel",2,"D",10,"Medium","Procedure, training","1-use highly reliable all metal sealing of all GN2 containers, transfer lines and connections to minimize possibility of leak\n2-use low pressure (dewar boil off or bottle) GN2 supply to limit possibilty of leak.\n3-use low volume (small) bottles / dewars to limit maximum supply available.\n4-employ flow meter to limit maximum normal mass flow.\n3-Use oxygen-deficiency monitors near the cryostat during accesses to ensure that personnel are not at risk of asphyxiation",2,"E",15,"Medium","Audit","1-design review to ensure proper material and component selection\n2-system level check of hardware funstion and conformance prior to interduction of \"hazardous\" materials\n3-Test ODM perodically, verify alarm setpoint, train personnel in use ",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-017","Refrig","Fire","Refrigerant fire at a leak in system","Leaking refrigerant at an ignition point starts a fire in cable trays or on telescope",2,"D",10,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","1-Use only non-flammable refrigerant, so there is no possibility of fire",4,"E",20,"Low","Review","1-Verify that non-flammable refrigerant is used",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-018","Refrig","Matl's","Hazardous gas released by burning refrigerant","Fumes and combustion products from burning refrigerant are harmful to health and the environment",2,"D",10,"Medium","Procedure, training","1-Use only non-flammable refrigerant, so there is no possibility of fire\n2-Add over-temp switches to compressors\n3-include necassary health and safety warning per refrigernat MSDS recommnedaitns to area signage reference \"in case of fire\".",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","1-Check over-temp switches\n2- review emergency procedures, suppression system and safety signage","CPS","Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-020","Cryostat","Struc","Overpressure failure of cryostat ","Structural failure of cryostat due to overpressure during a purge-venting operation",1,"D",8,"Serious","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report 10742,   1-Design cryostat for overpressure loads with recommended safety factors\n2-include burst disk and or pressure relief valve on cryostat vacuum system\n3-restrict purge and backfill connection to low pressure systems\n4-restrict purge and backfill connection to low volume bottles and or dewars.",1,"E",12,"Medium","Audit","1-Proof test cryostat to overpressure\n2-proof test pressure relief valve\n3- verify that burst disk parameters  are consistent with design specifications. test representative burst disc for proper function.\n4-review documentation and trianing to ensure only approved bottles and components will be connected to system\n5-design and or select interconnect hardware to minimize risk of unapproved hardware connecitons\n",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-021","Cryostat","Matl's","Asphyxiation due to release of refrigerant","Release of refrigerant in Utility Room may displace air, causing asphyxiation of personnel entering the room",1,"D",8,"Serious","Warning device","1-provide ventilation of room suffcient to remove limiited refrigerant quantity of system charge\n2-employ oxygen deficiency monitor in utility room",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","1-test ventilation system for adquate (as designed) performance for air change rate\n-Test ODM periodically, verify alarm setpoint\n3- ensure training is adequate and retrining frequency is consistent with needs.","CPS","Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"ELX-003","Sys Elec","Elec","Cable Abrasion or Stress","If a power or signal cable is abraded or stressed the insulation could be compromised or the connections could be broken, possibly resulting in a short circuit, overheating, and fire at worst",2,"C",6,"Serious","Control hazard","Design cable plant to avoid stress on joints and rub points; take great care with any moving cables",2,"E",15,"Medium","Inspection","Inspect camera cable system as it is being installed and as other parts of camera are installed.",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"ELX-004","Sys Elec","Elec","Electrical Fire","Local overheating of electronic components could cause fire",2,"D",10,"Medium","Safety device","Combination of using standard fire retardant or resistant construction materials and including smoke sensing devices in the volumes where electrical and electronic devices are located which will trip off power",3,"E",17,"Medium","Review","Inspect and qualify materials used and test smoke sensors as required by manufacturer or code",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"ELX-005","Sys Elec","Elec","Electrical Safety","Personnel hazard from high voltages or high currents.",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","All voltages and available currents above \"ultra-low voltages and currents\" to be handled according to all applicable codes and standards, implement LOTO during maintenance and repair ",1,"E",12,"Medium","Review","Verify construction",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"EXCH-005","Filter-X","Mech","Single-point failure","Mechanical failure of a single-point failure item:  axles, filter latches, truck wheels, keys on drive shafts",2,"C",6,"Serious","Control hazard","Design hardware in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard, ",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","Analysis, proof testing and inspection as part of PM plans",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"EXCH-006","Filter-X","Mech","Wear/fatigue failure","Failure due to long-term wear or cyclic loading causing fatigue failure",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Design hardware in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard, perform periodic inspections to identify wear and preventive maintenance ",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","Review inspection and PM plans",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"EXCH-007","Filter-X","Mech","Personnel injury","Pinch points, closing apertures, rolling and sliding parts are exposed to personnel working on the system",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Engineered safety features  to protect personnel, lock-out/tag-out provisions,  sensors,   emergency shut-off",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","Inspect safety systems during verification testing; include in periodic inspection and PM plans","CPS","Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"EXCH-012","Filter-X","Mech","Carousel clamp failure","Carousel clamp inadvertently releases, dropping a filter and damaging it",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","Clamps are spring-load in the clamped position, so they are fail safe from loss of power or actuator force; clamps are designed to carry full seismic and handling loads of the filters",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Proof test the carousel clamps, run verification tests as part of Carousel testing ",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-001","I&T","Mech","Sensor damaged during (de)integration","Sensor collides with adjacent sensor, raft, or tooling during acceptance testing, integration or deintegration. Probable damage to sensor. Cost of 1+ sensors plus replacement time lost per occurance. source, mechanism, outcome",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA 10748,  Lateral tolerance study performed, LCA-10738, used in design to maintain proper clearances.  Installation tooling design and assembly procedures for adequate clearance between sensors during assembly. ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","Verify no sensors have been damaged",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-002","I&T","Matl's","Cut from broken glass","If a glass optical element breaks, then broken glass could cut or abrade nearby personnel",2,"D",10,"Medium","Procedure, training","Plan all lifts; use protective covers on lenses and appropriate PPE",2,"E",15,"Medium","Audit","Review plans and monitor to make sure they are being implemented",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-003","I&T","Matl's","Cut from broken silicon CCD","If a silicon CCD sensor breaks, then broken silicon could cut or cause an eye injury to personnel",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Use appropriate procedures to reduce liklihood of damage to CCD; incorporate PPE",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","Review plans and monitor to make sure they are being implemented",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-004","I&T","Matl's","Cut from broken Grid chip","If the silicon-carbide Grid is damaged from sharp impact to it, then the resulting chip or sharp edge could cut personnel",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Use appropriate procedures to reduce liklihood of damage to Grid; incorporate PPE",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","Review plans and monitor to make sure they are being implemented",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-005","I&T","Matl's","Cut from broken CFC strut","If a strut structurally fails, then released carbon fibers could cut personnel",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Use appropriate procedures to reduce liklihood of damage to struts; incorporate PPE",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","Review plans and monitor to make sure they are being implemented",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-006","I&T","Matl's","Spraying refrigerant","If a refrigerant line ruptures, then refrigerant spray could cause eye injury",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Use appropriate procedures to reduce liklihood of tube/hose failure; incorporate PPE while working on systems",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","Review plans and monitor to make sure they are being implemented",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-007","I&T","Therm/Cryo","Frostbite","If surfaces at cryogenic temperatures are exposed, then personel who touch them could get frostbite",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Insulate all exposed cold surfaces; incorporate PPE while working around uncovered piping",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","Review plans and monitor to make sure they are being implemented",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-008","I&T","Env","Asphyxiation due to release of N2","If gaseous nitrogen purge gas free-flows into a confined space, then personnel could be exposed to low-oxygen environment",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","Limit flow of N2 into rooms",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","Test max flow rate",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-009","I&T","Elec","Shock from exposed leads","If high-current or high-voltage motor leads are easily exposed, then personnel may get shocked",1,"D",8,"Serious","Safety feature","Cover all exposed leads; incorporate lock-out/tag-out procedures for maintenance",1,"E",12,"Medium","Inspection","Inspect all covers; audit lock-out/tag-out procedures and implementation",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-010","I&T","Elec","Shock from unsafe electronics","If custom-designed electronics are not safely designed, then personnel may get shocked. ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety device","Design to national standards; incorporate safety devices to limit max current",3,"E",17,"Medium","Review","Review design and as-built boards to ensure they are designed and built to national standards",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-011","I&T","Mech","Crushing from entrapment","If a moving member of a fixture entraps a limb during a re-orientation or rigging operation, then personnel could be injured",1,"D",8,"Serious","Procedure, training","Use built-in or add-on passive guards; plan operations with personnel safety in mind",1,"E",12,"Medium","Audit","Review plans and guarding; monitor to  ensure plans are being implemented",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-012","I&T","Struc","Injury from falling equipment","If equipment falls or moves during an earthquake, then personnel could be injured",1,"D",8,"Serious","Procedure, training","Anchor fixed equipment; tether moving equipment to limit motion",1,"E",12,"Medium","Inspection","Inspect anchoring and tethers; check to ensure they are being used",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-014","I&T","Mech","Injury from falling equipment","During material handling with lifting equipment, equipment may fall or otherwise impinge on worker, resulting in injury",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","1-Limit use of hoists and forklifts to certified personnel.        2-Create and work to required lift plans",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","1-Audit training records.         2-Audit lift plans and monitor to ensure plans are being implemented",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-015","I&T","Mech","Injury from working in awkward postures","While performing Camera work on difficult-to-access components, workers may be acutely (sprain/strain) or chronically (via repetitive motion) injured",3,"B",9,"Serious","Procedure, training","1-Assess each each task for industrial ergonomics.         2-Train workers in safe industrial ergonomics",3,"C",11,"Medium","Audit","1. Review plans for possible ergonomic insults and alter tasks accordingly.        2-Assure worker completion of SLAC \"Industrial Ergonomics Awareness Training\"",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Opt-014","Optics","Mech","L1 damage during personnel access","The L1 lens is open to the dome and is at risk of damage during personnel access, due to a direct collision or contact with the lens by personnel, tools, or related equipment or gear",2,"D",10,"Medium","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Use a lens cap to cover up the lens during extended accesses; access the camera from the side, so there should be little opportunity to contact the lens",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","Verify that procedures are being used during accesses",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Opt-015","Optics","Mech","L2 or L3 damage during personnel access","To remove the Shutter or Auto Changer from the camera, the region between L2 and L3 is accessed by personnel and handling hardware, when personnel, tools, or handling fixtures could contact L2 or L3.  Such a contact could damage either the coating or even scratch the lens",3,"B",9,"Serious","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10746 and 10745,  1. Use rails for removing the Shutter and Auto Changer\n2. Install a cover over L2, to prevent contact ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","Use procedures for all large-scale servicing work, to ensure that safety devices are being used",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Sensor-001","Sensor","Struc","Sensor Handling Damage during acceptance","During acceptance testing, damage could occur on sensor (dropping sensor, breaking edges)",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety device","Hazard Report LCA-10740   Use of handling jig and transport container, training, procedures, (spare sensors)",3,"D",14,"Medium","Process control","Review procedures and plans to verify implementation  PSAP LCA-138",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Sensor-009","Sensor","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins during acceptance","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable, connector saver, and test stand cabling",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","Assembly procedures ensure proper connector mating and handling",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 3.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system.",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Sensor-014","Sensor","Env","Radiation","Personnel hazard from exposure to Iron 55 Radiation Source ",2,"C",6,"Serious","Control hazard","Radiation sources shall be handled according to all applicable codes and standards. This may include shielding, rad surveys, barriers, personnel dosimetry, inventory control, and procedures  ",2,"D",10,"Medium","Review","Audit dosimetry monitoring and procedures",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Sensor-015","Sensor","Press/Vac","Test Stand #3 Dewar hazards","Personnel hazard associated with the Test Stand # 3 Dewar inclued: ODH, cryo burns, personel injury due to window failure durng purge  ",2,"C",6,"Serious","Control hazard","Implement BNL occupational safety standards including: ODH analysis and monitoring if required, analysis of chamber and PRV for purge system,  training and PPE for work with cryogens",2,"D",10,"Medium","Review","Safety reviews to verify implementation of safety plans and requirements",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Srft-006","Sci Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower",3,"B",9,"Serious","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10794  ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","see Hazard Report",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Srft-014","Sci Raft","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable and REB",4,"C",18,"Low","Procedure, training","Assembly procedures ensure proper connector mating and handling",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system.",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Srft-015","Sci Raft","Struc","Mechanical damage to REB's","Boards can be mechanically damaged during handling causing solder joint hairline cracks or other componet structural damage",4,"C",18,"Low","Procedure, training","Assembly procedures ensure proper procedures during handling",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system.",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-013","I&T","Matl's","Surface damage to lens","AR coating or glass surface damaged. Occurs by abrasion, or collision when exposed. Repolish or recoating could be needed depending on damage level.",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety device","Have optics covered by protective gear at all times when not in use.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Inspection","Visual checks of lens surfaces",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Crft-011","Crnr Raft","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable and REB",4,"C",18,"Low","Procedure, training","Assembly procedures ensure proper connector mating and handling",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system.",null,"Y"]
[]
["Only in file 1"]
[null,"Srft-23","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","Cold plate fails while cryo plate continues running ","REBs can suffer undertemperatures should the cold plate fail while cryoplate continues running",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Put in place active monitoring and controls to shut down cryoplate in case of cold plate failure",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify shutoff is effected by coldplate failure","CPS"]
[]
["Obsoleted and moved to \"Obsolete\" tab"]
[null,"EXCH-001","Filter-X","Therm/Cryo","Carousel drive motor over-heating","This hazard is no longer current it is incorporated into hazard EXCH-021",4,"C",18,"Low","Safety device","Torque monitor on motor drive shaft shuts off motor before reaching stall torque\nCurrent monitor shuts off motor if current exceeds a pre-tested max value",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Test torque and current monitors as part of carousel proof test "]
[]
["Obsoleted and moved to \"Obsolete\" tab"]
[null,"EXCH-002","Filter-X","Therm/Cryo","Changer drive motor over-heating","This hazard is no longer current it is incorporated into hazard EXCH-021",4,"C",18,"Low","Safety device","Torque monitor on motor drive shaft shuts off motor before reaching stall torque\nCurrent monitor shuts off motor if current exceeds a pre-tested max value",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Test torque and current monitors as part of carousel proof test "]
[]
["Changed from "]
[null,"Cryo-021","Cryostat","Matl's","Asphyxiation due to release of refrigerant","Release of refrigerant in Utility Room may displace air, causing asphyxiation of personnel entering the room",1,"D",8,"Serious","Warning device","1-provide ventilation of room suffcient to remove limiited refrigerant quantity of system charge\n2-employ oxygen deficiency monitor in utility room",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","1-test ventilation system for adquate (as designed) performance for air change rate\n-Test ODM periodically, verify alarm setpoint\n3- ensure training is adequate and retrining frequency is consistent with needs.","CPS","Y"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-021","Cryostat","Matl's","Asphyxiation due to release of refrigerant","Release of refrigerant in Utility Room may displace air, causing asphyxiation of personnel entering the room",1,"D",8,"Serious","Warning device","1-provide ventilation of room suffcient to remove limiited refrigerant quantity of system charge\n2-employ oxygen deficiency monitor in utility room",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","1-test ventilation system for adquate (as designed) performance for air change rate\n-Test ODM periodically, verify alarm setpoint\n3- ensure training is adequate and retrining frequency is consistent with needs.",null,"Y","2015-07-14"]
[]
["Changed from "]
[null,"Cryo-020","Cryostat","Struc","Overpressure failure of cryostat ","Structural failure of cryostat due to overpressure during a purge-venting operation",1,"D",8,"Serious","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report 10742,   1-Design cryostat for overpressure loads with recommended safety factors\n2-include burst disk and or pressure relief valve on cryostat vacuum system\n3-restrict purge and backfill connection to low pressure systems\n4-restrict purge and backfill connection to low volume bottles and or dewars.",1,"E",12,"Medium","Audit","1-Proof test cryostat to overpressure\n2-proof test pressure relief valve\n3- verify that burst disk parameters  are consistent with design specifications. test representative burst disc for proper function.\n4-review documentation and trianing to ensure only approved bottles and components will be connected to system\n5-design and or select interconnect hardware to minimize risk of unapproved hardware connecitons\n",null,"Y"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x","x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-020","Cryostat","Struc","Overpressure failure of cryostat ","Structural failure of cryostat due to overpressure during a purge-venting operation",1,"D",8,"Serious","Safety device","See Hazard Report 10742,   Include burst disk on cryostat vacuum system\n",1,"E",12,"Medium","Audit","Verify that burst disk parameters  are consistent with design specifications. test representative burst disc for proper function.\n",null,"Y","2015-07-14"]
[]
["Changed from "]
[null,"EXCH-009","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rotation of the Carousel","Inadvertant rotation of the carousel and collision of a filter by back-driving through the drive train; this can occur when an unbalanced load of filters places a torque on the Carousel",2,"C",6,"Serious","Eliminate hazard","Use a non-back-driveable gear train, or add a power-off brake to prevent uncommanded rotation, even when the power is off",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Proof test the Carousel to demonstrate that gear train can not be back-driven, even under seismic loads"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-009","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rotation of the Carousel","Inadvertant rotation of the carousel and collision of a filter by back-driving through the drive train; this can occur when an unbalanced load of filters places a torque on the Carousel",2,"C",6,"Serious","Eliminate hazard","Use a non-back-driveable gear train",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Proof test the Carousel to demonstrate that gear train can not be back-driven, even under seismic loads",null,null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Changed from "]
[null,"EXCH-013","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rolling of filter in Auto Changer","Inadvertant rolling of the filter on the Auto Changer trucks by back-driving through the drive train, leading to collision of the filter with another filter",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Use a non-back-driveable drive train, or add a power-off brake to prevent uncommanded motion even when the power is off",4,"E",20,"Low","Process control","Proof test the Auto Changer to demonstrate that drive train can not be back-driven"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-013","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rolling of filter in Auto Changer","Inadvertant rolling of the filter on the Auto Changer trucks by back-driving through the drive train, leading to collision of the filter with another filter",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Use a non-back-driveable drive train.",4,"E",20,"Low","Process control","Proof test the Auto Changer to demonstrate that drive train can not be back-driven",null,null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Obsoleted and moved to \"Obsolete\" tab"]
[null,"EXCH-015","Filter-X","Mech","Driving filter off the end of Auto Changer rails","This hazard is eliminated due to the design change that eliminated the flip rails",4,"E",20,"Low","Safety device","Limit switches on the flip rail positively determine when the rail is in place and ready; these provide an \"enable\" signal to allow the Auto Changer to move",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that limit switches prevent motions that would lead to driving off the rail"]
[]
["Obsoleted and moved to \"Obsolete\" tab"]
[null,"EXCH-016","Filter-X","Mech","Flip Rails fail, dropping a filter","This hazard is eliminated due to the design change that eliminated the flip rails",4,"E",20,"Low","Eliminate hazard","Latch mechanism on the flip rails are normally-latched or bi-stable overcenter latches which prevent flip rails from rotating, even at loss of power",4,"E",20,"Low","Process control","Proof test the flip rail mechanism to ensure it cannot flip flat due to an accidental overload"]
[]
["Changed from "]
[null,"Opt-001","Optics","Struc","L1 flexure failure","Failure of an L1 flexure due to excessive radial flex'ing or overload, possibly coming from heating or cooling of the camera beyond its survival temperature limits - if one flexure failed there may be a potential to overload adjacent flexures ",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","Design flexures with safty factor in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to survive a broad survival temperature range, much larger than they should ever see.",1,"E",12,"Medium","Process control","Perform qualification testing of the flexure and acceptance testing of all assemblies"]
["To",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-001","Optics","Struc","L1 flexure failure","Failure of an L1 flexure due to excessive radial flex'ing or overload, possibly coming from heating or cooling of the camera beyond its survival temperature limits - if one flexure failed there may be a potential to overload adjacent flexures ",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","Design flexures with safty factor in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to survive a broad survival temperature range, much larger than they should ever see. See Hazard Report LCA-10746.",1,"E",12,"Medium","Process control","Perform qualification testing of the flexure and acceptance testing of all assemblies",null,null,"2015-07-14"]
[]
["Changed from "]
[null,"Opt-005","Optics","Struc","L1-L2 Assembly strut flexure failure","Failure of a flexure due to overloading during torquing or adjusting the assembly beyond the angular working range of the flexure",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","Design flexure with a safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to carry operational and handling loads",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","Proof test flexures individually and as a set, at extremes of their range"]
["To",null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x",null,"x","x","x",null,"x",null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-005","Optics","Struc","L1-L2 Assembly strut flexure failure","Failure of a flexure due to overloading during torqueing, exceeding angular working range, or not loosening strut ball seat",1,"C",4,"High","Procedure, training","1. Design flexure with a safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to carry operational and handling loads.    2. Follow strut adjustment procedures and use dedicated tooling; monitor offset angles",1,"D",8,"Serious","Test","1. Proof test flexures individually and as a set, at extremes of their range.    2. Qualify adjustment tooling and procedures to check for overloading of flexure",null,"Y","2015-07-14"]
[]
["Changed from"]
[null,"CB&M-014","Cam Bdy","Mech","Simultaneous turbo-pump operation and camera motion","If the telescope moves while a turbo-pump is running, the pump could be destroyed.",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety device","Add protection where a single key operates either the turbo pump or slewing",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Perform zero-voltage verification in both vacuum-pump-on and camera-motion on states",null,"Y"]
["To","x","x"]
[null,"Cryo-024","Cryostat","Mech","Simultaneous turbo-pump operation and camera motion","If the telescope moves while a turbo-pump is running, the pump could be destroyed.",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety device","Add protection where a single key operates either the turbo pump or slewing",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Perform zero-voltage verification in both vacuum-pump-on and camera-motion on states",null,"Y","2015-07-14"]
[]
[]
["change log for date 4/11/2017 10:29:08 PM"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Crft-007","Crnr Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","Hazard Report LCA-10794    Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller and GREB/WREB outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller  or  GREB/WREB at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure control - per LCA-10794.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Crft-007","Crnr Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","Hazard Report LCA-10794. Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller and GREB/WREB outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller  or  GREB/WREB at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure control - per LCA-10794.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Crft-013","Crnr Raft","Elec","GREB/WREB power on sequence","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed;\nActivating the Back Substrate (step 5) before the Bias voltages (step 2) are set to minimal values may cause damage to the sensors.\nDrains are \"off\" and BS is \"On\" could cause a destructive current to appear;\nOutput Drain and Output Diode :  always + with respect to FSS. Forward biasing of junction will cause damage of sensor;",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747,\nBS enable switch on the REB board allows application of BS after stable conditions satisfied - firmware and/or hardware control  from CABAC.\nAdd GND diode to output drain and output diode to prevent these potentials from going very negative (>0.3V)",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Crft-013","Crnr Raft","Elec","GREB/WREB power on sequence","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed;\nActivating the Back Substrate (step 5) before the Bias voltages (step 2) are set to minimal values may cause damage to the sensors.\nDrains are \"off\" and BS is \"On\" could cause a destructive current to appear;\nOutput Drain and Output Diode :  always + with respect to FSS. Forward biasing of junction will cause damage of sensor;",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747\nBS enable switch on the REB board allows application of BS after stable conditions satisfied - firmware and/or hardware control  from CABAC.\nAdd GND diode to output drain and output diode to prevent these potentials from going very negative (>0.3V)",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","See Hazard Report"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Crft-014","Crnr Raft","Mech","Sensor looses thermal contact to raft","failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat, in particular the guide sensors when read at 9Hz.",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and will have lock washer, or equivalent to prevent loosening.",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","Run thermal cycling tests on the full sensor mech assembly"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Crft-014","Crnr Raft","Mech","Sensor looses thermal contact to raft","Failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat, in particular the guide sensors when read at 9Hz.",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and will have lock washer, or equivalent to prevent loosening.",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","Run thermal cycling tests on the full sensor mech assembly"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-012","Cryostat","Matl's","Release of refrigerant","Refrigerant may be harmful to the CCD detectors and severely impact the cleanliness of the cryostat; gases may be greenhouse gases",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1-use single mill run lengths of tubing for refrigeration system in cryostat, no tubing joints in cryostat.\n2-design with high safety factors for burst pressure for all tubing in cryostat.\n3-implement pressure relieve vavle and burst disc in system,outside cryostat, to limit maximum system pressure to safe levels.",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","2-pressure test plumbing repeatedly during construction of system\n2-ensure process and procedure documentaiton details requirments for hook up and compoonent selection\n3-Leak check cooling channels and pump-out to verify they are leak-tight"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-012","Cryostat","Matl's","Release of refrigerant","Refrigerant may be harmful to the CCD detectors and severely impact the cleanliness of the cryostat; gases may be greenhouse gases",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1-use single mill run lengths of tubing for refrigeration system in cryostat, no tubing joints in cryostat.\n2-design with high safety factors for burst pressure for all tubing in cryostat.\n3-implement pressure relieve vavle and burst disc in system,outside cryostat, to limit maximum system pressure to safe levels.",2,"E",15,"Medium","Process control","1-pressure test plumbing repeatedly during construction of system\n2-ensure process and procedure documentaiton details requirments for hook up and compoonent selection\n3-Leak check cooling channels and pump-out to verify they are leak-tight"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-025","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Ice plug in supply line at or near compressor increases pressure on compressor discharge and vapor line and reduces cooling capacity and raises Camera temp",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Shut off the refrigerant system and allow to warm up to room temperature.  Then restart the system.  If it does not work, replace the filter dryer.",4,"D",19,"Low","Process control","Assure warm-up procedure is in place"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-026","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Ice plug in supply line at or near Camera causes increased pressure in compressor discharge and vapor line and reduces cooling capacity and raises Camera temp",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","Shut off the refrigerant system and allow to warm up to room temperature.  Then restart the system.  If it does not work, replace the filter dryer.",4,"D",19,"Low","Process control","Assure warm-up procedure is in place"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-027","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Plug in vapor supply line at or near compressor causes increased pressure in compressor discharge and liquid line",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Shut off the refrigerant system and allow to warm up to room temperature.  Then restart the system.",4,"C",18,"Low","Process control","Assure warm-up procedure is in place"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-028","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Plug in vapor supply line at or near Camera causes increased pressure in compressor discharge and liquid line and reduces cooling capacity and raises Camera temp",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","Shut off the refrigerant system and allow to warm up to room temperature.  Then restart the system.  ",4,"C",18,"Low","Process control","Assure warm-up procedure is in place"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-029","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Simultaneous plugs in vapor supply line and liquid supply line at or near compressor causes >600 psig between compressor and blockage and subsequent compressor failure",2,"E",15,"Medium","Safety device","Mechanical switch to cut compressor power and prevent over pressure near Camera",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Test pressure switch"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-030","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Simultaneous plugs in vapor supply line and liquid supply line at or near Camera causes increase in supply line pressures",2,"D",10,"Medium","Procedure, training","Mechanical switch to cut compressor power and prevent over pressure and burst disc at compressor",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Test pressure switch, verify placement of disc "]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-030","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Simultaneous plugs in vapor supply line and liquid supply line at or near Camera causes increase in supply line pressures",2,"D",10,"Medium","Procedure, training","Mechanical switch to cut compressor power and prevent over pressure near Camera ",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Test pressure switch"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-032","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Plug in return line at or near Camera causes pressures <600 psig at the high pressure side of the system, subsequntly damaging compressor",3,"E",17,"Medium","Safety device","Mechanical switch to cut compressor power and prevent over pressure and burst disc near Camera",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Test pressure switch, verify placement of disc "]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-033","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improperly closed valve in liquid supply line at or near compressor increases pressure in compressor discharge and vapor line and reduces cooling capacity",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","Employ proper refrigeration system servicing procedure",3,"D",14,"Medium","Process control","Assure service procedure is in place"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-034","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improperly closed valve in vapor supply line at or near Camera increases pressure in compressor discharge and vapor line and reduces cooling capacity",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","Employ proper refrigeration system servicing procedure",3,"D",14,"Medium","Process control","Assure service procedure is in place"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-035","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improperly closed valve in vapor supply line at or near compressor increases pressure in compressor discharge and liquid line and reduces cooling capacity",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","Employ proper refrigeration system servicing procedure",3,"D",14,"Medium","Process control","Assure service procedure is in place"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-036","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improperly closed valve in vapor supply line at or near Camera increases pressure in compressor discharge and liquid line and reduces cooling capacity",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety device","Mechanical switch to cut compressor power and prevent over pressure and burst disc near Camera",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Test pressure switch, verify placement of disc "]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-037","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Simultaneous improperly-closed valves in vapor supply line and liquid supply line at or near compressor causes >600psig between compressor and closed valve, subsequently damaging compressor",3,"C",6,"Serious","Safety device","Mechanical switch to cut compressor power and prevent over pressure ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Test","Test pressure switch"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-038","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Simultaneous improperly-closed valves in vapor supply line and liquid supply line at or near Camera causes increased supply line pressures and damages compressor",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety device","Install pressure relief valve to  prevent over pressure",3,"C",11,"Medium","Test","Test pressure relief valve "]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-039","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improperly closed valve in return line at or near compressor causes <100psig pressure equalization throughout system and provides no cooling capacity",4,"C",18,"Low","Procedure, training","Employ proper refrigeration system servicing procedure",4,"D",19,"Low","Process control","Assure service procedure is in place"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-040","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improperly closed valve in return line at or near Camera causes >600psig pressure on the systems's pressure side, damageing the compressor",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","Employ proper refrigeration system servicing procedure",3,"D",14,"Medium","Process control","Assure service procedure is in place"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-041","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Camera with full refrigerant charge is disconnected with valves closed while cold results in severe Camera overpressure (upon warmup) that could end in catastrophic release inside cryostat ",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety device","Place pressure relief valve near Camera",4,"D",10,"Medium","Test","Test pressure relief valve"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-042","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improper application of leak-check gas could cause overpressures pressure during leak check",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety device","Place pressure relief valve or burst disc near at leak-check gas source",4,"D",14,"Medium","Inspection","Verify placement of PRV or disc"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-043","Refrig","Matl's","Refrigerant toxicity","Release of 3919C refrigerant could result in illness from exposure to toxic component R245fa",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Prohibit presence of >200kg of 3919C in Dome",4,"C",18,"Low","Inspection","Periodically inspect Dome for presence of refrigerant storage"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-044","Refrig","Mech","Flow switch failure","Flow switch failures noted during prototyping could cause unwanted summit down time",3,"B",9,"Serious","Control hazard","Replace extant flow switched with more reliable units",3,"C",11,"Medium","Test","Test replacement flow switches to assure improved reliability"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Sensor-016","Sensor","Env","MOSFET radio- sensitivity","MOSFET damage to sensors from local use of portable radios ",2,"C",6,"Serious",null,"TBD",null,null,{"$error":"#N/A"},{"$error":"#N/A"},null,"TBD",null,null,null,null,42843]
[]
["Changed"]
[" ","EXCH-014","Filter-X","Mech","Dropping filter off Auto Changer truck","Latch mechanism that holds the filter releases and drops the filter, damaging it and L2, L3, or the Shutter",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10743,  Power and an enable signal is required to unlatch a filter",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Run proof tests to verify that latch can carry max load without unlatching","CPS"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-014","Filter-X","Mech","Dropping filter off Auto Changer truck","Latch mechanism that holds the filter releases and drops the filter, damaging it and L2, L3, or the Shutter",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10743:  Both power and an enable signal are required to unlatch a filter",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Run proof tests to verify that latch can carry max load without unlatching","CPS"]
[]
["Changed"]
["new","EXCH-023","Filter-X","Mech","Loose items damage Filter-X or L2","Exchange system and L2 could be damaged by a loosened (by motion cycling) Exchange-system part (screw, bolt, fastener, etc.) rolling around inside the camera body  ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Threaded fasteners will have lock washers or equivalent",3,"D",14,"Medium","Inspection","Inspect each fastener as installed  to assure redundant capturing"]
["x"]
[null,"EXCH-023","Filter-X","Mech","Loose items damage Filter-X or L2","Exchange system and L2 could be damaged by a loosened (by motion cycling) Exchange-system part (screw, bolt, fastener, etc.) rolling around inside the camera body  ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Threaded fasteners will have lock washers or equivalent",3,"D",14,"Medium","Inspection","Inspect each fastener as installed  to assure redundant capturing"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"IT-001","I&T","Mech","Sensor damaged during (de)integration","Sensor collides with adjacent sensor, raft, or tooling during acceptance testing, integration or deintegration. Probable damage to sensor. Cost of 1+ sensors plus replacement time lost per occurance. source, mechanism, outcome",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA 10748,  Lateral tolerance study performed, LCA-10738, used in design to maintain proper clearances.  Installation tooling design and assembly procedures for adequate clearance between sensors during assembly. ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","Verify no sensors have been damaged"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,"x","x"]
[null,"IT-001","I&T","Mech","Sensor damaged during (de)integration","Sensor collides with adjacent sensor, raft, or tooling during acceptance testing, integration or deintegration. Probable damage to sensor. Cost of 1+ sensors plus replacement time lost per occurance. source, mechanism, outcome",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","Lateral tolerance study performed, LCA-10738, used in design to maintain proper clearances.  Installation tooling design and assembly procedures for adequate clearance between sensors during assembly. Staff shall be trained in proper handling techniques and handling procedures, including LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations) and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations).",3,"D",14,"Medium","Review","Review efficacy of tolerance studies, handling techniques, rules"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"IT-008","I&T","Env","Asphyxiation due to release of N2","If gaseous nitrogen purge gas free-flows into a confined space, then personnel could be exposed to low-oxygen environment",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","Limit flow of N2 into rooms",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","Test max flow rate"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"IT-008","I&T","Env","Asphyxiation due to release of N2","If gaseous nitrogen purge gas free-flows into a confined space, then personnel could be exposed to low-oxygen environment",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","1-Limit flow of N2 into rooms\n2-Equip rooms with oxygen-deficiency monitors",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","Test max flow rate"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"IT-012","I&T","Struc","Injury from falling equipment","If equipment falls or moves during an earthquake, then personnel could be injured",1,"D",8,"Serious","Procedure, training","Anchor fixed equipment; tether moving equipment to limit motion",1,"E",12,"Medium","Inspection","Inspect anchoring and tethers; check to ensure they are being used"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"IT-012","I&T","Struc","Injury from falling equipment","If equipment falls or moves during an earthquake, then personnel could be injured",1,"D",8,"Serious","Procedure, training","Anchor fixed equipment per SLAC Anchorage of Experimental Equipment Program (\"BIO Policy P-15-001\"); tether moving equipment to limit motion",1,"E",12,"Medium","Inspection","Inspect anchoring and tethers; check to ensure they are being used"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"IT-014","I&T","Mech","Injury from falling equipment","During material handling with lifting equipment, equipment may fall or otherwise impinge on worker, resulting in injury",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","1-Limit use of hoists and forklifts to certified personnel.        2-Create and work to required lift plans",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","1-Audit training records.         2-Audit lift plans and monitor to ensure plans are being implemented"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"IT-014","I&T","Mech","Injury from falling equipment","During material handling with lifting equipment, equipment may fall or otherwise impinge on worker, resulting in injury",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","1-Limit use of hoists and forklifts to certified personnel.        \n2-Create and work to required lift plans",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","1-Audit training records.         2-Audit lift plans and monitor to ensure plans are being implemented"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"IT-015","I&T","Mech","Injury from working in awkward postures","While performing Camera work on difficult-to-access components, workers may be acutely (sprain/strain) or chronically (via repetitive motion) injured",3,"B",9,"Serious","Procedure, training","1-Assess each each task for industrial ergonomics.         2-Train workers in safe industrial ergonomics",3,"C",11,"Medium","Audit","1. Review plans for possible ergonomic insults and alter tasks accordingly.        2-Assure worker completion of SLAC \"Industrial Ergonomics Awareness Training\""]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"IT-015","I&T","Mech","Injury from working in awkward postures","While performing Camera work on difficult-to-access components, workers may be acutely (sprain/strain) or chronically (via repetitive motion) injured",3,"B",9,"Serious","Procedure, training","1-Assess each each task for industrial ergonomics.         \n2-Train workers in safe industrial ergonomics",3,"C",11,"Medium","Audit","1. Review plans for possible ergonomic insults and alter tasks accordingly.        2-Assure worker completion of SLAC \"Industrial Ergonomics Awareness Training\""]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-016","I&T","Struc","Test-stand mover (\"Alum-a-Lift\") failure (Test Raft Pgm)","Worker crushed by dropped load: Alum-a-lift fails",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Proof test Alum-a-Lift prior to deployment",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Vetting of manufacturer prooftest documents"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-017","I&T","Mech","Pinch/crush by moving TS component(s) (Test Raft Pgm)","Worker crushed between moving TS parts during automated tests",3,"D",14,"Medium","Warning device","Place requirement for roping off areas with moving parts on associated eTravelers",3,"E",17,"Medium","Audit","Periodically review eTravellers and compliance with eTravelers "]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-018","I&T","Env","Laser light injury (Test Raft Pgm)","Laser light eye injury during metrology activities",3,"D",14,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","1-Lasers used will not exceed Class 2 (per ANSI Z136)   \n2-Personnel are prohibited from using optical-aid instruments in ACR during metrology operations.",4,"E",20,"Low","Audit","Periodically inspect for and remove optical-aid instruments from ACR."]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-019","I&T","Elec","Motor/controller/ amplifier/power supply electrical (Test Raft Pgm)","Electrical shock/arcflash/startle from TS servo equipment",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Assure electrical component listing by UL, CSA, or SLAC-EEIP",3,"E",17,"Medium","Inspection","Inspect all non-UL/CSA items per SLAC-EEIP"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-020","I&T","Press/Vac","Refrigerant line/system break or breach  (Test Raft Pgm)","Injury from uncontrolled release of pressurized refrigerant",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","1-design the system such that by Boyles law (P1V1=P2V2) it is impossible to overpressure the heat exchanger system due to a refrigerant leak\n2-incorporate burst disc in system\n3-Pressure-test heat exchangers",3,"E",17,"Medium","Inspection","Verify burst disc parameters"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-021","I&T","Fire","PT-30 refrigerant fire (Test Raft Pgm)","Damage and injury after release and ignition of CryoTiger refrigerant. ",2,"C",6,"Serious","Control hazard","1-Abide by recommendations in Cryotiger \"PCC with PT Refrigerants\" manual (Brooks Automation doc. no. 825133-00, Revision A) \n2-Provide a pressure relief burst disc on the vacuum vessel to prevent an over-pressure condition if a leak of high-pressure refriger-\nant  occurs  within  the  vacuum  vessel.",3,"C",11,"Medium","Inspection","1. Verify burst disc parameters   2. Monitor use to assure adherance to manufacturer's requirements"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-022","I&T","Env","ODH from hot nitrogen purge (Test Raft Pgm)","Death/injury from inhalation of oxygen-deficient gas in or around TS during 80cfm hot N2 purges",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","1-Vent nitrogen into a diffusing device.    \n2-Design RTM Installation Fixture and peripheral equipment to not afford worker head insertion. \n3-Limit N2 flow to X lpm via critical flow orifice.   \n4-Employ oxygen deficiency monitors around purge activities",2,"E",15,"Medium","Inspection","Inspect test stand before use"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-023","I&T","Press/Vac","Test stand vessel overpressure ","Injury or equipment damage from accidental unvented overpressure and catastrophic failure of vessel. (If the cryostat pressure is too high, REBs and sensors may malfunction and contaminants and water can condense on the hardware.)",3,"D",14,"Medium","Safety feature","Equip vessel with a pressure relief valve for human safety.  Assign equipment monitoring staff for activities at Test Stands 3 and the Test Stands 5 and 8 cryostats (Test Stand 7). Upon high pressure conditions, follow response procedures to bring system into a safe state. Planned future mitigations include an automated response to bring the system into a safe state.",4,"D",19,"Low","Test","Test pressure relief valve  "]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
["new","IT-024","I&T","Press/Vac","Test stand vessel window breach ","Injury or equipment damage from accidental breach of vessel window under vacuum ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Provide supplemental window protection ",4,"E",20,"Low","Inspection","Inspect supplemental window protection before use"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-025","I&T","Therm/Cryo","Burns from hot nitrogen injector (Test Raft Pgm)","Burn from skin contact with hot (100C) injector",3,"C",11,"Medium","Warning device","Post warnings on and around hot surfaces",3,"D",14,"Medium","Inspection","Inspect warnings before use"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-026","I&T","Env","Radiation from Fe-55 sources (Test Raft Pgm)","Radiation exposure to personnel from four 5μCi Fe-55 sources",4,"C",18,"Low","Procedure, training","Sources to be controlled according to BNL or SLAC source control program",4,"D",19,"Low","Review","Review source control compliance"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-027","I&T","Env","Contamination from vent after turbopump-/power- failure (Test Raft Pgm)","Turbopump failure allows backventing of room air to single bay cryostat",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","TSs placed on UPS",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Test TS UPS"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-028","I&T","Therm/Cryo","Miscooling of TS cryostat after misinstallation of cryocooler lines (Test Raft Pgm)","Cryocooler lines are switched, allowing miscooling (over- and under-cooling) of TS cryostat hardware",3,"C",11,"Medium",null,"TBD",null,null,{"$error":"#N/A"},{"$error":"#N/A"},null,"TBD"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-029","I&T","Mech","Mismating of rafts during integration (Test Raft Pgm)","Dissimilarity between Science and Corner Rafts hold-down mechanisms could prompt improper installation resulting in damage to a raft",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","eTraveler to contain explanatory language to help prevent treatment of  a Science Raft like a Corner Raft and vice versa",3,"D",14,"Medium","Review","Verify eTraveler entries",null,null,null,null,null," "]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-030","I&T","Mech","Unintended Integration Stand/Metrology Sensor Arm motion into reference flat or L3 (BOT)","Damage to L3 or reference flat from unintensional metrology sensor arm displacement   ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Install chocks to prevent damaging  vertical displacements of arm/sensor",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Test chock efficacy before flat and L3 are in place"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-031","I&T","Struc","Fall from integration stand work platform (BOT)","Injury from fall from elevated work surface on integration stand work platform",2,"D",10,"Medium","Control hazard","Install standard railing at platform's edge where working surface is >48\" from floor",2,"E",15,"Medium","Inspection","Inspect rails for OSHA compliance before first use"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-032","I&T","Press/Vac","Dark Box overpressure (BOT)","Blocked Dark Box vent while air is flowing can push the Box doors outward, creating light leaks",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Port vent outlet to prevent dead-ending",3,"E",17,"Medium","Inspection","Inspect vent outlet before first use"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-033","I&T","Env","Dark Box under BOT stand ODH (BOT)","Asphyxiation from inhalation of air displaced by nitrogen cover gas in Dark Box",2,"D",10,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","Substitute dry air for N2",2,"E",15,"Medium","Inspection","View and confirm use of air on Box"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-034","I&T","Env","Power loss to I&T facilities","Contaminants and water can condense on the hardware. Hardware and Test Stands may malfunction from loss of filtered ventilation",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","Assign equipment monitoring staff for all activities. Upon loss of power, a brown-out or loss of connection, follow response procedures to bring systems and equipment into a safe state. ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Review","Review power loss protocols"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-035","I&T","Env","Network connection loss","Loss of test systems control or monitoring (remote or local) due to loss of network connection(s) could result in hardware damage",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","Assign equipment monitoring staff for all activities. Upon loss of network connection, follow response procedures to bring systems and equipment into a safe state. Assign staff to perform operations locally until a connection can be established.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Review","Review network loss protocols"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-36","I&T","Mech","Damage from ball handler","Loss of control or misuse of handling implement for balls (between  sensor assemblies and grid) damages hardware ",3,"C",11,"Medium",null,"TBD",null,null,{"$error":"#N/A"},{"$error":"#N/A"},null,"TBD"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-37","I&T","Mech","BOT awkward postures","Personnel injury or hardware damage from awkward postures required to work on BOT top side",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","Perform topside BOT work prone from a cantilevered work platform",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","Assure use of platform for topside BOT work"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-009","Optics","Therm/Cryo","Excessive raidative cooling of L3 lens","If the radiative cooling off of L3 were significantly more than predicted, the lens may cool down,  Ultimately, embrittling the glass or causing thermal contraction beyond the range of accommodation of the perimeter gasket.  In either case, this may generate stresses in the glass above allowable limits which could ultimately result in failure",1,"E",12,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","Analysis of the black-body radiative cooling, which is the maximum radiative heat transfer possible, shows only slightly more cooling than the nominal condition.  Thus, we are already designing for near-worst-case conditions, and even the worst-case temperatures possible do not pose a hazard to the lens",4,"E",20,"Low","Review","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.              2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-009","Optics","Therm/Cryo","Excessive raidative cooling of L3 lens","If the radiative cooling off of L3 were significantly more than predicted, the lens may cool down,  Ultimately, embrittling the glass or causing thermal contraction beyond the range of accommodation of the perimeter gasket.  In either case, this may generate stresses in the glass above allowable limits which could ultimately result in failure",1,"E",12,"Medium","Eliminate hazard","Analysis of the black-body radiative cooling, which is the maximum radiative heat transfer possible, shows only slightly more cooling than the nominal condition.  Thus, we are already designing for near-worst-case conditions, and even the worst-case temperatures possible do not pose a hazard to the lens",4,"E",20,"Low","Review","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.              \n2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-010","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive external pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",1,"C",4,"High","Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10745,  1.  Design L3 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n2.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 (after I&T observatory located at approx 8000 feet ASL, atmospheric pressure is 75% of SL, this reduces press diff)",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.             2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures","CPS"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-010","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive external pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",1,"C",4,"High","Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10745  \n1.  Design L3 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n2.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 (after I&T observatory located at approx 8000 feet ASL, atmospheric pressure is 75% of SL, this reduces press diff)",1,"E",12,"Medium","Test","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.             \n2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures","CPS"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-012","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L1 lens","Overload of L1 due to excessive internal pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  1. Regulate purge pressure to less than 3kPa (TBD).\n2. Size purge system pump to limit max pressure.\n3. Design L1 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n4.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 ",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Acceptance test pressure switch and relief valve;\nAnalyze L1 lens for max over-pressure load","CPS"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-012","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L1 lens","Overload of L1 due to excessive internal pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10746  \n1. Regulate purge pressure to less than 3kPa (TBD).\n2. Size purge system pump to limit max pressure.\n3. Design L1 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n4.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 ",2,"E",15,"Medium","Test","Acceptance test pressure switch and relief valve;\nAnalyze L1 lens for max over-pressure load","CPS"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-015","Optics","Mech","L2 or L3 damage during personnel access","To remove the Shutter or Auto Changer from the camera, the region between L2 and L3 is accessed by personnel and handling hardware, when personnel, tools, or handling fixtures could contact L2 or L3.  Such a contact could damage either the coating or even scratch the lens",3,"B",9,"Serious","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10746 and 10745,  1. Use rails for removing the Shutter and Auto Changer\n2. Install a cover over L2, to prevent contact ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","Use procedures for all large-scale servicing work, to ensure that safety devices are being used"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-015","Optics","Mech","L2 or L3 damage during personnel access","To remove the Shutter or Auto Changer from the camera, the region between L2 and L3 is accessed by personnel and handling hardware, when personnel, tools, or handling fixtures could contact L2 or L3.  Such a contact could damage either the coating or even scratch the lens",3,"B",9,"Serious","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10746 and 10745  \n1. Use rails for removing the Shutter and Auto Changer\n2. Install a cover over L2, to prevent contact ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","Use procedures for all large-scale servicing work, to ensure that safety devices are being used"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-017","Optics","Struc","L3 micro-crack leads to failure","A flaw or micro-crack in the glass on the inner surface could cause a failure of the lens, since it is under continuous stress due to vacuum/purge pressure loads",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10745,  1. Perform fracture analysis to determine the largest acceptable crack size; use large factors of safety (limit max differential pressure per Haz # 19) (AR coating will provide limited protection for unintended contact)\n2. Perform period inspections to verify surface condition",3,"E",17,"Medium","Inspection","Qual and proof test L3 lenses; Inspect to verify that any cracks are smaller than the critical crack size"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-017","Optics","Struc","L3 micro-crack leads to failure","A flaw or micro-crack in the glass on the inner surface could cause a failure of the lens, since it is under continuous stress due to vacuum/purge pressure loads",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10745  \n1. Perform fracture analysis to determine the largest acceptable crack size; use large factors of safety (limit max differential pressure per Haz # 19) (AR coating will provide limited protection for unintended contact)\n2. Perform period inspections to verify surface condition",3,"E",17,"Medium","Inspection","Qual and proof test L3 lenses; Inspect to verify that any cracks are smaller than the critical crack size"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-002","Sensor","Struc","Sensor thermal excursion outside of safe range","failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Redundant attachment features withlocking features or equilavent to prevent loosening",3,"D",14,"Medium","Process control","Monitor temperature during acceptance testing"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-002","Sensor","Struc","Sensor thermal excursion outside of safe range","Failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Redundant attachment features withlocking features or equilavent to prevent loosening",3,"D",14,"Medium","Process control","Monitor temperature during acceptance testing"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-004","Sensor","Elec","ESD during acceptance testing damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages sensors",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10794  (spare sensors)",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-004","Sensor","Elec","ESD during acceptance testing damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages sensors",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10794  (spare sensors)",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","See LCA-10794"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-005","Sensor","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from materials in test dewar","Materials or parts with volatile compounds outgass contamination that plates onto sensors, possibly damaging them permanently",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","Implelment LCA_279, Contamination Control Plan and use Hazard Report LCA-10741 as a guide  (spare sensors)",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-005","Sensor","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from materials in test dewar","Materials or parts with volatile compounds outgas contamination that plates onto sensors, possibly damaging them permanently",3,"C",11,"Medium","Procedure, training","Implelment LCA-279, Contamination Control Plan and use Hazard Report LCA-10741 as a guide  (spare sensors)",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","See LCA-279 and LCA-10794"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-007","Sensor","Elec","CCD power on sequence in test readout system","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-007","Sensor","Elec","CCD power on sequence in test readout system","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","See Hazard Report"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-008","Sensor","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up in test dewar","contamination due to condensation onto sensors  causing damage",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Process control","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-008","Sensor","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up in test dewar","Contamination due to condensation onto sensors  causing damage",3,"D",14,"Medium","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Process control","See Hazard Report"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-012","Sensor","Elec","Gate over-voltage on EO test stand","Excursions of transistor gates in the  CCD readout  structures  outside their allowable range could damage sensor",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10794,    Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure controls ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety features and procidures"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-012","Sensor","Elec","Gate over-voltage on EO test stand","Excursions of transistor gates in the  CCD readout  structures  outside their allowable range could damage sensor",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10794    \nShorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure controls ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety features and procidures"]
[]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-001","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower outside min/max operating temp range","Thermal excursion exceeeds allowable limits resulting in damage to electronics or sensors ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10795",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","see Hazard Report","CPS"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x","x",null,null,"x",null,"x","x",null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-001","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower outside min/max operating temp range","Thermal excursion exceeeds allowable limits resulting in damage to electronics or sensors ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Assign equipment monitoring staff for activities at Test Stands 3  and the Test Stands 5 and 8 cryostats (Test Stand 7). Upon low temperature conditions, follow response procedures to bring system into a safe state. Planned future mitigations include an automated response to bring the system into a safe state. (See Hazard Report LCA-10795)",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","See Hazard Report 10795","CPS"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-006","Sci Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower",3,"B",9,"Serious","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10794  ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-006","Sci Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower",3,"B",9,"Serious","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10794. ESD damage is controlled in the Cleanroom by maintaining EPAs, which are labeled. Grounding Monitors and other EPA equipment, such as ESD table mats and air ionizers, are used, maintained and tested in accordance with LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations). CCD and raft electronics are grounded to the same potention when integrating in accordance with procedures. ",3,"D",14,"Medium","Audit","See Hazard Report LCA-10794"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-007","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from materials","Materials or parts with volatile compounds outgas vapor that plates onto sensors, possibly damaging them permanently",1,"C",4,"High","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",2,"D",10,"Medium","Process control","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-007","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from materials","Materials or parts with volatile compounds outgas vapor that plates onto sensors, possibly damaging them permanently",1,"C",4,"High","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741. Staff shall be trained in proper cleaning and handling techniques and procedures, including LCA-13493 (Cleaning Standards), LCA-14987 (Process Control), LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations), and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706.",2,"D",10,"Medium","Process control","Aee Hazard Report LCA-10741"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-008","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by by-products of component failure","An electronic component fails energeticaly producing smoke, contaminating the sensors",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",2,"D",10,"Medium","Process control","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-008","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by by-products of component failure","An electronic component fails energeticaly producing smoke, contaminating the sensors",1,"D",8,"Serious","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",2,"D",10,"Medium","Process control","See Hazard Report LCA-10741"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-009","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by cross-contamination","Contaminants are introduced to a raft tower and subsequently contaminate sensors",1,"C",4,"High","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",2,"D",10,"Medium","Audit","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-009","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by cross-contamination","Contaminants are introduced to a raft tower and subsequently contaminate sensors",1,"C",4,"High","Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10741. Staff shall be trained in proper cleaning and handling techniques and procedures, including L:CA-13493 (Cleaning Standards), LCA-14987 (Process Control), LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations), and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706.",2,"D",10,"Medium","Audit","See Hazard Report LCA-10741"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-010","Sci Raft","Struc","Sensor damaged by small part","Screw backs out or electronic component breaks off under thermal cycling, dropping onto sensor backside",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Design / choice of lock harwdare, installation torque / procedures.  Contamination barriers that separate REB space from CCD space are rigid enough to protect sensors. Verify electronic component assembly to IPC3 standards. All fasteners to use locking device.",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","thermal cycle mechancial / electrical testing "]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-010","Sci Raft","Struc","Sensor damaged by small part","Screw backs out or electronic component breaks off under thermal cycling, dropping onto sensor backside",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","Design / choice of lock harwdare, installation torque / procedures.  Contamination barriers that separate REB space from CCD space are rigid enough to protect sensors. Verify electronic component assembly to IPC3 standards. All fasteners to use locking device.",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Thermal cycle mechancial / electrical testing "]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-012","Sci Raft","Elec","CCD power on sequence","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed ",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747",2,"D",10,"Medium","Test","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-012","Sci Raft","Elec","CCD power on sequence","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed ",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747",2,"D",10,"Medium","Test","See Hazard Report"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-013","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up","CCD's preferentially getter contaminant during warm-up since it can't keep up with ramp-up rate of Cryo Plate and Grid, causing degradation in sensor performance",2,"C",6,"Serious","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",2,"D",10,"Medium","Test","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-013","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up","CCDs receive getter contaminants during warm-up since getter can't keep up with ramp-up rate of Cryo Plate and Grid, causing degradation in sensor performance",2,"C",6,"Serious","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",2,"D",10,"Medium","Test","See Hazard Report"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-014","Sci Raft","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable and REB",4,"C",18,"Low","Procedure, training","Assembly procedures ensure proper connector mating and handling",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system."]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-014","Sci Raft","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable and REB",4,"C",18,"Low","Procedure, training","Staff shall be trained in proper handling techniques and handling procedures, including LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations) and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations).",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system."]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-015","Sci Raft","Struc","Mechanical damage to REB's","Boards can be mechanically damaged during handling causing solder joint hairline cracks or other componet structural damage",4,"C",18,"Low","Procedure, training","Assembly procedures ensure proper procedures during handling",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system."]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-015","Sci Raft","Struc","Mechanical damage to REB's","Boards can be mechanically damaged during handling causing solder joint hairline cracks or other componet structural damage",4,"C",18,"Low","Procedure, training","Staff shall be trained in proper handling techniques and handling procedures, including LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations) and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations).",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system."]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-016","Sci Raft","Elec","Back substrate voltage","Drains are \"off\" and BS is \"On\" could cause a destructive current to appear ",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA 10747,  Enable/Shorting  switch on  REB on allows application of BS after stable conditions satisfied - firmware and/or hardware control  from CABAC",2,"D",10,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-016","Sci Raft","Elec","Back substrate voltage","Drains are \"off\" and BS is \"On\" could cause a destructive current to appear ",2,"C",6,"Serious","Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA 10747  Enable/Shorting  switch on  REB on allows application of BS after stable conditions satisfied - firmware and/or hardware control  from CABAC",2,"D",10,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-018","Sci Raft","Elec","Gate over-voltage","Excursions of transistor gates in the  CCD readout  structures  outside their allowable range could damage sensor",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10794,    Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller and REB outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller  or  REB at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure control - per LCA-10794.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-018","Sci Raft","Elec","Gate over-voltage","Excursions of transistor gates in the  CCD readout  structures  outside their allowable range could damage sensor",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10794,    Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller and REB outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller  or  REB at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure control - per LCA-10794.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","See LCA-10794. Verify safety feature operates"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-019","Sci Raft","Elec","Power On & Back Bias activation","Activating the Back Substrate (step 5) before the Bias voltages (step 2) are set to minimal values may cause damage to the sensors",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","Same as Sci Raft 120.",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-019","Sci Raft","Elec","Power On & Back Bias activation","Activating the Back Substrate (step 5) before the Bias voltages (step 2) are set to minimal values may cause damage to the sensors",3,"C",11,"Medium","Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","Verify safety feature operates"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-021","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from electronics due to overheating","Over heating of the electronics could cause outgassing/damage to the focal plane ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Hazard Report LCA-10741",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","see Hazard Report","CPS"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-021","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from electronics due to overheating","Over heating of the electronics could cause outgassing and damage to the focal plane ",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",3,"D",14,"Medium","Test","see Hazard Report LCA-10741","CPS"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-022","Sci Raft","Struc","Sensor loses thermal contact to raft","failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and will have lock washer, or equivalent to prevent loosening.",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","Run thermal cycling tests on the full sensor mech assembly"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-022","Sci Raft","Struc","Sensor loses thermal contact to raft","Failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat",3,"C",11,"Medium","Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and will have lock washer, or equivalent to prevent loosening.",3,"E",17,"Medium","Process control","Run thermal cycling tests on the full sensor mech assembly"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Srft-024","Sci Raft","Env","Overhumidity in clean room","Condensate from too-high humidity in BNL clean roomcan collect on sensors, damaging sensors",3,"D",14,"Medium","Warning device","Assign equipment monitoring staff for all activities. Upon humidity alarm, follow response procedures to place equipment into a safe state. ",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","Test humidity alarm system"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Sfrt-025","Sci Raft","Env","Ambient particle count too high","In BNL clean room, airborne particles from any source can accumulate and damage hardware",3,"D",14,"Medium","Warning device","Assign equipment monitoring staff for all activities. Upon particle count alarm during exposure, follow response procedures to place equipment into a safe state. ",2,"D",10,"Medium","Test","Test particle counter alarm"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,191,"Total","OK","Cross-check",null,null,"2A",3,"High"]
[]
["Only in file 1"]
[null,"Cryo-015","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Overpressure due to orifice ice plug, inadvertent valve-off, or pinched line causes rupture in a line",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","1-Design entire system to max pressure differential of compressor plus safety factor\n2-incorporate bust discs and or pressure relief valves\n3-enusre system only connected to charge bottles with max PSI beloew system limt.\n4-if ever connected to purge or backfill system ensure that auxilary system is protected from over pressure via burst disc, pressure reliefe valve(s) and / or max charge system limit.",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1-Pressure test relief valves and verify burst disc parameters\n2- ensure documentation defines requirements for component connection and parameters of operation\n"]
[]
["Obsoleted and moved to \"Obsolete\" tab"]
[null,"Opt-005","Optics","Struc","L1-L2 Assembly strut flexure failure","Failure of a flexure due to overloading during torquing or adjusting the assembly beyond the angular working range of the flexure",1,"C",4,"High","Procedure, training","1. Design flexure with a safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to carry operational and handling loads.    2. Follow strut adjustment procedures and use dedicated tooling; monitor offset angles",1,"D",8,"Serious","Test","1. Proof test flexures individually and as a set, at extremes of their range.    2. Qualify adjustment tooling and procedures to check for overloading of flexure"]
[]
["Only in file 1"]
[null,149,"Total","OK","Cross-check",null,null,"2A",3,"High"]
[]
[]
["change log for date 8/18/2017 1:20 p.m."]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"#","Subsystem","Type","Title","Hazard Description","Severity","Probability","Risk Value","Risk Category","Mitigation Strategy","Mitigation Description","Severity1","Probability1","Risk Value1","Risk Category1","Verif Method","Verification Plan","Protection System?","O&S hazard?","Date modified"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"CB&M-001","Shutter","Mech","Leading edge blades collide","Leading-edge blades collide during activation, destroying the blades and damaging the L3 lens or filter",2,"D",null,null,"Safety device","Use limit switches to only enable blade motion when the opposing blade stack is in its parked position",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Run protection certification tests to verify that limit switches only enable motion when blades are parked","CPS",41768]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,"x",null,"x",null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"CB&M-001","Shutter","Mech","Leading edge blades collide","Leading-edge blades collide during activation, destroying the blades and damaging the L3 lens or filter",2,"C",null,null,"Safety device","1. Use switches to only enable blade motion when the opposing blade stack is in its parked position\n2. Use Hall-Effect switches for gating blade timing, ensuring that blades stay within their prescribed trajectory",2,"D",null,null,"Test","Run protection certification tests to verify that limit switches only enable motion when blades are parked and that gating logic works correctly","CPS",null,"2017-05-30"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"CB&M-002","Shutter","Mech","Blades collide","Blades within a stack collide when a timing belt breaks, damaging the blades",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1. Add bumpers on blade carriages to absorb energy of leading and trailing blades colliding\n2. Add capture block at blade root to prevent trailing blade to fall away from leading blade",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Run test of failed-state with one carriage disconnected from its timing belt",null,41768]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,"x","x",null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"CB&M-002","Shutter","Mech","Blades collide","Blades within a stack collide when a timing belt breaks, damaging the blades",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","1. Design blades such that blade brackets always contact first and not the blades;\n2. Add a catch block on the blade root to ensure that leading and trailing blades do not fall away from each other if a belt brakes; this prevents damage to the chicane feature",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Inspect blade final position and confirm that brackets and stop-blocks contact before blades",null,null,"2017-05-30"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"CB&M-003","Shutter","Mech","Blade scrapes against L3","During actuation, a blade flutters or vibrates, hitting and damaging the L3 lens or filter",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1. Design and fabricate stiff and light blades to reduce dynamic vibration and flutter;\n2. Test dynamics during prototyping to check for coupling of drive system and blade modes",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Test blade flutter during final verification testing of shutter",null,41768]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"CB&M-003","Shutter","Mech","Blade scrapes against L3","During actuation, a blade flutters or vibrates, hitting and damaging the L3 lens or filter",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","1. Design and fabricate stiff and light blades to reduce dynamic vibration and flutter;\n2. Test dynamics during prototyping to check for coupling of drive system and blade modes\n3. Build in adequate clearances between blades and L3",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Measure natural frequency of blades and use correlated FEA model to show that worst-case dynamic deflection is within allowed dynamic envelope",null,null,"2017-05-30"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"CB&M-004","Shutter","Mech","Pinching","During access or servicing, personnel could be injured by shutter blade or carriage pinching a finger while it is closing",3,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","1. During personnel access, lock out the shutter; \n2. Add rail lock to prevent pinching during shutter work",3,"E",null,null,"Audit","1. Verify that LOTO procedures are in place;\n2. Confirm that rail lock is used",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,"x","x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"CB&M-004","Shutter","Mech","Pinching","During access or servicing, personnel could be injured by shutter blade or carriage pinching a finger while it is closing",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","1. Include lock-out and E-stop at shutter; \n2. Add maintenance mode with low-speed, joggning, and max blade speed limits",3,"E",null,null,"Audit","1. Verify that LOTO procedures are in place;\n2. Confirm that maintenance mode is used for shutter servicing access",null,"Y","2017-05-30"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"CB&M-005","Cam Bdy","Struc","Housing over-pressure","The camera housing, shroud, and L1-L2 Assembly form an enclosure that is pressurized at a slight positive pressure.  If this were over-pressured, the structure would be stressed above its normal operating stresses",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1. Use a pressure-relief device to ensure that camera volume pressure never exceeds its limits\n2. Use a pressure switch to turn off purge flow if pressure increases",3,"E",null,null,"Test","1. Test relief valve to verify that it operates correctly\n2. Test pressure switch to verify that it operates correctly",null,41768]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"CB&M-005","Cam Bdy","Struc","Housing over-pressure","The camera housing, shroud, and L1-L2 Assembly form an enclosure that is pressurized at a slight positive pressure.  If this were over-pressured, the structure would be stressed above its normal operating stresses",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1. Use a pressure-relief device to ensure that camera volume pressure never exceeds its limits\n2. Use a pressure switch to turn off purge flow if pressure increases",3,"E",null,null,"Test","1. Test relief valve to verify that it operates correctly\n2. Test pressure switch to verify that it operates correctly",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"CB&M-006","Cam Bdy","Struc","Housing structural failure","The camera housing and back flange provide the primary structural support for the camera; over-stressing or failure of one structural element could result in large-scale damage or collapse",1,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","1. Use multiply-redundant bolted connections to ensure that no single failure can endanger the camera structure;\n2. Design back flange and housing with conservative factors of safety, even under seismic loads, per LCA-280, \"Camera Mech Std's\"",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","1. Use FEA analysis to set bolt limit loads; analyze pre-load per LCA-280;\n2. Verify bolt torques during assembly;\n3. Perform proof load test to demonstrate that structure can carry max loads ",null,41768]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"CB&M-006","Cam Bdy","Struc","Housing structural failure","The camera housing and back flange provide the primary structural support for the camera; over-stressing or failure of one structural element could result in large-scale damage or collapse",1,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","1. Use multiply-redundant bolted connections to ensure that no single failure can endanger the camera structure;\n2. Design back flange and housing with conservative factors of safety, even under seismic loads, per LCA-280, \"Camera Mech Std's\"",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","1. Use FEA analysis to set bolt limit loads; analyze pre-load per LCA-280;\n2. Verify bolt torques during assembly;\n3. Perform proof load test to demonstrate that structure can carry max loads ",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"CB&M-007","Cam Bdy","Env","Camera volume contamination","Failure of any one of the housing seals could introduce contaminants into the camera volume",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1. Over-pressured camera volume to ensure that any leaks result in a net outward flow; \n2. Use instrumentation to monitor internal pressure and flow rate of purge gas, to identify any leaks",3,"E",null,null,"Test","1. Functionally test purge system to demonstrate ability to hold min over-pressure;\n2. Test pressure gauge and flow meter to verify that they have sensitivity to detect a leak of a min leak rate",null,41768]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"CB&M-007","Cam Bdy","Env","Camera volume contamination","Failure of any one of the housing seals could introduce contaminants into the camera volume",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1. Over-pressured camera volume to ensure that any leaks result in a net outward flow; \n2. Use instrumentation to monitor internal pressure and flow rate of purge gas, to identify any leaks",3,"E",null,null,"Test","1. Functionally test purge system to demonstrate ability to hold min over-pressure;\n2. Test pressure gauge and flow meter to verify that they have sensitivity to detect a leak of a min leak rate",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"CB&M-009","Shutter","Mech","Leading blade overruns end of travel","Leading-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation, damaging blades and possibly the L3 lens or filter",2,"D",null,null,"Safety device","1. Use over-travel switch to cut power to blade;\n2. Add garage plates to contain blades at their end of travel",2,"E",null,null,"Test","1. Run protection certification tests to verify over-travel switch function","CPS",41768]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"CB&M-009","Shutter","Mech","Leading blade overruns end of travel","Leading-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation, damaging blades and possibly the L3 lens or filter",2,"C",null,null,"Safety device","1. Use Hall-Effect switches for gating blade timing, ensuring that blades stay within their prescribed trajectory;\n2. Add garage plates to contain blades at their end of travel",2,"E",null,null,"Test","1. Run protection certification tests to verify over-travel switch function","CPS",null,"2017-05-30"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"CB&M-010","Shutter","Mech","Trailing blade overruns end of travel","Trailing-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation, damaging blade and the L3 lens",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1. Add blade stop to limit motion in the event of belt breakage;\n2. Use over-travel switch to cut power to blade",2,"E",null,null,"Test","1. Measure blade location when at the stop to confirm it clears L3 lens\n2. Run protection certification tests to verify over-travel switch function","CPS",41768]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x",null,null,null,"x","x","x"]
[null,"CB&M-010","Shutter","Mech","Trailing blade overruns end of travel","Trailing-edge blade runs past its end of travel during activation, damaging blade and the L3 lens",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1. Position trailing blade in Z so it clears L3 completely\n2. Add blade stop in parked position to limit motion in the event of belt breakage",2,"D",null,null,"Test","1. Measure blade Z-location to confirm it clears L3 lens;\n2. Confirm that blade stop bounds blade motion in its parked position",null,null,"2017-05-30"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"CB&M-011","Cam Bdy","Env","Glycol leak in purge unit","Glycol coolant is used for cooling purge gas air in the purge unit, located in the utility trunk; if a glycol line leaks, it could contaminate many camera components",2,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","1. Use high-integrity fittings for glycol lines\n2. Make the purge unit cabinet water-tight;\n3. Add a hygrometer in the purge unit",2,"E",null,null,"Test","1. Leak test purge unit glycol lines;\n2. Verify that purge unit is water-tight;\n3. Test functionality of hygrometer","CPS",41768]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"CB&M-011","Cam Bdy","Env","Glycol leak in purge unit","Glycol coolant is used for cooling purge gas air in the purge unit, located in the utility trunk; if a glycol line leaks, it could contaminate many camera components",2,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","1. Use high-integrity fittings for glycol lines\n2. Make the purge unit cabinet water-tight;\n3. Add a hygrometer in the purge unit",2,"E",null,null,"Test","1. Leak test purge unit glycol lines;\n2. Verify that purge unit is water-tight;\n3. Test functionality of hygrometer","CPS",null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"CB&M-014","Shutter","Mech","Shutter damages L2 or L3 lens during removal","During servicing removal  operations, Shutter unit scratches a lens or damages an L2 strut as it is being removed or replaced from the camera",2,"B",null,null,"Procedure, training","1. Use extraction rail to hold the shutter and control its motion during removal and insertion",2,"D",null,null,"Process control","1. Test the extraction and insertion degrees of freedom with dummy lenses;\n2. Define prescribed motions and use process controls to ensure that they are used",null,null,"2017-05-30"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Crft-001","Crnr Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower/RCM drops below min operating temp","Raft tower or RCM module drops below min operating temp",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Modules mounted to Cryo/Cold Plate heat sinks, which establish min possible temp (see #50); test modules to cold-survival temp.Hazard Report LCA-10795",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Run verification tests on temp gradients of as-installed modules; run under-temp survival tests on all modules",null,"Revised 7/10/2014"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Crft-001","Crnr Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower/RCM drops below min operating temp","Raft tower or RCM module drops below min operating temp",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Modules mounted to Cryo/Cold Plate heat sinks, which establish min possible temp (see #50); test modules to cold-survival temp.Hazard Report LCA-10795",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Run verification tests on temp gradients of as-installed modules; run under-temp survival tests on all modules",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Crft-002","Crnr Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower/RCM exceeds max operating temp","Raft tower or RCM exceeds max operating temp",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Modules mounted to Cryo/Cold Plate heat sinks with multiply-redundant connections; Plates actively controlled (see #51); test modules to hot-survival temp. Hazard Report LCA-10795",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Run verification tests on contact resistance and temp gradients up as-installed modules; run over-temp survival tests on all modules",null,"Revised 7/10/2014"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Crft-002","Crnr Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower/RCM exceeds max operating temp","Raft tower or RCM exceeds max operating temp",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Modules mounted to Cryo/Cold Plate heat sinks with multiply-redundant connections; Plates actively controlled (see #51); test modules to hot-survival temp. Hazard Report LCA-10795",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Run verification tests on contact resistance and temp gradients up as-installed modules; run over-temp survival tests on all modules",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Crft-006","Crnr Raft","Elec","Over-current damage to sensor or FE board","Loss of a sensor or raft due to uncontrolled short to ground or over-current condition",3,"D",null,null,"Safety device","Over-current protection in power supplies protect sensor from short",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Run qualifiation test on system","CPS","Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Crft-006","Crnr Raft","Elec","Over-current damage to sensor or FE board","Loss of a sensor or raft due to uncontrolled short to ground or over-current condition",3,"D",null,null,"Safety device","Over-current protection in power supplies protect sensor from short",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Run qualifiation test on system","CPS",null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Crft-007","Crnr Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","Hazard Report LCA-10794    Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller and GREB/WREB outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller  or  GREB/WREB at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure control - per LCA-10794.",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Crft-007","Crnr Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","Hazard Report LCA-10794. Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller and GREB/WREB outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller  or  GREB/WREB at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure control - per LCA-10794.",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Crft-009","Crnr Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by by-products of component failure","An electronic component fails catastrophically, contaminating the sensors",2,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","Use only electronic parts tested to failure and compared against outgassing standards;\nLimit max power available to actual needs",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Verify by QA records that all parts being used have passed destructive tests",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Crft-009","Crnr Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by by-products of component failure","An electronic component fails catastrophically, contaminating the sensors",2,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","Use only electronic parts tested to failure and compared against outgassing standards;\nLimit max power available to actual needs",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Verify by QA records that all parts being used have passed destructive tests",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Crft-012","Crnr Raft","Elec","On board circuit failure","On board circuit internal failure could cause damage to a sensor ",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","Reliability issue. Addressed by  design,  calculation and lifetime testing of on board circuits - addressed in electronics reliability plan.",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,"Added 07/10/2014"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Crft-012","Crnr Raft","Elec","On board circuit failure","On board circuit internal failure could cause damage to a sensor ",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","Reliability issue. Addressed by  design,  calculation and lifetime testing of on board circuits - addressed in electronics reliability plan.",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Crft-013","Crnr Raft","Elec","GREB/WREB power on sequence","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed;\nActivating the Back Substrate (step 5) before the Bias voltages (step 2) are set to minimal values may cause damage to the sensors.\nDrains are \"off\" and BS is \"On\" could cause a destructive current to appear;\nOutput Drain and Output Diode :  always + with respect to FSS. Forward biasing of junction will cause damage of sensor;",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747,\nBS enable switch on the REB board allows application of BS after stable conditions satisfied - firmware and/or hardware control  from CABAC.\nAdd GND diode to output drain and output diode to prevent these potentials from going very negative (>0.3V)",3,"D",null,null,"Test","see Hazard Report",null,"Added 07/10/2014"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Crft-013","Crnr Raft","Elec","GREB/WREB power on sequence","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed;\nActivating the Back Substrate (step 5) before the Bias voltages (step 2) are set to minimal values may cause damage to the sensors.\nDrains are \"off\" and BS is \"On\" could cause a destructive current to appear;\nOutput Drain and Output Diode :  always + with respect to FSS. Forward biasing of junction will cause damage of sensor;",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747\nBS enable switch on the REB board allows application of BS after stable conditions satisfied - firmware and/or hardware control  from CABAC.\nAdd GND diode to output drain and output diode to prevent these potentials from going very negative (>0.3V)",3,"D",null,null,"Test","See Hazard Report",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Crft-014","Crnr Raft","Mech","Sensor looses thermal contact to raft","failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat, in particular the guide sensors when read at 9Hz.",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and will have lock washer, or equivalent to prevent loosening.",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Run thermal cycling tests on the full sensor mech assembly",null,"Added 07/10/2014"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Crft-014","Crnr Raft","Mech","Sensor looses thermal contact to raft","Failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat, in particular the guide sensors when read at 9Hz.",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and will have lock washer, or equivalent to prevent loosening.",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Run thermal cycling tests on the full sensor mech assembly",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Crft-015","Crnr Raft","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up","CCD's preferentially getter contaminant during warm-up since it can't keep up with ramp-up rate of Cryo Plate and Grid, causing degradation in sensor performance",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",3,"D",null,null,"Process control","see Hazard Report",null,"Added 07/10/2014"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Crft-015","Crnr Raft","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up","CCD's preferentially getter contaminant during warm-up since it can't keep up with ramp-up rate of Cryo Plate and Grid, causing degradation in sensor performance",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",3,"D",null,null,"Process control","see Hazard Report",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-001","Cryostat","Press/Vac","Uncontrolled venting of cryostat","Failure of a vacuum seal in the cryostat leads to uncontrolled venting of the cryostat, possibly introducing contaminants and water vapor into the cryostat which could damage the detectors",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-Use double O-ring seals with an intermediate vacuum groove at all bolted joints. Failure of one seal can be detected. \n2-use of all metal seals wherever possible\n3-ensure all valve are normally closed / fail to safe configuration\n4-ensure redundant valve for all critical locations,\n5- implement control system with valve sequencing ensuring proper operation\n6-tst and verification of vacuum control system with double check function confirmation to enusre no unintended vent\n&- implement emergency purge and backfill with clean dry gas ensures that very clean and dry gas would be ingested into the cryostat",2,"E",null,null,"Test","1-Test vacuum-tightness of each of the double O-ring seals\n2-design reviews of system to ensureproper component selection\n",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-001","Cryostat","Press/Vac","Uncontrolled venting of cryostat","Failure of a vacuum seal in the cryostat leads to uncontrolled venting of the cryostat, possibly introducing contaminants and water vapor into the cryostat which could damage the detectors",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-Use double O-ring seals with an intermediate vacuum groove at all bolted joints. Failure of one seal can be detected. \n2-use of all metal seals wherever possible\n3-ensure all valve are normally closed / fail to safe configuration\n4-ensure redundant valve for all critical locations,\n5- implement control system with valve sequencing ensuring proper operation\n6-tst and verification of vacuum control system with double check function confirmation to enusre no unintended vent\n&- implement emergency purge and backfill with clean dry gas ensures that very clean and dry gas would be ingested into the cryostat",2,"E",null,null,"Test","1-Test vacuum-tightness of each of the double O-ring seals\n2-design reviews of system to ensureproper component selection\n",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-005","Cryostat","Struc","Brittle failure of ceramic Grid","Grid is manufactured from SiC ceramic, making it less fracture-tough than metals and making it more susceptible to catastrophic brittle failure",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-design the Grid with large safety factors and test any high-stress regions\n2- complete cold temperature strength and toughness testing on samples\n3-design grid to eliminate joints and elements with potential stress concentrations",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","1-Analyze and test Grid structure\n2-review results of material strength and fracture toughness at operaitn temperature",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-005","Cryostat","Struc","Brittle failure of ceramic Grid","Grid is manufactured from SiC ceramic, making it less fracture-tough than metals and making it more susceptible to catastrophic brittle failure",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-design the Grid with large safety factors and test any high-stress regions\n2- complete cold temperature strength and toughness testing on samples\n3-design grid to eliminate joints and elements with potential stress concentrations",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","1-Analyze and test Grid structure\n2-review results of material strength and fracture toughness at operaitn temperature",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-006","Cryostat","Struc","Buckling of flexure","Buckling of a Grid, Cryo or Cold Plate thin-bladed flexure could severely damage the cryostat contents",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-design flexures with large safety factors; \n2-load test all flexure designs",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","1-Qualification / acceptance test all flexure designs",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-006","Cryostat","Struc","Buckling of flexure","Buckling of a Grid, Cryo or Cold Plate thin-bladed flexure could severely damage the cryostat contents",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-design flexures with large safety factors; \n2-load test all flexure designs",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","1-Qualification / acceptance test all flexure designs",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-007","Cryostat","Elec","Heater short to ground","Cryo or Cold Plate heater shorts to ground, overheating the element and possibly causing it to melt",4,"D",null,null,"Safety device","1-electrically isolate heaters from camera ground plane\n2-Use over-current protection and current monitoring to ensure that heater circuits shut off if a short to ground occurs\n3-wire heaters in parallel to ensure shorted heater does not short entire heater system",4,"E",null,null,"Inspection","1-complete grounding / isolation tests of heater as installed and at operational temperature testing\n2- Verify that protection circuits are functioning","CPS","Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-007","Cryostat","Elec","Heater short to ground","Cryo or Cold Plate heater shorts to ground, overheating the element and possibly causing it to melt",4,"D",null,null,"Safety device","1-electrically isolate heaters from camera ground plane\n2-Use over-current protection and current monitoring to ensure that heater circuits shut off if a short to ground occurs\n3-wire heaters in parallel to ensure shorted heater does not short entire heater system",4,"E",null,null,"Inspection","1-complete grounding / isolation tests of heater as installed and at operational temperature testing\n2- Verify that protection circuits are functioning","CPS",null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-008","Cryostat","Control","Cryostat uncontrolled vent","Damage to the cryostat vacuum system and uncontrolled vent due to loss of backing vacuum on turbo-pump",2,"D",null,null,"Safety device","1-ensure all elements, specifcally valves and actuators, fail to a safe conditon, presumably \"closed\" in all cases.\n2-ensure all valves and actuators are redundant where possible, low pressure pumps and high pressure pumps valves between so one inproperly actuated valve does not vent the cryostat\n3-ensure critical vlaves are interlocked to pressure gauging such that inadvertant operation cannot vent the cryostat\n4-complete design of vacuum control systeem / logic to ensure no improper operation of critical valves or actuators.\n5-incorporate \"double check\" system of alerts and quarries / confirmation of valves operations.\n6-do not imbed valve operation in higher level sequence without incorporating descrete \"yes/ no\" provision / quarries in routine.",2,"E",null,null,"Test","1- Verify isolation valve function and failure state\n2-review system level functional diagrams and ensure fault tree is consitent with operaitonal modes and function\n3-test pressure interlock function for ciritcal valves prior to sensor I&T\n4-complete extensive testing on vacuum control systeem / logic to ensure no improper operation of critical valves or actuators.\n","CPS","Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-008","Cryostat","Control","Cryostat uncontrolled vent","Damage to the cryostat vacuum system and uncontrolled vent due to loss of backing vacuum on turbo-pump",2,"D",null,null,"Safety device","1-ensure all elements, specifcally valves and actuators, fail to a safe conditon, presumably \"closed\" in all cases.\n2-ensure all valves and actuators are redundant where possible, low pressure pumps and high pressure pumps valves between so one inproperly actuated valve does not vent the cryostat\n3-ensure critical vlaves are interlocked to pressure gauging such that inadvertant operation cannot vent the cryostat\n4-complete design of vacuum control systeem / logic to ensure no improper operation of critical valves or actuators.\n5-incorporate \"double check\" system of alerts and quarries / confirmation of valves operations.\n6-do not imbed valve operation in higher level sequence without incorporating descrete \"yes/ no\" provision / quarries in routine.",2,"E",null,null,"Test","1- Verify isolation valve function and failure state\n2-review system level functional diagrams and ensure fault tree is consitent with operaitonal modes and function\n3-test pressure interlock function for ciritcal valves prior to sensor I&T\n4-complete extensive testing on vacuum control systeem / logic to ensure no improper operation of critical valves or actuators.\n","CPS",null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-010","Cryostat","Control","Cryo, Cold Plate over-temp","Cryo or Cold Plate exceed their max operating limits",3,"D",null,null,"Safety device","Temp sensors on Cryo and Cold plates provide feedback; upon over-temp, cut power to heaters and RCM power supplies",3,"E",null,null,"Test","1-Test montiroing feedback control and over-temp switches","CPS","Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-010","Cryostat","Control","Cryo, Cold Plate over-temp","Cryo or Cold Plate exceed their max operating limits",3,"D",null,null,"Safety device","Temp sensors on Cryo and Cold plates provide feedback; upon over-temp, cut power to heaters and RCM power supplies",3,"E",null,null,"Test","1-Test montiroing feedback control and over-temp switches","CPS",null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-012","Cryostat","Matl's","Release of refrigerant","Refrigerant may be harmful to the CCD detectors and severely impact the cleanliness of the cryostat; gases may be greenhouse gases",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-use single mill run lengths of tubing for refrigeration system in cryostat, no tubing joints in cryostat.\n2-design with high safety factors for burst pressure for all tubing in cryostat.\n3-implement pressure relieve vavle and burst disc in system,outside cryostat, to limit maximum system pressure to safe levels.",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","2-pressure test plumbing repeatedly during construction of system\n2-ensure process and procedure documentaiton details requirments for hook up and compoonent selection\n3-Leak check cooling channels and pump-out to verify they are leak-tight",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-012","Cryostat","Matl's","Release of refrigerant","Refrigerant may be harmful to the CCD detectors and severely impact the cleanliness of the cryostat; gases may be greenhouse gases",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-use single mill run lengths of tubing for refrigeration system in cryostat, no tubing joints in cryostat.\n2-design with high safety factors for burst pressure for all tubing in cryostat.\n3-implement pressure relieve vavle and burst disc in system,outside cryostat, to limit maximum system pressure to safe levels.",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","1-pressure test plumbing repeatedly during construction of system\n2-ensure process and procedure documentaiton details requirments for hook up and compoonent selection\n3-Leak check cooling channels and pump-out to verify they are leak-tight",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-013","Refrig","Therm/Cryo","Icing of refrig return lines","Icing due to overcooling of refrig outlet lines drips water on system elec, possibly causing shorts",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-enclose and protect all sensitive hardware from moisture entrusion\n2-do not route refrigeration lines intemately with or past sensitive hardware\n3-encorporate line heaters to maintian transfer lines at or above ambient (per Telescope-camera ICD) and keep transfer lines above dew point.\n4-complete high efficiency heat exchanger design to limit low temperature return flow.",3,"E",null,null,"Test","1-Test temp sensors as part of verif test process",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x","x","x",null,null,null,"x",null,"x",null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-013","Refrig","Therm/Cryo","Icing of refrig return lines","IF refrig return lines are overcooled, THEN they will ice up and drip water on system electronics, possibly causing shorts",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","1 - enclose and protect all electronics hardware inside utility trunk\n2 - only route refrigeration lines outside UT\n3 - hermetically seal UT\n4-complete high efficiency heat exchanger design to limit low temperature return flow.",3,"D",null,null,"Test","1 - test hermeticity of UT enclosure with overpressure test to determine leak rate",null,null,"2017-04-21"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-014","Refrig","Therm/Cryo","Heat-X Can leak causes icing","Icing of Heat Exchanger Can due to vacuum leak drips water on system elec, possibly causing shorts",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-enclose and protect all sensitive hardware from moisture entrusion\n2-locate heat exchangers in vacuum insulating tank (functional requirement for refrig system)\n3-install radiation insulation to limit heat ransfer.\n4-complete high efficiency heat exchanger design to limit low temperature return flow.",3,"E",null,null,"Test","1-Leak test Heat-X Can\n2- verify functionality vacuum system for thermal insulation","CPS","Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x","x","x",null,null,null,"x","x","x",null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-014","Refrig","Therm/Cryo","Heat-X Can leak causes icing","IF Heat Exchanger Can develops a vacuum leak, THEN it may ice up and drip water on system elec, possibly causing shorts",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","1 - wrap heat exchangers and transfer lines in superinsulation to minimize heat transfer in vacuum\n2 - use all-metal seals for Heat-Ex Can vacuum connections\n3 - monitor and actively pump on Heat-Ex Can",2,"D",null,null,"Test","1 - leak test Heat-X Can\n2 - test functionality of Heat-Ex vacuum system pump and monitoring components","CPS",null,"2017-04-21"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-016","Refrig","Press/Vac","Heat-X Can over-pressure","Heat-X Can fails due to over-pressure from refrigerant leaking from a heat exchanger",3,"D",null,null,"Safety device","1-design the system such that by boyles law (P1V1=P2V2) it is impossible to overpressure the heat exchanger system due to a refrigerant leak\n2-design pumping syste with sufficient capacity (speed) to overcome pressure increase due to large refrigerant leak\n3-incorporate burst dics and / or pressure relief valves in system\n4-Pressure-test heat exchangers\n5-add pressure switch and relief valve to Heat-X Can",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","1- Pressure test Heat-X Can, relief valve;  \n2- verify burst disc parameters","CPS","Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x","x","x",null,null,null,"x",null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-016","Refrig","Press/Vac","Heat-X Can over-pressure","IF a refrigerant line from a heat exchanger leaks in the Heat-Ex Can, THEN the chamber could fail due to over-pressure",2,"C",null,null,"Safety device","1 - design the system such that by Boyle's law (P1V1=P2V2) it is impossible to overpressure the Heat-Ex can volume due to a refrigerant leak\n2 - incorporate burst dics and / or pressure relief valves to Heat-Ex Can \n3 - pressure-test heat exchangers",3,"D",null,null,"Process control","1- Pressure test Heat-X Can, relief valve;  \n2- verify burst disc parameters","CPS",null,"2017-04-21"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-018","Refrig","Matl's","Hazardous gas released by burning refrigerant","Fumes and combustion products from burning refrigerant are harmful to health and the environment",2,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","1-Use only non-flammable refrigerant, so there is no possibility of fire\n2-Add over-temp switches to compressors\n3-include necassary health and safety warning per refrigernat MSDS recommnedaitns to area signage reference \"in case of fire\".",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","1-Check over-temp switches\n2- review emergency procedures, suppression system and safety signage","CPS","Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x","x"]
[null,"Cryo-018","Refrig","Matl's","Hazardous gas released by burning refrigerant","Fumes and combustion products from burning refrigerant are harmful to health and the environment",2,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","1-Use only non-flammable refrigerant, so there is no possibility of fire\n2-Add over-temp switches to compressors\n3-include necassary health and safety warning per refrigernat MSDS recommnedaitns to area signage reference \"in case of fire\".",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","1-Check over-temp switches\n2- review emergency procedures, suppression system and safety signage",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-019","Refrig","Matl's","Refrigerant leak in Utility Trunk","Refrigerant leaking in the Utility Trunk vaporizes and coats the M2 mirror",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-Design system using high-reliability connections to ensure they seal",3,"E",null,null,"Test","1-Pressure test the as-installed system"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-019","Refrig","Matl's","Refrigerant leak in Utility Trunk","IF refrigerant hoses at the Utility Trunk interface leak, THEN vaporize refrigerant may coat the M2 mirror",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","1-Design system using high-reliability connections to ensure they seal",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Pressure test the as-installed system",null,null,"2017-04-21"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-022","Cryostat","Struc","Cryostat vacuum-pressure failure","Cryostat vacuum envelope structural failure due to total differential pressure",2,"C",null,null,"Control Hazard","1- Complete sturctural analysis using maximum differential pressure possible with inclusion of safety factor",2,"E",null,null,"Review","1-Complete full design review",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-022","Cryostat","Struc","Cryostat vacuum-pressure failure","Cryostat vacuum envelope structural failure due to total differential pressure",2,"C",null,null,"Control Hazard","1- Complete sturctural analysis using maximum differential pressure possible with inclusion of safety factor",2,"E",null,null,"Review","1-Complete full design review",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Cryo-024","Cryostat","Mech","Simultaneous turbo-pump operation and camera motion","If the telescope moves while a turbo-pump is running, the pump could be destroyed.",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","Add protection where a single key operates either the turbo pump or slewing",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Perform zero-voltage verification in both vacuum-pump-on and camera-motion on states",null,null,"y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Cryo-024","Cryostat","Mech","Simultaneous turbo-pump operation and camera motion","IF the telescope moves while a turbo-pump is running, THEN the pump could be destroyed.",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","Turbo-pumps must be backed by scroll pumps, which are in pump carts off the camera; thus, turbo pumps can not be turned on without personnel access which requires lock-out of telescope motion axes",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Confirm lock-out capability of telescope drives during access",null,"Y","2017-04-21"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-025","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Ice plug in supply line at or near compressor increases pressure on compressor discharge and vapor line and reduces cooling capacity and raises Camera temp",3,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","Shut off the refrigerant system and allow to warm up to room temperature.  Then restart the system.  If it does not work, replace the filter dryer.",4,"D",null,null,"Process control","Assure warm-up procedure is in place",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-026","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Ice plug in supply line at or near Camera causes increased pressure in compressor discharge and vapor line and reduces cooling capacity and raises Camera temp",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Shut off the refrigerant system and allow to warm up to room temperature.  Then restart the system.  Replace the filter dryer. Monitor setpoint. Cleaning and dry-out procedure and filter dryer installed in lines.",4,"D",null,null,"Process control","Assure warm-up procedure is in place",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-027","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Plug in vapor supply line at or near compressor causes increased pressure in compressor discharge and liquid line",3,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","Shut off the refrigerant system and allow to warm up to room temperature.  Then restart the system.",4,"C",null,null,"Process control","Assure warm-up procedure is in place",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-028","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Plug in vapor supply line at or near Camera causes increased pressure in compressor discharge and liquid line and reduces cooling capacity and raises Camera temp",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Shut off the refrigerant system and allow to warm up to room temperature.  Then restart the system.  ",4,"C",null,null,"Process control","Assure warm-up procedure is in place",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-029","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Simultaneous plugs in vapor supply line and liquid supply line at or near compressor causes >600 psig between compressor and blockage and subsequent compressor failure",2,"E",null,null,"Safety device","Pressure transducer cut compressor power via software and PLC and prevent over pressure at compressor ",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Test pressure transducer and calibrate during shutdowns","CPS",null,"2017-07-28"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-030","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Simultaneous plugs in vapor supply line and liquid supply line at or near Camera causes increase in supply line pressures",2,"D",null,null,"Safety device","Pressure transducer cut compressor power via software and PLC and prevent over pressure at compressor ",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Test pressure transducer and calibrate during shutdowns","CPS",null,"2017-07-28"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-031","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Plug in return line at or near compressor causes <100 psig pressure equalization throughout system, leads to no cooling capacity",3,"E",null,null,"Procedure, training","Shut off the refrigerant system and allow to warm up to room temperature.  Then restart the system.  ",4,"E",null,null,"Process control","Assure warm-up procedure is in place",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-032","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Plug in return line at or near Camera causes pressures <600 psig at the high pressure side of the system, subsequntly damaging compressor",3,"E",null,null,"Safety device","Mechanical switch to cut compressor power and prevent over pressure near Camera",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Test pressure switch, verify placement of disc ",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-033","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improperly closed valve in liquid supply line at or near compressor increases pressure in compressor discharge and vapor line and reduces cooling capacity",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Employ proper refrigeration system servicing procedure",3,"D",null,null,"Process control","Assure service procedure is in place",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-034","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improperly closed valve in vapor supply line at or near Camera increases pressure in compressor discharge and vapor line and reduces cooling capacity",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Employ proper refrigeration system servicing procedure",3,"D",null,null,"Process control","Assure service procedure is in place",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-035","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improperly closed valve in vapor supply line at or near compressor increases pressure in compressor discharge and liquid line and reduces cooling capacity",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Employ proper refrigeration system servicing procedure",3,"D",null,null,"Process control","Assure service procedure is in place",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-036","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improperly closed valve in vapor supply line at or near Camera increases pressure in compressor discharge and liquid line and reduces cooling capacity",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","Install pressure transducer to actuate mechanical switch to cut compressor power and prevent over pressure",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Test pressure switch",null,"Y","2017-08-01"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-037","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Simultaneous improperly-closed valves in vapor supply line and liquid supply line at or near compressor causes >600psig between compressor and closed valve, subsequently damaging compressor",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","Install pressure transducer to actuate mechanical switch to cut compressor power and prevent over pressure",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Test pressure switch",null,"Y","2017-08-01"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-039","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improperly closed valve in return line at or near compressor causes <100psig pressure equalization throughout system and provides no cooling capacity",4,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Employ proper refrigeration system servicing procedure",4,"D",null,null,"Process control","Assure service procedure is in place",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-040","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improperly closed valve in return line at or near Camera causes >600psig pressure on the systems's pressure side, damageing the compressor",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Employ proper refrigeration system servicing procedure",3,"D",null,null,"Process control","Assure service procedure is in place",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-041","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Camera with full refrigerant charge is disconnected with valves closed while cold results in severe Camera overpressure (upon warmup) that could end in catastrophic release inside cryostat ",2,"C",null,null,"Safety device","Place pressure relief valve near Camera",4,"D",null,null,"Test","Test pressure relief valve",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-042","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Improper application of leak-check gas could cause overpressures pressure during leak check",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","Place pressure relief valve or burst disc near at leak-check gas source",4,"D",null,null,"Inspection","Verify placement of PRV or disc",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-043","Refrig","Matl's","Refrigerant toxicity","Release of 3919C refrigerant could result in illness from exposure to toxic component R245fa",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Prohibit presence of >200kg of 3919C in Dome",4,"C",null,null,"Inspection","Periodically inspect Dome for presence of refrigerant storage",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-045","Refrig","Env","Cold system condesation","Condensation from cold system could drip onto optics.",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Install a thermal static expansion valve on cold system return line",2,"D",null,null,"Test","Test efficacy of expansion valve in preventing condensation",null,null,"2017-05-18"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-046","Cryostat","Env","Dynalene leak in Utility Trunk","IF Dynalene leaks inside the utility trunk, THEN it could damage components",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","1 - Use high-integrity fittings and no synthetic hoses in the Utility Trunk\n2 - Monitor Dynalene pressure and use a hygrometer in the Utility Trunk to detect a leak",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Test Dynalene system monitoring",null,null,"2017-04-21"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-047","Cryostat","Mech","Making up Utility Trunk vacuum and refrig lines","IF a vacuum knife-edge flange or refrig VCR fitting is damaged during mate-up of the UT, THEN a leak may be difficult to repair",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","1 - Design UT to provide adequate room for the final mate-up of refrig lines\n2 - Leak test refrig and vacuum lines before putting them into service",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Leak test refrig and vacuum lines before putting them into service",null,null,"2017-04-21"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-048","Cryostat","Elec","Control of elec and fans in Utility Trunk","IF fans or powered systems in the UT are not de-energize, THEN personnel may be hurt during an access",2,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","1 - Provide locking breakers to de-energize circuits before accessing the utility trunk volume\n2 - Include lock-out/tag-out protocols in utility trunk access procedures",2,"D",null,null,"Audit","Confirm that lock-out procedures are correctly used",null,null,"2017-04-21"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Cryo-049","Cryostat","Press/Vac","Overpressure of Utility Trunk Volume","IF an air, refrigerant, or Dynalene lines breaks in the utility trunk, THEN it could fill the UT and overpressurize it",2,"C",null,null,"Safety device","1 - monitor pressure in the UT\n2 - include \"weak-link\" or pressure relief in the UT outer skin",2,"D",null,null,"Test","Test that Utility Trunk vent to atmosphere in when over-pressurized",null,null,"2017-04-21"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"ELX-003","Sys Elec","Elec","Cable Abrasion or Stress","If a power or signal cable is abraded or stressed the insulation could be compromised or the connections could be broken, possibly resulting in a short circuit, overheating, and fire at worst",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Design cable plant to avoid stress on joints and rub points; take great care with any moving cables",2,"E",null,null,"Inspection","Inspect camera cable system as it is being installed and as other parts of camera are installed.",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"ELX-003","Sys Elec","Elec","Cable Abrasion or Stress","If a power or signal cable is abraded or stressed the insulation could be compromised or the connections could be broken, possibly resulting in a short circuit, overheating, and fire at worst",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Design cable plant to avoid stress on joints and rub points; take great care with any moving cables",2,"E",null,null,"Inspection","Inspect camera cable system as it is being installed and as other parts of camera are installed.",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"ELX-004","Sys Elec","Elec","Electrical Fire","Local overheating of electronic components could cause fire",2,"D",null,null,"Safety device","Combination of using standard fire retardant or resistant construction materials and including smoke sensing devices in the volumes where electrical and electronic devices are located which will trip off power",3,"E",null,null,"Review","Inspect and qualify materials used and test smoke sensors as required by manufacturer or code",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"ELX-004","Sys Elec","Elec","Electrical Fire","Local overheating of electronic components could cause fire",2,"D",null,null,"Safety device","Combination of using standard fire retardant or resistant construction materials and including smoke sensing devices in the volumes where electrical and electronic devices are located which will trip off power",3,"E",null,null,"Review","Inspect and qualify materials used and test smoke sensors as required by manufacturer or code",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"ELX-005","Sys Elec","Elec","Electrical Safety","Personnel hazard from high voltages or high currents.",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","All voltages and available currents above \"ultra-low voltages and currents\" to be handled according to all applicable codes and standards, implement LOTO during maintenance and repair ",1,"E",null,null,"Review","Verify construction",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x","x",null,"x"]
[null,"ELX-005","Sys Elec","Elec","Electrical Safety","Personnel hazard from high voltages or high currents.",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","All voltages and available currents above \"ultra-low voltages and currents\" to be handled according to all applicable codes and standards, implement LOTO during maintenance and repair ",1,"E",null,null,"Audit","Verify construction and LOTO use",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-004","Filter-X","Mech","Dropping a filter","Improper sequencing of clamps leaves a filter in an unsecured condition",2,"B",null,null,"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10743,  Switches monitor the position of all mechanisms, and will only open when system is in a safe state",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Test instrumentation as part of exchange system performance verification","CPS",41712]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-004","Filter-X","Mech","Dropping a filter","Improper sequencing of clamps leaves a filter in an unsecured condition",2,"B",null,null,"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10743,  Switches monitor the position of all mechanisms, and will only open when system is in a safe state",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Test instrumentation as part of exchange system performance verification","CPS",null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-005","Filter-X","Mech","Single-point failure","Mechanical failure of a single-point failure item:  axles, filter latches, truck wheels, keys on drive shafts",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Design hardware in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard, ",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","Analysis, proof testing and inspection as part of PM plans",null,"Y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-005","Filter-X","Mech","Single-point failure","Mechanical failure of a single-point failure item:  axles, filter latches, truck wheels, keys on drive shafts",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Design hardware in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard, ",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","Analysis, proof testing and inspection as part of PM plans",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-006","Filter-X","Mech","Wear/fatigue failure","Failure due to long-term wear or cyclic loading causing fatigue failure",3,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","Design hardware in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard, perform periodic inspections to identify wear and preventive maintenance ",3,"E",null,null,"Audit","Review inspection and PM plans",null,"Y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-006","Filter-X","Mech","Wear/fatigue failure","Failure due to long-term wear or cyclic loading causing fatigue failure",3,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","Design hardware in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard, perform periodic inspections to identify wear and preventive maintenance ",3,"E",null,null,"Audit","Review inspection and PM plans",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-008","Filter-X","Struc","Linkage buckling","Buckling or structural failure of thin linkage members, causing damage to Shutter or filter",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Design linkage in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard to carry loads consistent with stall force of motor",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Proof test the linkage, then run verification tests as part of Changer testing",null,41694]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-008","Filter-X","Struc","Linkage buckling","Buckling or structural failure of thin linkage members, causing damage to Shutter or filter",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Design linkage in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard to carry loads consistent with stall force of motor",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Proof test the linkage, then run verification tests as part of Changer testing",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-009","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rotation of the Carousel","Inadvertant rotation of the carousel and collision of a filter by back-driving through the drive train; this can occur when an unbalanced load of filters places a torque on the Carousel",2,"C",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","Use a non-back-driveable gear train",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Proof test the Carousel to demonstrate that gear train can not be back-driven, even under seismic loads",null,40644]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-009","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rotation of the Carousel","Inadvertant rotation of the carousel and collision of a filter by back-driving through the drive train; this can occur when an unbalanced load of filters places a torque on the Carousel",2,"C",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","Use a non-back-driveable gear train",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Proof test the Carousel to demonstrate that gear train can not be back-driven, even under seismic loads",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-010","Filter-X","Mech","Driving Carousel blind","Inadvertant collision and damage to a filter by losing or not tracking the position of the carousel while it is rotating",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10743,  Position sensors or periodic switches establish the Carousel's rotary position during normal operation or after a loss of power or control",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that switches and controls prevent motions that would lead to collision","CPS",41722]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-010","Filter-X","Mech","Driving Carousel blind","Inadvertant collision and damage to a filter by losing or not tracking the position of the carousel while it is rotating",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10743,  Position sensors or periodic switches establish the Carousel's rotary position during normal operation or after a loss of power or control",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that switches and controls prevent motions that would lead to collision","CPS",null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-011","Filter-X","Mech","Carousel misalignment","Carousel stops in the wrong place for a filter exchange, and filter is damaged by the Auto Changer ",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","Position sensors will indicate when the Carousel is correctly located, and enable the Auto Changer to move",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that switches and controls prevent motions that would lead to collision","CPS",41712]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-011","Filter-X","Mech","Carousel misalignment","Carousel stops in the wrong place for a filter exchange, and filter is damaged by the Auto Changer ",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","Position sensors will indicate when the Carousel is correctly located, and enable the Auto Changer to move",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that switches and controls prevent motions that would lead to collision","CPS",null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-012","Filter-X","Mech","Carousel clamp failure","Carousel clamp inadvertently releases, dropping a filter and damaging it",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Clamps are spring-load in the clamped position, so they are fail safe from loss of power or actuator force; clamps are designed to carry full seismic and handling loads of the filters",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Proof test the carousel clamps, run verification tests as part of Carousel testing ",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-012","Filter-X","Mech","Carousel clamp failure","Carousel clamp inadvertently releases, dropping a filter and damaging it",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Clamps are spring-load in the clamped position, so they are fail safe from loss of power or actuator force; clamps are designed to carry full seismic and handling loads of the filters",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Proof test the carousel clamps, run verification tests as part of Carousel testing ",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-013","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rolling of filter in Auto Changer","Inadvertant rolling of the filter on the Auto Changer trucks by back-driving through the drive train, leading to collision of the filter with another filter",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Use a non-back-driveable drive train.",4,"E",null,null,"Process control","Proof test the Auto Changer to demonstrate that drive train can not be back-driven",null,41712]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-013","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rolling of filter in Auto Changer","Inadvertant rolling of the filter on the Auto Changer trucks by back-driving through the drive train, leading to collision of the filter with another filter",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Use a non-back-driveable drive train.",4,"E",null,null,"Process control","Proof test the Auto Changer to demonstrate that drive train can not be back-driven",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-014","Filter-X","Mech","Dropping filter off Auto Changer truck","Latch mechanism that holds the filter releases and drops the filter, damaging it and L2, L3, or the Shutter",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10743,  Power and an enable signal is required to unlatch a filter",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Run proof tests to verify that latch can carry max load without unlatching","CPS",41712]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-014","Filter-X","Mech","Dropping filter off Auto Changer truck","Latch mechanism that holds the filter releases and drops the filter, damaging it and L2, L3, or the Shutter",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10743:  Both power and an enable signal are required to unlatch a filter",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Run proof tests to verify that latch can carry max load without unlatching","CPS",null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-017","Filter-X","Mech","Rotator starts to move Camera","Telescope rotator rotates Camera while Auto Changer is transporting a filter; possibly damaging trucks or filter mount",3,"D",null,null,"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10743,  Tiltmeter or accelerometer on camera housing monitors orientation of Camera and stops changer",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Test functionality of tiltmeter during system testing","CPS",41712]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-017","Filter-X","Mech","Rotator starts to move Camera","Telescope rotator rotates Camera while Auto Changer is transporting a filter; possibly damaging trucks or filter mount",3,"D",null,null,"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10743,  Tiltmeter or accelerometer on camera housing monitors orientation of Camera and stops changer",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Test functionality of tiltmeter during system testing","CPS",null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-018","Filter-X","Mech","Drive screw buckling","Long drive ball screw is in compression during parts of the change and could buckle if load is high enough",3,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","Size drive screw with conservative margins even under seismic and motor stall loads",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Qual test bearings with max stall loads at critical carriage position where buckling loads are highest",null,41712]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-018","Filter-X","Mech","Drive screw buckling","Long drive ball screw is in compression during parts of the change and could buckle if load is high enough",3,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","Size drive screw with conservative margins even under seismic and motor stall loads",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Qual test bearings with max stall loads at critical carriage position where buckling loads are highest",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-019","Filter-X","Mech","Changer rail mount overload","Rails/support differential CTC causes rails to bow towards each other, pinching filter and trucks, possibly damaging trucks or filter mount",4,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","Design rail mount to minimize bi-metallic bending effect; tolerance trucks to allow for deviation in position with respect to filter",4,"E",null,null,"Review","Review design and analysis to ensure thermal distortion is accommodated",null,41712]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-019","Filter-X","Mech","Changer rail mount overload","Rails/support differential CTC causes rails to bow towards each other, pinching filter and trucks, possibly damaging trucks or filter mount",4,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","Design rail mount to minimize bi-metallic bending effect; tolerance trucks to allow for deviation in position with respect to filter",4,"E",null,null,"Review","Review design and analysis to ensure thermal distortion is accommodated",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-021","Filter-X","Therm/Cryo","Drive motor overheats ","Stalled motor overheats resulting in damage. This applies to all the motors in the three subsystems (Carousel, AutoChanger, Loader)",4,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Current monitor shuts off motor if current exceeds a preset max value. Current preset limit will be defined in the motor controllers.",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Test torque and current monitors as part of carousel proof test ",null,41712]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-021","Filter-X","Therm/Cryo","Drive motor overheats ","Stalled motor overheats resulting in damage. This applies to all the motors in the three subsystems (Carousel, AutoChanger, Loader)",4,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Current monitor shuts off motor if current exceeds a preset max value. Current preset limit will be defined in the motor controllers.",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Test torque and current monitors as part of carousel proof test ",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"EXCH-022","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rolling of the filter in the Loader","Inadvertant rolling of the filter on the Loader by back driving through the drive train leading to a collision with another filter of the AutoChanger components",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Use a non-back-driveable drive train, or add a power-off brake to prevent uncommanded rotation even when the power is off",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Proof test the loader to demonstrate that the drive train can not be back-driven",null,41712]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"EXCH-022","Filter-X","Mech","Uncontrolled rolling of the filter in the Loader","Inadvertant rolling of the filter on the Loader by back driving through the drive train leading to a collision with another filter of the AutoChanger components",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Use a non-back-driveable drive train, or add a power-off brake to prevent uncommanded rotation even when the power is off",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Proof test the loader to demonstrate that the drive train can not be back-driven",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
["new","EXCH-023","Filter-X","Mech","Loose items damage Filter-X or L2","Exchange system and L2 could be damaged by a loosened (by motion cycling) Exchange-system part (screw, bolt, fastener, etc.) rolling around inside the camera body  ",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Threaded fasteners will have lock washers or equivalent",3,"D",null,null,"Inspection","Inspect each fastener as installed  to assure redundant capturing"]
["x"]
[null,"EXCH-023","Filter-X","Mech","Loose items damage Filter-X or L2","Exchange system and L2 could be damaged by a loosened (by motion cycling) Exchange-system part (screw, bolt, fastener, etc.) rolling around inside the camera body  ",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Threaded fasteners will have lock washers or equivalent",3,"D",null,null,"Inspection","Inspect each fastener as installed  to assure redundant capturing",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"IT-001","I&T","Mech","Sensor damaged during (de)integration","Sensor collides with adjacent sensor, raft, or tooling during acceptance testing, integration or deintegration. Probable damage to sensor. Cost of 1+ sensors plus replacement time lost per occurance. source, mechanism, outcome",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA 10748,  Lateral tolerance study performed, LCA-10738, used in design to maintain proper clearances.  Installation tooling design and assembly procedures for adequate clearance between sensors during assembly. ",3,"D",null,null,"Audit","Verify no sensors have been damaged",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,"x","x"]
[null,"IT-001","I&T","Mech","Sensor damaged during (de)integration","Sensor collides with adjacent sensor, raft, or tooling during acceptance testing, integration or deintegration. Probable damage to sensor. Cost of 1+ sensors plus replacement time lost per occurance. source, mechanism, outcome",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Lateral tolerance study performed, LCA-10738, used in design to maintain proper clearances.  Installation tooling design and assembly procedures for adequate clearance between sensors during assembly. Staff shall be trained in proper handling techniques and handling procedures, including LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations) and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations).",3,"D",null,null,"Review","Review efficacy of tolerance studies, handling techniques, rules",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"IT-008","I&T","Env","Asphyxiation due to release of N2","If gaseous nitrogen purge gas free-flows into a confined space, then personnel could be exposed to low-oxygen environment",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Limit flow of N2 into rooms",1,"E",null,null,"Test","Test max flow rate",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"IT-008","I&T","Env","Asphyxiation due to release of N2","If gaseous nitrogen purge gas free-flows into a confined space, then personnel could be exposed to low-oxygen environment",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-Limit flow of N2 into rooms\n2-Equip rooms with oxygen-deficiency monitors",1,"E",null,null,"Test","Test max flow rate",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"IT-012","I&T","Struc","Injury from falling equipment","If equipment falls or moves during an earthquake, then personnel could be injured",1,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","Anchor fixed equipment; tether moving equipment to limit motion",1,"E",null,null,"Inspection","Inspect anchoring and tethers; check to ensure they are being used",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"IT-012","I&T","Struc","Injury from falling equipment","If equipment falls or moves during an earthquake, then personnel could be injured",1,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","Anchor fixed equipment per SLAC Anchorage of Experimental Equipment Program (\"BIO Policy P-15-001\"); tether moving equipment to limit motion",1,"E",null,null,"Inspection","Inspect anchoring and tethers; check to ensure they are being used",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"IT-014","I&T","Mech","Injury from falling equipment","During material handling with lifting equipment, equipment may fall or otherwise impinge on worker, resulting in injury",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","1-Limit use of hoists and forklifts to certified personnel.        2-Create and work to required lift plans",3,"D",null,null,"Audit","1-Audit training records.         2-Audit lift plans and monitor to ensure plans are being implemented",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"IT-014","I&T","Mech","Injury from falling equipment","During material handling with lifting equipment, equipment may fall or otherwise impinge on worker, resulting in injury",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","1-Limit use of hoists and forklifts to certified personnel.        \n2-Create and work to required lift plans",3,"D",null,null,"Audit","1-Audit training records.         2-Audit lift plans and monitor to ensure plans are being implemented",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"IT-015","I&T","Mech","Injury from working in awkward postures","While performing Camera work on difficult-to-access components, workers may be acutely (sprain/strain) or chronically (via repetitive motion) injured",3,"B",null,null,"Procedure, training","1-Assess each each task for industrial ergonomics.         2-Train workers in safe industrial ergonomics",3,"C",null,null,"Audit","1. Review plans for possible ergonomic insults and alter tasks accordingly.        2-Assure worker completion of SLAC \"Industrial Ergonomics Awareness Training\"",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"IT-015","I&T","Mech","Injury from working in awkward postures","While performing Camera work on difficult-to-access components, workers may be acutely (sprain/strain) or chronically (via repetitive motion) injured",3,"B",null,null,"Procedure, training","1-Assess each each task for industrial ergonomics.         \n2-Train workers in safe industrial ergonomics",3,"C",null,null,"Audit","1. Review plans for possible ergonomic insults and alter tasks accordingly.        2-Assure worker completion of SLAC \"Industrial Ergonomics Awareness Training\"",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-016","I&T","Struc","Test-stand mover (\"Alum-a-Lift\") failure (Test Raft Pgm)","Worker crushed by dropped load: Alum-a-lift fails",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Proof test Alum-a-Lift prior to deployment",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Vetting of manufacturer prooftest documents",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-017","I&T","Mech","Pinch/crush by moving TS component(s) (Test Raft Pgm)","Worker crushed between moving TS parts during automated tests",3,"D",null,null,"Warning device","Place requirement for roping off areas with moving parts on associated eTravelers",3,"E",null,null,"Audit","Periodically review eTravellers and compliance with eTravelers ",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-018","I&T","Env","Laser light injury (Test Raft Pgm)","Laser light eye injury during metrology activities",3,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","1-Lasers used will not exceed Class 2 (per ANSI Z136)   \n2-Personnel are prohibited from using optical-aid instruments in ACR during metrology operations.",4,"E",null,null,"Audit","Periodically inspect for and remove optical-aid instruments from ACR.",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-019","I&T","Elec","Motor/controller/ amplifier/power supply electrical (Test Raft Pgm)","Electrical shock/arcflash/startle from TS servo equipment",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Assure electrical component listing by UL, CSA, or SLAC-EEIP",3,"E",null,null,"Inspection","Inspect all non-UL/CSA items per SLAC-EEIP",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-020","I&T","Press/Vac","Refrigerant line/system break or breach  (Test Raft Pgm)","Injury from uncontrolled release of pressurized refrigerant",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-design the system such that by Boyles law (P1V1=P2V2) it is impossible to overpressure the heat exchanger system due to a refrigerant leak\n2-incorporate burst disc in system\n3-Pressure-test heat exchangers",3,"E",null,null,"Inspection","Verify burst disc parameters",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-021","I&T","Fire","PT-30 refrigerant fire (Test Raft Pgm)","Damage and injury after release and ignition of CryoTiger refrigerant. ",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","1-Abide by recommendations in Cryotiger \"PCC with PT Refrigerants\" manual (Brooks Automation doc. no. 825133-00, Revision A) \n2-Provide a pressure relief burst disc on the vacuum vessel to prevent an over-pressure condition if a leak of high-pressure refriger-\nant  occurs  within  the  vacuum  vessel.",3,"C",null,null,"Inspection","1. Verify burst disc parameters   2. Monitor use to assure adherance to manufacturer's requirements",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-022","I&T","Env","ODH from hot nitrogen purge (Test Raft Pgm)","Death/injury from inhalation of oxygen-deficient gas in or around TS during 80cfm hot N2 purges",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-Vent nitrogen into a diffusing device.    \n2-Design RTM Installation Fixture and peripheral equipment to not afford worker head insertion. \n3-Limit N2 flow to X lpm via critical flow orifice.   \n4-Employ oxygen deficiency monitors around purge activities",2,"E",null,null,"Inspection","Inspect test stand before use",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-023","I&T","Press/Vac","Test stand vessel overpressure ","Injury or equipment damage from accidental unvented overpressure and catastrophic failure of vessel. (If the cryostat pressure is too high, REBs and sensors may malfunction and contaminants and water can condense on the hardware.)",3,"D",null,null,"Safety feature","1. Equip vessel with a pressure relief valve.   \n2. Review by pressure safety SME. \n3. Employ automated shutdown/safe-state system timed after automated notifications",4,"D",null,null,"Test","Test pressure relief valve and shutdown automations  ",null,"Y","2017-07-20"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-024","I&T","Press/Vac","Test stand vessel window breach ","Injury or equipment damage from accidental breach of vessel window under vacuum ",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Provide supplemental window protection ",4,"E",null,null,"Inspection","Inspect supplemental window protection before use",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-025","I&T","Therm/Cryo","Burns from hot nitrogen injector (Test Raft Pgm)","Burn from skin contact with hot (100C) injector",3,"C",null,null,"Warning device","Post warnings on and around hot surfaces",3,"D",null,null,"Inspection","Inspect warnings before use",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-026","I&T","Env","Radiation from Fe-55 sources (Test Raft Pgm)","Radiation exposure to personnel from four 5μCi Fe-55 sources",4,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Sources to be controlled according to BNL or SLAC source control program",4,"D",null,null,"Review","Review source control compliance",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-027","I&T","Env","Contamination from vent after turbopump-/power- failure","Turbopump failure allows backventing of room air to single bay cryostat",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","Automate valve closure during catastrophic venting",4,"D",null,null,"Test","Test automation",null,"Y","2017-08-02"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-028","I&T","Therm/Cryo","Miscooling of TS cryostat after misinstallation of cryocooler lines (Test Raft Pgm)","Cryocooler lines are switched, allowing miscooling (over- and under-cooling) of TS cryostat hardware",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","Color code lines to prevent mismating",3,"D",null,null,"Inspection","Inspect lines before use",null,"Y","2017-08-01"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-029","I&T","Mech","Mismating of rafts during integration","Dissimilarity between Science and Corner Rafts hold-down mechanisms could prompt improper installation resulting in damage to a raft",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","eTraveler to contain explanatory language to help prevent treatment of  a Science Raft like a Corner Raft and vice versa",3,"D",null,null,"Review","Verify eTraveler entries",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-030","I&T","Mech","Unintended Integration Stand/Metrology Sensor Arm motion into reference flat or L3 (BOT)","Damage to L3 or reference flat from unintensional metrology sensor arm displacement   ",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Install chocks to prevent damaging  vertical displacements of arm/sensor",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Test chock efficacy before flat and L3 are in place",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-031","I&T","Struc","Fall from integration stand work platform (BOT)","Injury from fall from elevated work surface on integration stand work platform",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Install standard railing at platform's edge where working surface is >48\" from floor",2,"E",null,null,"Inspection","Inspect rails for OSHA compliance before first use",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-032","I&T","Press/Vac","Dark Box overpressure (BOT)","Blocked Dark Box vent while air is flowing can push the Box doors outward, creating light leaks",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Port vent outlet to prevent dead-ending",3,"E",null,null,"Inspection","Inspect vent outlet before first use",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-033","I&T","Env","Dark Box under BOT stand ODH (BOT)","Asphyxiation from inhalation of air displaced by nitrogen cover gas in Dark Box",2,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","Substitute dry air for N2",2,"E",null,null,"Inspection","View and confirm use of air on Box",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-034","I&T","Env","Power loss to I&T facilities","Contaminants and water can condense on the hardware. Hardware and Test Stands may malfunction from loss of filtered ventilation",3,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","Assign equipment monitoring staff for all activities. Upon loss of power, a brown-out or loss of connection, follow response procedures to bring systems and equipment into a safe state. ",3,"D",null,null,"Review","Review power loss protocols",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-035","I&T","Env","Network connection loss","Loss of test systems control or monitoring (remote or local) due to loss of network connection(s) could result in hardware damage",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Employ automated shutdown/safe-state system timed after automated notifications",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Test notification and shutdown automations",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-036","I&T","Mech","Damage from ball handler","Loss of control or misuse of handling implement for balls (between  sensor assemblies and grid) damages hardware ",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Design ball handler to prevent impingment on adjacent hardware.",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Test handler on mockup or prototype",null,"Y","2017-08-01"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-037","I&T","Mech","BOT awkward postures","Personnel injury or hardware damage from awkward postures required to work on BOT top side",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","Perform topside BOT work from an elevating worker-positioning device ",3,"D",null,null,"Audit","Assure use of device in field",null,"Y","2017-08-01"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"IT-038","I&T","Mech","Fan impingement","Injury from high-speed purge system fans ",3,"D",null,null,"Safety device","Install finger guards over fan faces during I&T activities",3,"E",null,null,"Audit","View fan guards in situ",null,"Y","2017-08-01"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-001","Optics","Struc","L1 flexure failure","Failure of an L1 flexure due to excessive radial flex'ing or overload, possibly coming from heating or cooling of the camera beyond its survival temperature limits - if one flexure failed there may be a potential to overload adjacent flexures ",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Design flexures with safty factor in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to survive a broad survival temperature range, much larger than they should ever see. See Hazard Report LCA-10746.",1,"E",null,null,"Process control","Perform qualification testing of the flexure and acceptance testing of all assemblies",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-001","Optics","Struc","L1 flexure failure","Failure of an L1 flexure due to excessive radial flex'ing or overload, possibly coming from heating or cooling of the camera beyond its survival temperature limits - if one flexure failed there may be a potential to overload adjacent flexures ",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Design flexures with safty factor in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to survive a broad survival temperature range, much larger than they should ever see. See Hazard Report LCA-10746.",1,"E",null,null,"Process control","Perform qualification testing of the flexure and acceptance testing of all assemblies",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-002","Optics","Struc","L1 flexure mount bond failure","Failure of the bond joint holding the flexure to the glass, either due to an adhesive de-bonding or glass fracture at the bond - if one bond joint fails  there may be a potential to overload adjacent bond joints",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Design bond joint with a safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to carry worst-case loading; spec bonding process - design feature to restrain L1 in the event of bond failure",1,"E",null,null,"Process control","Proof test the bond joint and run in-process tests of adhesive",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-002","Optics","Struc","L1 flexure mount bond failure","Failure of the bond joint holding the flexure to the glass, either due to an adhesive de-bonding or glass fracture at the bond - if one bond joint fails  there may be a potential to overload adjacent bond joints",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Design bond joint with a safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to carry worst-case loading; spec bonding process - design feature to restrain L1 in the event of bond failure",1,"E",null,null,"Process control","Proof test the bond joint and run in-process tests of adhesive",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-003","Optics","Struc","L2 flexure failure","Failure of an L2 flexure due to excessive radial flex'ing or overload - possible damage to L1 and filter ",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Design flexures with safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to survive a broad survival temperature range, much larger than they should ever see",1,"E",null,null,"Process control","Perform qualification testing of the flexure and acceptance testing of all assemblies",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-003","Optics","Struc","L2 flexure failure","Failure of an L2 flexure due to excessive radial flex'ing or overload - possible damage to L1 and filter ",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Design flexures with safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to survive a broad survival temperature range, much larger than they should ever see",1,"E",null,null,"Process control","Perform qualification testing of the flexure and acceptance testing of all assemblies",null,"Y","2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-004","Optics","Struc","L2 flexure mount bond failure","Failure of the bond joint holding the flexure to the glass, either due to an adhesive de-bonding or glass fracture at the bond",1,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Design bond joint with a safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to carry worst-case loading; spec bonding process",1,"E",null,null,"Process control","Proof test the bond joint and run in-process tests of adhesive",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-004","Optics","Struc","L2 flexure mount bond failure","Failure of the bond joint holding the flexure to the glass, either due to an adhesive de-bonding or glass fracture at the bond",1,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Design bond joint with a safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to carry worst-case loading; spec bonding process",1,"E",null,null,"Process control","Proof test the bond joint and run in-process tests of adhesive",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-006","Optics","Struc","L1-L2 Assembly strut failure","Buckling or structural failure of a strut tube, either due to overloading of the CFC tube or de-bonding or shear failure at the adhesively bonded end fittings",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Design strut tube with large factor of safety in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 against buckling for operational and handling loads",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Acceptance test, Qual test and destructive test strut tubes; proof load test all struts",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-006","Optics","Struc","L1-L2 Assembly strut failure","Buckling or structural failure of a strut tube, either due to overloading of the CFC tube or de-bonding or shear failure at the adhesively bonded end fittings",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Design strut tube with large factor of safety in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 against buckling for operational and handling loads",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Acceptance test, Qual test and destructive test strut tubes; proof load test all struts",null,"Y","2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-007","Optics","Struc","Filter glass fracture","Fracture of the filter glass due to excessive loads imparted on the glass through the support frame ",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Design frame to isolate the filter from external loading due to frame flexure",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","Qual test frame and filter assembly with loading and flex'ing tests",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-007","Optics","Struc","Filter glass fracture","Fracture of the filter glass due to excessive loads imparted on the glass through the support frame ",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Design frame to isolate the filter from external loading due to frame flexure",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","Qual test frame and filter assembly with loading and flex'ing tests",null,"Y","2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-008","Optics","Struc","Filter glass fracture","Damage to filter glass due to loads imparted on it during a hand-off of the exchange system",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Design Filter frame to prevent overstress - Frame interfaces to carousel and changer truck are very close, so any overload would not affect the filters; switches prevent out-of-sequence actuation that would lead to an overload",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Test switches to ensure protection; analyze frame at max overload force",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-008","Optics","Struc","Filter glass fracture","Damage to filter glass due to loads imparted on it during a hand-off of the exchange system",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Design Filter frame to prevent overstress - Frame interfaces to carousel and changer truck are very close, so any overload would not affect the filters; switches prevent out-of-sequence actuation that would lead to an overload",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Test switches to ensure protection; analyze frame at max overload force",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-009","Optics","Therm/Cryo","Excessive raidative cooling of L3 lens","If the radiative cooling off of L3 were significantly more than predicted, the lens may cool down,  Ultimately, embrittling the glass or causing thermal contraction beyond the range of accommodation of the perimeter gasket.  In either case, this may generate stresses in the glass above allowable limits which could ultimately result in failure",1,"E",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","Analysis of the black-body radiative cooling, which is the maximum radiative heat transfer possible, shows only slightly more cooling than the nominal condition.  Thus, we are already designing for near-worst-case conditions, and even the worst-case temperatures possible do not pose a hazard to the lens",4,"E",null,null,"Review","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.              2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-009","Optics","Therm/Cryo","Excessive raidative cooling of L3 lens","If the radiative cooling off of L3 were significantly more than predicted, the lens may cool down,  Ultimately, embrittling the glass or causing thermal contraction beyond the range of accommodation of the perimeter gasket.  In either case, this may generate stresses in the glass above allowable limits which could ultimately result in failure",1,"E",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","Analysis of the black-body radiative cooling, which is the maximum radiative heat transfer possible, shows only slightly more cooling than the nominal condition.  Thus, we are already designing for near-worst-case conditions, and even the worst-case temperatures possible do not pose a hazard to the lens",4,"E",null,null,"Review","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.              \n2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-010","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive external pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",1,"C",null,null,"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10745,  1.  Design L3 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n2.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 (after I&T observatory located at approx 8000 feet ASL, atmospheric pressure is 75% of SL, this reduces press diff)",1,"E",null,null,"Test","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.             2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures","CPS","Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x","x","x"]
[null,"Opt-010","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive external pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",1,"C",null,null,"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10745  \n1.  Design L3 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n2.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 (after I&T observatory located at approx 8000 feet ASL, atmospheric pressure is 75% of SL, this reduces press diff)",1,"E",null,null,"Test","1-Assure thermal modeling of L3 assembly design for extremes of temperature and pressure.             \n2-Test at operational temperatures and pressures",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-011","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive internal pressure from within the cyrostat, due to overpressurizing the cryostat during backfill and purge operations",1,"D",null,null,"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10745,  1. Regulate purge pressure to less than 3kPa (TBD).\n2. Size purge system pump to limit max pressure.\n3. Design L3 lens to survive the mas purge system pressure differential, using a large factor of safety\n4.  Use a pressure-relief valve in the pump/ purge lines to limit the internal pressure on L3 (Pressure relief valve on cryostat housing)",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Qual test L3 Assembly at extremes of temperature and pressure;\nTest pressure-relief valve prior to every vent as part of set-up procedure",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11\nUpdated 7-Aug-14"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-011","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L3 lens","Overload of L3 due to excessive internal pressure from within the cyrostat, due to overpressurizing the cryostat during backfill and purge operations",1,"D",null,null,"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10745,  1. Regulate purge pressure to less than 3kPa (TBD).\n2. Size purge system pump to limit max pressure.\n3. Design L3 lens to survive the mas purge system pressure differential, using a large factor of safety\n4.  Use a pressure-relief valve in the pump/ purge lines to limit the internal pressure on L3 (Pressure relief valve on cryostat housing)",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Qual test L3 Assembly at extremes of temperature and pressure;\nTest pressure-relief valve prior to every vent as part of set-up procedure",null,"Y","2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-012","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L1 lens","Overload of L1 due to excessive internal pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",2,"C",null,null,"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  1. Regulate purge pressure to less than 3kPa (TBD).\n2. Size purge system pump to limit max pressure.\n3. Design L1 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n4.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 ",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Acceptance test pressure switch and relief valve;\nAnalyze L1 lens for max over-pressure load","CPS","Revised 4-Oct-11\nUpdated 7-Aug-14"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-012","Optics","Press/Vac","Overpressure of the L1 lens","Overload of L1 due to excessive internal pressure from overpressurizing the camera volume",2,"C",null,null,"Safety device","See Hazard Report LCA-10746  \n1. Regulate purge pressure to less than 3kPa (TBD).\n2. Size purge system pump to limit max pressure.\n3. Design L1 lens to survive the largest pressure differential possible, using a large factor of safety (size purge system pump to limit max pressure)\n4.  Use pressure switch to turn off purge flow and design feature or relief valve in camera volume to limit external pressure on L3 ",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Acceptance test pressure switch and relief valve;\nAnalyze L1 lens for max over-pressure load","CPS","Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-013","Optics","Press/Vac","L3 vacuum gasket failure","Freezing, tearing, or other failure of the vacuum gasket that supports L3 could result in an uncontrolled venting of the cryostat, which could introduce contaminants or water vapor into the cryostat, possibly damaging the detectors",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1.  Design the vacuum gasket to tolerate the vacuum load + shearing produced by contraction of the flange relative to the lens\n2.  Back-up O-ring around the perimeter of the air-side of the flange.  This is also vacuum-tight, and the volume between the two vacuum seals is evacuated with a second vacuum system.  Thus, this system is fully redundant\n3.  The camera volume is filled with very clean and dry gas, which would fill the cryostat if it were ever to vent",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Test the gaskets and double-seal over all extremes of pressure and temperature to verify their performance, monitor the volume between the primary and secondary seals ",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-013","Optics","Press/Vac","L3 vacuum gasket failure","Freezing, tearing, or other failure of the vacuum gasket that supports L3 could result in an uncontrolled venting of the cryostat, which could introduce contaminants or water vapor into the cryostat, possibly damaging the detectors",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1.  Design the vacuum gasket to tolerate the vacuum load + shearing produced by contraction of the flange relative to the lens\n2.  Back-up O-ring around the perimeter of the air-side of the flange.  This is also vacuum-tight, and the volume between the two vacuum seals is evacuated with a second vacuum system.  Thus, this system is fully redundant\n3.  The camera volume is filled with very clean and dry gas, which would fill the cryostat if it were ever to vent",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Test the gaskets and double-seal over all extremes of pressure and temperature to verify their performance, monitor the volume between the primary and secondary seals ",null,"Y","2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-014","Optics","Mech","L1 damage during personnel access","The L1 lens is open to the dome and is at risk of damage during personnel access, due to a direct collision or contact with the lens by personnel, tools, or related equipment or gear",2,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Use a lens cap to cover up the lens during extended accesses; access the camera from the side, so there should be little opportunity to contact the lens",3,"D",null,null,"Audit","Verify that procedures are being used during accesses",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-014","Optics","Mech","L1 damage during personnel access","The L1 lens is open to the dome and is at risk of damage during personnel access, due to a direct collision or contact with the lens by personnel, tools, or related equipment or gear",2,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Use a lens cap to cover up the lens during extended accesses; access the camera from the side, so there should be little opportunity to contact the lens",3,"D",null,null,"Audit","Verify that procedures are being used during accesses","CPS","Y","2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-015","Optics","Mech","L2 or L3 damage during personnel access","To remove the Shutter or Auto Changer from the camera, the region between L2 and L3 is accessed by personnel and handling hardware, when personnel, tools, or handling fixtures could contact L2 or L3.  Such a contact could damage either the coating or even scratch the lens",3,"B",null,null,"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10746 and 10745,  1. Use rails for removing the Shutter and Auto Changer\n2. Install a cover over L2, to prevent contact ",3,"D",null,null,"Audit","Use procedures for all large-scale servicing work, to ensure that safety devices are being used",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-015","Optics","Mech","L2 or L3 damage during personnel access","To remove the Shutter or Auto Changer from the camera, the region between L2 and L3 is accessed by personnel and handling hardware, when personnel, tools, or handling fixtures could contact L2 or L3.  Such a contact could damage either the coating or even scratch the lens",3,"B",null,null,"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10746 and 10745  \n1. Use rails for removing the Shutter and Auto Changer\n2. Install a cover over L2, to prevent contact ",3,"D",null,null,"Audit","Use procedures for all large-scale servicing work, to ensure that safety devices are being used",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-016","Optics","Struc","L1 micro-crack leads to failure","A flaw or micro-crack in the glass could cause a failure of the lens, since it is under continuous stress due to pressure loads",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Perform fracture analysis to determine the largest acceptable crack size; use large factors of safety",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Inspect the lens to verify that any cracks are smaller than the critical crack size",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-016","Optics","Struc","L1 micro-crack leads to failure","A flaw or micro-crack in the glass could cause a failure of the lens, since it is under continuous stress due to pressure loads",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10746,  Perform fracture analysis to determine the largest acceptable crack size; use large factors of safety",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Inspect the lens to verify that any cracks are smaller than the critical crack size",null,"Y","2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-017","Optics","Struc","L3 micro-crack leads to failure","A flaw or micro-crack in the glass on the inner surface could cause a failure of the lens, since it is under continuous stress due to vacuum/purge pressure loads",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10745,  1. Perform fracture analysis to determine the largest acceptable crack size; use large factors of safety (limit max differential pressure per Haz # 19) (AR coating will provide limited protection for unintended contact)\n2. Perform period inspections to verify surface condition",3,"E",null,null,"Inspection","Qual and proof test L3 lenses; Inspect to verify that any cracks are smaller than the critical crack size",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11\nUpdated 7-Aug-14"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-017","Optics","Struc","L3 micro-crack leads to failure","A flaw or micro-crack in the glass on the inner surface could cause a failure of the lens, since it is under continuous stress due to vacuum/purge pressure loads",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10745  \n1. Perform fracture analysis to determine the largest acceptable crack size; use large factors of safety (limit max differential pressure per Haz # 19) (AR coating will provide limited protection for unintended contact)\n2. Perform period inspections to verify surface condition",3,"E",null,null,"Inspection","Qual and proof test L3 lenses; Inspect to verify that any cracks are smaller than the critical crack size",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-018","Optics","Matl's","Damage to sixth filter in storage","If the off-camera filter is not stored in a controlled environment, then it could be scratched or its coating irretrievably damaged",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Store off-line filter in the Manual Changer under a purge to physically and environmentally protect it",3,"E",null,null,"Audit","Check that Manual Changer use and storage procedures are used"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-018","Optics","Matl's","Damage to sixth filter in storage","If the off-camera filter is not stored in a controlled environment, then it could be scratched or its coating irretrievably damaged",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Store off-line filter in the Manual Changer under a purge to physically and environmentally protect it",3,"E",null,null,"Audit","Check that Manual Changer use and storage procedures are used",null,"Y","2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Opt-019","Optics","Mech","Filter or L3 metal to glass contact","If the optic shifts in its mount (due to not having any deterministic hard-stops in the present design), the optic could impact with the metal frame, creating a stress concentration and crack in the optic.",2,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","By incorporating a polymer hardstop into the opto-mechanical design, the motion of the glass is physically prevented from impacting the metal.  Instead, the glass would impact with the softer polymer material",3,"E",null,null,"Audit","Review manufacturing logs to verify that the polymer hardstops have been installed in the assembly.",null,"Added 8/7/14"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Opt-019","Optics","Mech","Filter or L3 metal to glass contact","If the optic shifts in its mount (due to not having any deterministic hard-stops in the present design), the optic could impact with the metal frame, creating a stress concentration and crack in the optic.",2,"D",null,null,"Eliminate hazard","By incorporating a polymer hardstop into the opto-mechanical design, the motion of the glass is physically prevented from impacting the metal.  Instead, the glass would impact with the softer polymer material",3,"E",null,null,"Audit","Review manufacturing logs to verify that the polymer hardstops have been installed in the assembly.",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-002","Sensor","Struc","Sensor thermal excursion outside of safe range","failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Redundant attachment features withlocking features or equilavent to prevent loosening",3,"D",null,null,"Process control","Monitor temperature during acceptance testing"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-002","Sensor","Struc","Sensor thermal excursion outside of safe range","Failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Redundant attachment features withlocking features or equilavent to prevent loosening",3,"D",null,null,"Process control","Monitor temperature during acceptance testing",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-004","Sensor","Elec","ESD during acceptance testing damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages sensors",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10794  (spare sensors)",3,"D",null,null,"Audit","see Hazard Report",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-004","Sensor","Elec","ESD during acceptance testing damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages sensors",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10794  (spare sensors)",3,"D",null,null,"Audit","See LCA-10794",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-005","Sensor","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from materials in test dewar","Materials or parts with volatile compounds outgass contamination that plates onto sensors, possibly damaging them permanently",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Implelment LCA_279, Contamination Control Plan and use Hazard Report LCA-10741 as a guide  (spare sensors)",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-005","Sensor","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from materials in test dewar","Materials or parts with volatile compounds outgas contamination that plates onto sensors, possibly damaging them permanently",3,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Implelment LCA-279, Contamination Control Plan and use Hazard Report LCA-10741 as a guide  (spare sensors)",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","See LCA-279 and LCA-10794",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-006","Sensor","Elec","Input voltage out of range in test readout system","An input voltage is over-voltage and  damages the CCD",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","Over-voltage proctection on test system power supplies",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Verify that over-voltage protection is operational"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-006","Sensor","Elec","Input voltage out of range in test readout system","An input voltage is over-voltage and  damages the CCD",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","Over-voltage proctection on test system power supplies",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Verify that over-voltage protection is operational",null,"Y","2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-007","Sensor","Elec","CCD power on sequence in test readout system","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed ",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747",3,"E",null,null,"Test","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-007","Sensor","Elec","CCD power on sequence in test readout system","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed ",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747",3,"E",null,null,"Test","See Hazard Report",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-008","Sensor","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up in test dewar","contamination due to condensation onto sensors  causing damage",3,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",3,"D",null,null,"Process control","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-008","Sensor","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up in test dewar","Contamination due to condensation onto sensors  causing damage",3,"D",null,null,"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",3,"D",null,null,"Process control","See Hazard Report",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-012","Sensor","Elec","Gate over-voltage on EO test stand","Excursions of transistor gates in the  CCD readout  structures  outside their allowable range could damage sensor",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10794,    Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure controls ",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify safety features and procidures"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-012","Sensor","Elec","Gate over-voltage on EO test stand","Excursions of transistor gates in the  CCD readout  structures  outside their allowable range could damage sensor",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10794    \nShorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure controls ",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify safety features and procidures",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Sensor-015","Sensor","Press/Vac","Test Stand #3 Dewar hazards","Personnel hazard associated with the Test Stand # 3 Dewar inclued: ODH, cryo burns, personel injury due to window failure durng purge  ",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Implement BNL occupational safety standards including: ODH analysis and monitoring if required, analysis of chamber and PRV for purge system,  training and PPE for work with cryogens",2,"D",null,null,"Review","Safety reviews to verify implementation of safety plans and requirements",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Sensor-015","Sensor","Press/Vac","Test Stand #3 Dewar hazards","Personnel hazard associated with the Test Stand # 3 Dewar inclued: ODH, cryo burns, personel injury due to window failure durng purge  ",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Implement BNL occupational safety standards including: ODH analysis and monitoring if required, analysis of chamber and PRV for purge system,  training and PPE for work with cryogens",2,"D",null,null,"Review","Safety reviews to verify implementation of safety plans and requirements",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Sensor-016","Sensor","Env","MOSFET radio- sensitivity","Local use of portable radios can RF power at certain frequencies near the focal plane, causing sensor interference or damage ",2,"C",null,null,"Warning device","Post signs prohibiting radio use in vulnerable dome areas (in front of Camera) until  MOSFET effects are quantified",2,"D",null,null,"Inspection","View postings",null,null,"2017-08-01"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-001","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower outside min/max operating temp range","Thermal excursion exceeeds allowable limits resulting in damage to electronics or sensors ",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10795",3,"E",null,null,"Test","see Hazard Report","CPS",41724]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,"x",null,"x",null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-001","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","Raft Tower outside min/max operating temp range","Thermal excursion exceeeds allowable limits resulting in damage to electronics or sensors ",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Employ automated shutdown/safe-state system timed after automated notifications for temperature excursion (See Hazard Report LCA-10795)",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Test notification and shutdown automations","CPS",null,"2017-07-20"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-002","Sci Raft","Struc","Dropping a raft","Failure of the springs or attach hardware drops raft onto L3 or swings it over into neighboring sensors  (redesign of hold-down no cam-lock in new design)",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Design raft with appropriate FOS in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","Verify design meets requirements with QA program establilshed in LCA-138 Performance Safety Assurance Plan (PSAP) ",null,"Revised 25-Mar-14"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-002","Sci Raft","Struc","Dropping a raft","Failure of the springs or attach hardware drops raft onto L3 or swings it over into neighboring sensors  (redesign of hold-down no cam-lock in new design)",2,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Design raft with appropriate FOS in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard",2,"E",null,null,"Process control","Verify design meets requirements with QA program establilshed in LCA-138 Performance Safety Assurance Plan (PSAP) ",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-003","Sci Raft","Struc","Drop raft at load transfer","Mechancial components that have a single failure mode, casuing the raft to fall onto L3 or swing into neighboring rafts / sensors",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Design raft with appropriate FOS in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard, Design fixtures and tooling with appropriate FOS, establish procedures",2,"D",null,null,"Process control","Verify design meets requirements with QA program establilshed in LCA-138 Performance Safety Assurance Plan (PSAP), test procedures with prototype",null,"Revised 25-Mar-14"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-003","Sci Raft","Struc","Drop raft at load transfer","Mechancial components that have a single failure mode, casuing the raft to fall onto L3 or swing into neighboring rafts / sensors",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Design raft with appropriate FOS in accordance with LCA-280, Mechanical Standard, Design fixtures and tooling with appropriate FOS, establish procedures",2,"D",null,null,"Process control","Verify design meets requirements with QA program establilshed in LCA-138 Performance Safety Assurance Plan (PSAP), test procedures with prototype",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-004","Sci Raft","Struc","Drop sensor off raft","Failure of attachment studs or nuts  causes sensor to fall off raft",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and designed with high margins of safety; design per mechancial standard LCA-280",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Run strength qualification tests on the stud design, and on the full sensor mech assembly",null,"Revised 25-Mar-14"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-004","Sci Raft","Struc","Drop sensor off raft","Failure of attachment studs or nuts  causes sensor to fall off raft",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and designed with high margins of safety; design per mechancial standard LCA-280",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Run strength qualification tests on the stud design, and on the full sensor mech assembly",null,null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-005","Sci Raft","Elec","Over-current damage to REB or sensor or raft","Loss of a sensor or raft due to uncontrolled short to ground or over-current condition",3,"D",null,null,"Safety device","Over-current protection in power supplies protect REB and  raft from short",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Run qualification test on system","CPS","Revised 25 Mar 14"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-005","Sci Raft","Elec","Over-current damage to REB or sensor or raft","Loss of a sensor or raft due to uncontrolled short to ground or over-current condition",3,"D",null,null,"Safety device","Over-current protection in power supplies protect REB and  raft from short",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Run qualification test on system","CPS",null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-006","Sci Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower",3,"B",null,null,"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10794  ",3,"D",null,null,"Audit","see Hazard Report",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-006","Sci Raft","Elec","ESD damages sensor circuits","Electrostatic discharge damages/destroys electronics in raft tower",3,"B",null,null,"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10794. ESD damage is controlled in the Cleanroom by maintaining EPAs, which are labeled. Grounding Monitors and other EPA equipment, such as ESD table mats and air ionizers, are used, maintained and tested in accordance with LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations). CCD and raft electronics are grounded to the same potention when integrating in accordance with procedures. ",3,"D",null,null,"Audit","See Hazard Report LCA-10794",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-007","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from materials","Materials or parts with volatile compounds outgas vapor that plates onto sensors, possibly damaging them permanently",1,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",2,"D",null,null,"Process control","see Hazard Report"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-007","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from materials","Materials or parts with volatile compounds outgas vapor that plates onto sensors, possibly damaging them permanently",1,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741. Staff shall be trained in proper cleaning and handling techniques and procedures, including LCA-13493 (Cleaning Standards), LCA-14987 (Process Control), LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations), and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706.",2,"D",null,null,"Process control","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-008","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by by-products of component failure","An electronic component fails energeticaly producing smoke, contaminating the sensors",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",2,"D",null,null,"Process control","see Hazard Report",null,41724]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-008","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by by-products of component failure","An electronic component fails energeticaly producing smoke, contaminating the sensors",1,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",2,"D",null,null,"Process control","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-009","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by cross-contamination","Contaminants are introduced to a raft tower and subsequently contaminate sensors",1,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",2,"D",null,null,"Audit","see Hazard Report",null,41724]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-009","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by cross-contamination","Contaminants are introduced to a raft tower and subsequently contaminate sensors",1,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","See Hazard Report LCA-10741. Staff shall be trained in proper cleaning and handling techniques and procedures, including L:CA-13493 (Cleaning Standards), LCA-14987 (Process Control), LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations), and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706.",2,"D",null,null,"Audit","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-010","Sci Raft","Struc","Sensor damaged by small part","Screw backs out or electronic component breaks off under thermal cycling, dropping onto sensor backside",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Design / choice of lock harwdare, installation torque / procedures.  Contamination barriers that separate REB space from CCD space are rigid enough to protect sensors. Verify electronic component assembly to IPC3 standards. All fasteners to use locking device.",3,"E",null,null,"Test","thermal cycle mechancial / electrical testing ",null,"Revised 25-Mar-14"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-010","Sci Raft","Struc","Sensor damaged by small part","Screw backs out or electronic component breaks off under thermal cycling, dropping onto sensor backside",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","Design / choice of lock harwdare, installation torque / procedures.  Contamination barriers that separate REB space from CCD space are rigid enough to protect sensors. Verify electronic component assembly to IPC3 standards. All fasteners to use locking device.",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Thermal cycle mechancial / electrical testing ",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-011","Sci Raft","Elec","Input voltage out of range","An input voltage to the REB is over-voltage and  damages the FPGA, components on the board, or CCD",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","Over-voltage proctection on power supplies",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Verify that over-voltage protection is operational","CPS","Revised 23-Apr-13"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-011","Sci Raft","Elec","Input voltage out of range","An input voltage to the REB is over-voltage and  damages the FPGA, components on the board, or CCD",3,"C",null,null,"Safety device","Over-voltage proctection on power supplies",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Verify that over-voltage protection is operational","CPS",null,"2014-09-09"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-012","Sci Raft","Elec","CCD power on sequence","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed ",2,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747",2,"D",null,null,"Test","see Hazard Report",null,41724]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-012","Sci Raft","Elec","CCD power on sequence","OG should be #3 in the power-on order; if not the CCD could be damaged/destroyed ",2,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747",2,"D",null,null,"Test","Produce test reports for code and firmware controls",null,null,"2017-05-03"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-013","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up","CCD's preferentially getter contaminant during warm-up since it can't keep up with ramp-up rate of Cryo Plate and Grid, causing degradation in sensor performance",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",2,"D",null,null,"Test","see Hazard Report",null,41724]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-013","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","CCD cold contamination during ramp-up","CCDs receive getter contaminants during warm-up since getter can't keep up with ramp-up rate of Cryo Plate and Grid, causing degradation in sensor performance",2,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741 ",2,"D",null,null,"Test","See Hazard Report",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-014","Sci Raft","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable and REB",4,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Assembly procedures ensure proper connector mating and handling",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system.",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-014","Sci Raft","Elec","Damage to CCD connector pins","Connector pins can be bent through handling or improper mating, causing shorts or permanent damage to the connector; applies to connectors on the CCD flex cable and REB",4,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Staff shall be trained in proper handling techniques and handling procedures, including LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations) and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations).",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system.",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-015","Sci Raft","Struc","Mechanical damage to REB's","Boards can be mechanically damaged during handling causing solder joint hairline cracks or other componet structural damage",4,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Assembly procedures ensure proper procedures during handling",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system.",null,"Y","y"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-015","Sci Raft","Struc","Mechanical damage to REB's","Boards can be mechanically damaged during handling causing solder joint hairline cracks or other componet structural damage",4,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","Staff shall be trained in proper handling techniques and handling procedures, including LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations) and eTravelers. The 2-person rule shall be followed in accordance with LCA-11706 (Cleanroom Operations).",4,"E",null,null,"Test","Verify electrical connectivity and electro-optical performance during Test Stand 7 and Test Stand 8.  All test results and data are logged into the eTraveler system.",null,"Y","2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-016","Sci Raft","Elec","Back substrate voltage","Drains are \"off\" and BS is \"On\" could cause a destructive current to appear ",2,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA 10747,  Enable/Shorting  switch on  REB on allows application of BS after stable conditions satisfied - firmware and/or hardware control  from CABAC",2,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,41723]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-016","Sci Raft","Elec","Back substrate voltage","Drains are \"off\" and BS is \"On\" could cause a destructive current to appear ",2,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA 10747  Enable/Shorting  switch on  REB on allows application of BS after stable conditions satisfied - firmware and/or hardware control ",2,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,"2017-05-01"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-018","Sci Raft","Elec","Gate over-voltage","Excursions of transistor gates in the  CCD readout  structures  outside their allowable range could damage sensor",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10794,    Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller and REB outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller  or  REB at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure control - per LCA-10794.",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,41723]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-018","Sci Raft","Elec","Gate over-voltage","Excursions of transistor gates in the  CCD readout  structures  outside their allowable range could damage sensor",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10794,    Shorting plugs  are used on the  CCD cables during transport and storage. All commercial controller and REB outputs to CCD  gates have  protection diodes so it is  necessary and  sufficient to put  the  CCD and the controller  or  REB at  the same potential  prior  to connection using fixturing and procedure control - per LCA-10794.",3,"D",null,null,"Test","See LCA-10032. Audit ESD Program",null,null,"2017-05-03"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-019","Sci Raft","Elec","Power On & Back Bias activation","Activating the Back Substrate (step 5) before the Bias voltages (step 2) are set to minimal values may cause damage to the sensors",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","Same as Sci Raft 120.",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,41723]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-019","Sci Raft","Elec","Power On & Back Bias activation","Activating the Back Substrate (step 5) before the Bias voltages (step 2) are set to minimal values may cause damage to the sensors",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","See Hazard Report LCA-10747",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify firmware tests for each raft (See Hazard Report 10747)",null,null,"2017-05-03"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-020","Sci Raft","Elec","On board circuit failure","On board circuit internal failure could cause damage to a sensor ",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","Reliability issue. Addressed by  design,  calculation and lifetime testing of on board circuits - addressed in electronics reliability plan.",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,41723]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-020","Sci Raft","Elec","On board circuit failure","On board circuit internal failure could cause damage to a sensor ",3,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","Reliability issue. Addressed by  design,  calculation and lifetime testing of on board circuits - addressed in electronics reliability plan.",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,"2015-07-17"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-021","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from electronics due to overheating","Over heating of the electronics could cause outgassing/damage to the focal plane ",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Hazard Report LCA-10741",3,"D",null,null,"Test","see Hazard Report","CPS",41724]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-021","Sci Raft","Matl's","Sensors damaged by outgassing from electronics due to overheating","Over heating of the electronics could cause outgassing and damage to the focal plane ",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","See Hazard Report LCA-10741",3,"D",null,null,"Test","See Hazard Report LCA-10741","CPS",null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-022","Sci Raft","Struc","Sensor loses thermal contact to raft","failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and will have lock washer, or equivalent to prevent loosening.",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Run thermal cycling tests on the full sensor mech assembly",null,"Revised 25-Mar-14"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"x",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-022","Sci Raft","Struc","Sensor loses thermal contact to raft","Failure of attachment studs or nuts due to thermal cycling causes sensor to lose thermal contact and overheat",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Threaded studs are 3-for-2 redundant, and will have lock washer, or equivalent to prevent loosening.",3,"E",null,null,"Process control","Run thermal cycling tests on the full sensor mech assembly",null,null,"2016-12-15"]
[]
["Changed"]
[null,"Srft-023","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","REB under-temperature","Unpowered REBs can suffer undertemperatures should the cold plate heater fail while cryoplate cooling continues running",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Put in place active monitoring and controls to shut down cryoplate and cold plate cooling upon cold plate under temperature",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify shutoff is effected by coldplate failure","CPS"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"x"]
[null,"Srft-023","Sci Raft","Therm/Cryo","REB under-temperature","Unpowered REBs can suffer undertemperatures should the cold plate heater fail while cryoplate cooling continues running",3,"C",null,null,"Control hazard","Put in place active monitoring and controls to shut down cryoplate and cold plate cooling upon cold plate under temperature",3,"D",null,null,"Test","Verify shutoff is effected by coldplate failure","CPS","Y","2015-07-17"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Srft-024","Sci Raft","Env","Overhumidity in clean room","Condensate from too-high humidity in clean roomcan collect on sensors, damaging sensors",3,"D",null,null,"Warning device","Assign equipment monitoring staff for all activities. Upon humidity alarm, follow response procedures to place equipment into a safe state. ",3,"E",null,null,"Test","Test humidity alarm system",null,"Y","2017-03-01"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,"Sfrt-025","Sci Raft","Env","Ambient particle count too high","In clean room, airborne particles from any source can accumulate and damage hardware",3,"D",null,null,"Warning device","Assign equipment monitoring staff for all activities. Upon particle count alarm during exposure, follow response procedures to place equipment into a safe state. ",2,"D",null,null,"Test","Test particle counter alarm",null,"Y","2017-03-01"]
[]
["Only in file 2"]
[null,196,"Total","OK","Cross-check",null,null,"2A"]
[]
["Only in file 1"]
[null,"Cryo-015","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Overpressure due to orifice ice plug, inadvertent valve-off, or pinched line causes rupture in a line",3,"D",null,null,"Control hazard","1-Design entire system to max pressure differential of compressor plus safety factor\n2-incorporate bust discs and or pressure relief valves\n3-enusre system only connected to charge bottles with max PSI beloew system limt.\n4-if ever connected to purge or backfill system ensure that auxilary system is protected from over pressure via burst disc, pressure reliefe valve(s) and / or max charge system limit.",3,"E",null,null,"Test","1-Pressure test relief valves and verify burst disc parameters\n2- ensure documentation defines requirements for component connection and parameters of operation\n",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11"]
[]
["Only in file 1"]
[null,"Opt-005","Optics","Struc","L1-L2 Assembly strut flexure failure","Failure of a flexure due to overloading during torquing or adjusting the assembly beyond the angular working range of the flexure",1,"C",null,null,"Procedure, training","1. Design flexure with a safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to carry operational and handling loads.    2. Follow strut adjustment procedures and use dedicated tooling; monitor offset angles",1,"D",null,null,"Test","1. Proof test flexures individually and as a set, at extremes of their range.    2. Qualify adjustment tooling and procedures to check for overloading of flexure",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11","y"]
[]
["Only in file 1"]
[null,"Srft-017","Sci Raft","Elec","Output Drain and Output Diode voltage","Output Drain and Output Diode :  always + with respect to FSS. Forward biasing of junction will cause damage of sensor ",2,"C",null,null,"Safety feature","Add diode to prevent these from going very negative (>0.3V) ",2,"E",null,null,"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,"Revised 23-Apr-13"]

{"sheet":"usedids","index":5,"n_rows":57,"n_cols":10,"rows_kept":57,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["Sensor_Hazards.xlsm","SciRaft_Hazards.xlsm","Optics_Hazards.xlsm","IandT_Hazards.xlsm","EXCH_Hazards.xlsm","ELX_Hazards.xlsm","Cryostat_Hazards.xlsm","CornerRaft_Hazards.xlsm","CCS_Hazards.xlsm","CBM_Hazards.xlsm"]
["Sensor-001","Srft-001","Opt-001","IT-001","EXCH-003","ELX-001","Cryo-001","Crft-001","CCS-001","CB&M-001"]
["Sensor-002","Srft-002","Opt-002","IT-002","EXCH-004","ELX-002","Cryo-002","Crft-002",null,"CB&M-002"]
["Sensor-003","Srft-003","Opt-003","IT-003","EXCH-005","ELX-003","Cryo-003","Crft-003",null,"CB&M-003"]
["Sensor-004","Srft-004","Opt-004","IT-004","EXCH-006","ELX-004","Cryo-004","Crft-004",null,"CB&M-004"]
["Sensor-005","Srft-005","Opt-006","IT-005","EXCH-007","ELX-005","Cryo-005","Crft-005",null,"CB&M-005"]
["Sensor-006","Srft-006","Opt-007","IT-006","EXCH-008",null,"Cryo-006","Crft-006",null,"CB&M-006"]
["Sensor-007","Srft-007","Opt-008","IT-007","EXCH-009",null,"Cryo-007","Crft-007",null,"CB&M-007"]
["Sensor-008","Srft-008","Opt-009","IT-008","EXCH-010",null,"Cryo-008","Crft-008",null,"CB&M-008"]
["Sensor-009","Srft-009","Opt-010","IT-009","EXCH-011",null,"Cryo-009","Crft-009",null,"CB&M-009"]
["Sensor-010","Srft-010","Opt-011","IT-010","EXCH-012",null,"Cryo-010","Crft-010",null,"CB&M-010"]
["Sensor-011","Srft-011","Opt-012","IT-011","EXCH-013",null,"Cryo-011","Crft-011",null,"CB&M-011"]
["Sensor-012","Srft-012","Opt-013","IT-012","EXCH-014",null,"Cryo-012","Crft-012",null,"CB&M-012"]
["Sensor-013","Srft-013","Opt-014","IT-013","EXCH-017",null,"Cryo-013","Crft-013",null,"CB&M-013"]
["Sensor-014","Srft-014","Opt-015","IT-014","EXCH-018",null,"Cryo-014","Crft-014",null,"CB&M-014"]
["Sensor-015","Srft-015","Opt-016","IT-015","EXCH-019",null,"Cryo-015","Crft-015"]
["Sensor-016","Srft-016","Opt-017","IT-016","EXCH-020",null,"Cryo-016"]
[null,"Srft-018","Opt-018","IT-017","EXCH-021",null,"Cryo-017"]
[null,"Srft-019","Opt-019","IT-018","EXCH-022",null,"Cryo-018"]
[null,"Srft-020",null,"IT-019","EXCH-023",null,"Cryo-019"]
[null,"Srft-021",null,"IT-020",null,null,"Cryo-020"]
[null,"Srft-022",null,"IT-021",null,null,"Cryo-021"]
[null,"Srft-023",null,"IT-022",null,null,"Cryo-022"]
[null,"Srft-024",null,"IT-023",null,null,"Cryo-023"]
[null,"Srft-025",null,"IT-024",null,null,"Cryo-024"]
[null,null,null,"IT-025",null,null,"Cryo-025"]
[null,null,null,"IT-026",null,null,"Cryo-026"]
[null,null,null,"IT-027",null,null,"Cryo-027"]
[null,null,null,"IT-028",null,null,"Cryo-028"]
[null,null,null,"IT-029",null,null,"Cryo-029"]
[null,null,null,"IT-030",null,null,"Cryo-030"]
[null,null,null,"IT-031",null,null,"Cryo-031"]
[null,null,null,"IT-032",null,null,"Cryo-032"]
[null,null,null,"IT-033",null,null,"Cryo-033"]
[null,null,null,"IT-034",null,null,"Cryo-034"]
[null,null,null,"IT-035",null,null,"Cryo-035"]
[null,null,null,"IT-036",null,null,"Cryo-036"]
[null,null,null,"IT-037",null,null,"Cryo-037"]
[null,null,null,"IT-038",null,null,"Cryo-039"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,"Cryo-040"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,"Cryo-041"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,"Cryo-042"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,"Cryo-043"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,"Cryo-045"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,"Cryo-046"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,"Cryo-047"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,"Cryo-048"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,"Cryo-049"]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
["Obseleted hazards are in italics"]

{"sheet":"Obselete","index":6,"n_rows":11,"n_cols":22,"rows_kept":11,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["Obsoleted Hazard List items"]
[null,"EXCH-001","Filter-X","Therm/Cryo","Carousel drive motor over-heating","This hazard is no longer current it is incorporated into hazard EXCH-021",4,"C",18,"Low","Safety device","Torque monitor on motor drive shaft shuts off motor before reaching stall torque\nCurrent monitor shuts off motor if current exceeds a pre-tested max value",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Test torque and current monitors as part of carousel proof test ",null,41702,null,"2015-07-14"]
[null,"EXCH-002","Filter-X","Therm/Cryo","Changer drive motor over-heating","This hazard is no longer current it is incorporated into hazard EXCH-021",4,"C",18,"Low","Safety device","Torque monitor on motor drive shaft shuts off motor before reaching stall torque\nCurrent monitor shuts off motor if current exceeds a pre-tested max value",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Test torque and current monitors as part of carousel proof test ",null,41702,null,"2015-07-14"]
[null,"EXCH-015","Filter-X","Mech","Driving filter off the end of Auto Changer rails","This hazard is eliminated due to the design change that eliminated the flip rails",4,"E",20,"Low","Safety device","Limit switches on the flip rail positively determine when the rail is in place and ready; these provide an \"enable\" signal to allow the Auto Changer to move",4,"E",20,"Low","Test","Run acceptance tests to verify that limit switches prevent motions that would lead to driving off the rail",null,41712,null,"2015-07-14"]
[null,"EXCH-016","Filter-X","Mech","Flip Rails fail, dropping a filter","This hazard is eliminated due to the design change that eliminated the flip rails",4,"E",20,"Low","Eliminate hazard","Latch mechanism on the flip rails are normally-latched or bi-stable overcenter latches which prevent flip rails from rotating, even at loss of power",4,"E",20,"Low","Process control","Proof test the flip rail mechanism to ensure it cannot flip flat due to an accidental overload",null,41712,null,"2015-07-14"]
[null,"Cryo-015","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","Item eliminated: broken out into items Cryo-25 thru Cryo-44, inclusive-(Overpressure due to orifice ice plug, inadvertent valve-off, or pinched line causes rupture in a line)",3,"D",14,"Medium","Control hazard","1-Design entire system to max pressure differential of compressor plus safety factor\n2-incorporate bust discs and or pressure relief valves\n3-enusre system only connected to charge bottles with max PSI beloew system limt.\n4-if ever connected to purge or backfill system ensure that auxilary system is protected from over pressure via burst disc, pressure reliefe valve(s) and / or max charge system limit.",3,"E",17,"Medium","Test","1-Pressure test relief valves and verify burst disc parameters\n2- ensure documentation defines requirements for component connection and parameters of operation\n",null,null,null,"2016-05-05"]
[null,"Opt-005","Optics","Struc","L1-L2 Assembly strut flexure failure","Failure of a flexure due to overloading during torquing or adjusting the assembly beyond the angular working range of the flexure",1,"C",4,"High","Procedure, training","1. Design flexure with a safety factor  in accordance with Mech Standard LCA-280 to carry operational and handling loads.    2. Follow strut adjustment procedures and use dedicated tooling; monitor offset angles",1,"D",8,"Serious","Test","1. Proof test flexures individually and as a set, at extremes of their range.    2. Qualify adjustment tooling and procedures to check for overloading of flexure",null,"Revised 4-Oct-11","y","2016-03-01"]
[null,"Cryo-038","Refrig","Press/Vac","Refrig system overpressure","(Simultaneous improperly-closed valves in vapor supply line and liquid supply line at or near Camera causes increased supply line pressures and damages compressor) Retired per D. Hascall and B. Qiu",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Safety device","Install pressure relief valve to  prevent over pressure",3,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":10},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test pressure relief valve  ",null,null,null,"2017-08-01"]
[null,"Cryo-044","Refrig","Mech","Flow switch failure","(Flow switch failures noted during prototyping could cause unwanted summit down time.) Retired per D. Hascall and B. Qiu",3,"B",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Control hazard","Replace extant flow switched with more reliable thermal switch",3,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Test replacement thermal switch to assure improved reliability",null,null,null,"2017-05-18"]
[null,"ELX-006","Cam Bdy","Struc","Access platform failure","(Careless use of the proposed   UT access platform could exceed the 100kg maximum load limit, placing personnel at risk of falling from the platform) Hazard is tied Observatory and transferred accordingly. ",2,"D",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":6},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Serious"},"Control hazard","Design platform to support >=200 kg. to accommodate, e.g., a heavy worker and large toolbox ",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Review","Review platform design (Proposed to move this item to Observatory hazard list.)",null,null,null,"2017-08-01"]
[null,"Srft-017","Sci Raft","Elec","Output Drain and Output Diode voltage","(Output Drain and Output Diode :  always + with respect to FSS. Forward biasing of junction will cause damage of sensor) Retired per P. Doherty and B. Wahl",2,"C",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":11},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity]&Hazards[Probability],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Safety feature","Add diode to prevent these from going very negative (>0.3V) ",2,"E",{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,2,FALSE)","v":17},{"$f":"VLOOKUP(Hazards[Severity1]&Hazards[Probability1],CategoryLookup,3,FALSE)","v":"Medium"},"Test","Verify safety feature operates",null,null,null,"2017-06-14"]